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HARNESSING PRIVATE REGULATION
Lesley K. McAllister *
In private regulation, private actors make, implement, and enforce rules that
serve traditional public goals. While private safety standards have a long history,
private social and environmental regulation in the forms of self-regulation, supply chain contracting, and voluntary certification and labeling programs have
proliferated in the past couple decades. This expansion of private regulation raises
the question of how it might be harnessed by public actors to build better regulatory regimes. This Article tackles this question first by identifying three forms of
strong harnessing: public incorporation of private standards, public endorsement
of self-regulation, and third-party verification. It then analyzes eight third-party
verification programs established by six federal regulatory agencies to derive lessons about what makes a program successful and to develop recommendations to
federal agencies about when and how they should use third-party verification.
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INTRODUCTION
Private regulation is a large and growing field of regulatory activity. 1
Industry associations set health and safety standards for their member
companies. Companies with global supply chains establish codes of conduct
for their foreign suppliers regarding treatment of workers and the environment. Companies join voluntary programs that certify and label their
consumer products to indicate compliance with social and environmental
criteria. Private auditors are hired to assess corporate compliance with rules
and standards developed by both governments and private entities. In all
these forms of private regulation, private actors engage in developing and
implementing rules that serve the traditional social goals of public regulation, particularly health, safety, and environmental protection. 2
Private regulation is often viewed as an alternative to public regulation. 3 It tends to develop where there are gaps in public regulation. 4 Private
environmental governance has thrived in the United States, for example, in
the absence of significant new legislation. 5 Gaps may also be present because existing governmental institutions cannot reach certain activity.
Economic globalization has been an important driver of private regulation
because governmental actors lack sufficient authority to regulate against
many of the negative social externalities of international economic activity. 6
1.
See Michael P. Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, 99 CORNELL L.
REV. 129, 140–41 (2013) (discussing the “large number of private environmental governance
initiatives that have emerged”); see also infra notes 37–40 and associated text.
2.
Vandenbergh, supra note 1, at 147 (referring to private governance as the “development and enforcement by private parties of requirements designed to achieve traditionally
governmental ends”). On the distinction between social regulation and economic regulation,
see Keith Hawkins, Rule and Discretion in Comparative Perspective: The Case of Social Regulation, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 663 (1989) (distinguishing social regulation from other forms of
regulatory control that seek to control markets or other aspects of economic life); Cass R.
Sunstein, Administrative Substance, 1991 DUKE L.J. 607, 609 (identifying health, safety,
broadcasting, discrimination, and the environment as areas of social regulation and
distinguishing social regulation from economic regulation). While much of its analysis may
also apply to economic regulation, this Article limits its focus to social regulation.
3.
As others have discussed, the lines between public and private blur upon examination. See especially Jody Freeman, Private Parties, Public Functions and the New Administrative
Law, in RECRAFTING THE RULE OF LAW: THE LIMITS OF LEGAL ORDER 331 (David
Dyzenhaus ed., 1999); Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for the New
Religion, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1229, 1229 n.1 (2003). However, these terms continue to be
useful as “shorthand for describing different kinds of regulatory actors.” Freeman, supra, at
334 n.13.
4.
Cf. Michael P. Vandenbergh, The New Wal-Mart Effect: The Role of Private Contracting in Global Governance, 54 UCLA L. REV. 913, 919 (2007).
5.
See Vandenbergh, supra note 1, at 133.
6.
Cf. Fabrizio Cafaggi, New Foundations of Transnational Private Regulation, 38 J.L. &
SOC’Y 20 (2011) (discussing drivers of transnational private regulation); Frederick Mayer &
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Even when public actors have the power to regulate, companies or industries may develop private regulation in an attempt to address public
concerns and preempt new governmental regulation. 7 Commonly cited
benefits of enabling private actors to exercise functions that would otherwise be carried out by public actors include enhancing pluralism, better
representing interests, increasing expertise, and reducing governmental
bureaucracy and cost. 8
Less examined are the ways that private regulation may be coordinated
and even integrated with public regulation. 9 Public regulation suffers from
many well-documented deficiencies. Rulemaking has been described as
ossified. 10 Regulatory implementation is subject to slippage. 11 Enforcement
is unreliable and agencies lack data to assess compliance. 12 Regulatory agencies endure budget constraints and downsizing. 13 In this context, an apt
Gary Gereffi, Regulation and Economic Globalization: Prospects and Limits of Private Governance, 12 BUS. & POL., no. 3, art. 11, 2010 at 1, 3 (explaining that private governance responds
to the public governance deficit in the face of economic globalization); David Vogel, The
Private Regulation of Global Corporate Conduct: Achievement and Limitations, 49 BUS. & SOC’Y
68, 72–73 (2010).
7.
Responsible Care, which was established in the wake of the Bhopal disaster, has
been viewed as an example of this. Thomas P. Lyon & John W. Maxwell, “Voluntary” Approaches to Environmental Regulation: A Survey, in ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS AND
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: PAST PRESENT AND FUTURE 75, 79 (Maurizio Franzini & Antonio Nicita eds., 2002); see also ROSS E. CHEIT, SETTING SAFETY STANDARDS: REGULATION
IN THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS 179–80 (1990) (discussing private regulatory action
taken with the intention o� forestalling governmental regulation).
8.
David M. Lawrence, Private Exercise of Governmental Power, 61 IND. L.J. 647, 651–
57 (1986); see also Minow, supra note 3, at 1242–46 (citing potential increases in quality of
public services, incentives for improvement, pluralism, and new knowledge).
9.
An important body o� legal scholarship has recognized the many public functions
that private actors fulfill, but there has been little work on how public and private regulation
can be coordinated and integrated. Key works include Freeman, supra note 3; Jody Freeman,
Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1286–87 (2003);
Minow, supra note 3; WILLIAM J. NOVAK, Public-Private Governance: A Historical Introduction,
in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (Jody Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 2009).
10.
Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L.
REV. 1, 9 (1997); Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process,
41 DUKE L.J. 1385 (1992).
11.
Daniel A. Farber, Taking Slippage Seriously: Noncompliance and Creative Compliance
in Environmental Law, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 297 (1999).
12.
Victor B. Flatt & Paul M. Collins, Jr., Environmental Enforcement in Dire Straits:
There Is No Protection for Nothing and No Data for Free, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 55, 86
(2010).
13.
Sidney A. Shapiro & Rena Steinzor, Capture, Accountability, and Regulatory Metrics,
86 TEX. L. REV. 1741, 1756–59 (2008); Paul Verkuil, Outsourcing and the Duty to Govern, in
GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 310, 311 (Jody
Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 2009).
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question is whether public and private regulation can be combined to create
more robust regulatory regimes. 14 More specifically, this Article addresses
whether and how private regulation can be leveraged—or harnessed—by
public regulators to achieve the objectives of public law. 15 By relying on the
mechanisms and institutions of private regulation, public regulators may be
able to regulate more effectively. 16
Such harnessing has been recognized as a possibility by other scholars,
but little analysis exists regarding how public regulators can design regulatory regimes that include significant roles for private actors. 17 As one
commentator has stated, “scholarship on new regulatory forms has produced
far more empirical research on their rise and character than on their translation into practice.” 18 To the extent that legal scholars have considered how
private regulation can be leveraged to serve public goals, they have focused
primarily on the constitutionality of private delegations and the incorporation of private standards. 19 Much less has been written about designing
14.
On the concept of a regulatory regime, see DAVID LEVI-FAUR, Regulation &
Regulatory Governance, in HANDBOOK ON THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 13–14 (David
Levi-Faur ed., 2011) (“The notion of a regulatory regime encompasses the norms, the
mechanisms of decision making, and the network of actors that are involved in regulation.”);
Colin Scott, Regulating Everything: From Mega- to Meta-Regulation, 60 ADMINISTRATION 61,
67 (2012) (“A regulatory regime is the aggregation of the activities of those whose actions
shape behaviour within a particular set sector or policy domain.”).
15.
Harnessing is used herein in the sense o� leveraging or bringing into service or
incorporating, cf. David Freeman Engstrom, Harnessing the Private Attorney General: Evidence
from Qui Tam Litigation, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1244, 1253 (pointing out that harnessing can be
used in two senses: to mean either leveraging or constraining).
16.
Cf. Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543,
549 (2000) (stating that administrative law needs to reorient “toward facilitating the effectiveness of public/private regulatory regimes”).
17.
Id. (mentioning the “possibility o� harnessing private capacity to serve public
goals”); see also Tim Büthe, Global Private Politics: A Research Agenda, 12 BUS. & POL., no. 3,
art. 12, 2010 at 1, 19 (stating that it is possible that private regulation can “strengthen public
regulation, for instance if the former addresses problems that are inherently transnational
and hence cannot be effectively regulated by any one state unilaterally”); Sidney A. Shapiro,
Outsourcing Government Regulation, 53 DUKE L.J. 389 (2003) (discussing contractual standard
setting and contractual enforcement); David M. Trubek & Louise G. Trubek, New Governance & Legal Regulation: Complementarity, Rivalry, and Transformation, 13 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 1
(2006) (suggesting that transformation in the law can be achieved by yoking private and
public regulation together); see also infra notes 151–156 and associated text.
18.
Jodi L. Short & Michael W. Toffel, Making Self-Regulation More Than Merely
Symbolic: The Critical Role of the Legal Environment, 55 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 361, 365 (2010) (citing
Marc Schneiberg & Tim Bartley, Organizations, Regulation, and Economic Behavior: Regulatory
Dynamics and Forms from the Nineteenth to Twenty-First Century, 4 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI.
31, 50 (2008)).
19.
On the constitutionality of private delegations, see especially Harold I. Abramson, A Fifth Branch of Government: The Private Regulators and Their Constitutionality, 16
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 165, 168 (1989); Harold J. Krent, Fragmenting the Unitary Executive:
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public regulation to incorporate the implementation and enforcement
mechanisms that are commonly used in private regulation. 20 By analyzing
how major federal programs in the United States have been structured to
enable third-party verifiers to assess the compliance of regulated entities,
this Article helps fill that void. Moreover, the Article’s broad analytical
framework combines the insights of scholarship on private and public regulation in ways that suggest a set of criteria for designing public-private
regulatory regimes and invite further theoretical and empirical research.
In its first part, this Article explains the concept of private regulation
and analyzes the public harnessing of private regulation. This part begins
by defining private regulation and identifying how private actors engage in
standard setting, implementation, and enforcement in the most common
forms of private regulation. It then conceptualizes harnessing and distinguishes weak forms from strong forms, in which a private regulatory
function substitutes for a public regulatory function. Private standard setting, for example, is strongly harnessed when private standards are
incorporated into public regulation. Private standard setting and private
implementation are strongly harnessed when public law endorses selfregulation in various forms. And private implementation is strongly harnessed in third-party verification programs that rely on private inspectors
to monitor and assess compliance with public law. 21
The remaining three parts of the Article focus on third-party verification programs established by federal regulatory agencies. 22 In these
programs, federal agencies rely on private third parties that they have approved to provide information about the regulated entity’s compliance with

Congressional Delegations of Administrative Authority Outside the Federal Government, 85 NW. U.
L. REV. 62; Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367 (2003).
On the incorporation of private standards, see Emily S. Bremer, Incorporation by Reference in
an Open Government Age, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 131 (2013); Robert W. Hamilton, The
Role of Nongovernmental Standards in the Development of Mandatory Federal Standards Affecting
Safety or Health, 56 TEX. L. REV. 1329 (1978); Nina Mendelson, Private Control Over Access to
Public Law: The Puzzling Federal Regulatory Use of Private Standards, 112 MICH. L. REV. 737
(2014); Peter L. Strauss, Private Standards Organizations and Public Law, 22 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 497 (2013).
20.
Cf. Colin Scott, Beyond Taxonomies of Private Authority in Transnational Regulation,
13 GERMAN L. J. 1329, 1330 (2012) (noting the need to “consider also the central importance
of mechanisms of monitoring and enforcement”).
21.
See especially Lesley K. McAllister, Regulation by Third-Party Verification, 53 B.C. L.
REV. 1 (2012).
22.
These parts are closely based on a report that the author prepared for the Administrative Conference of the United States. See LESLEY K. MCALLISTER, THIRD PARTY
PROGRAMS TO ASSESS REGULATORY COMPLIANCE (2012), available at http://www.acus.gov/
sites/default/files/documents/Third-Party-Programs-Report_Final.pdf.
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applicable standards. 23 While not an entirely new practice, third-party
verification seems to be increasingly attractive to Congress and federal
agencies in light of inadequate agency resources and other persistent barriers to reliably monitoring regulatory compliance. 24 The Article’s objective
in these parts is to analyze the design and performance of existing federal
third-party programs and make policy recommendations for future programs based on this analysis. To gather information about existing
programs, the author reviewed relevant statutes, regulations, guidance
documents, and reports. She also conducted twenty interviews of agency
staff and other experts.
Eight third-party verification programs developed by six different federal agencies are identified and described in the second part of the Article. 25
Congress directed agencies to use third-party verification in four of the
programs. In the others, agencies chose third-party verification without
specific Congressional authorization. In four of the programs, third parties
are used by regulatory agencies to assess compliance with mandatory regulatory standards such as food and medical device safety standards. In the
other four, third parties assess compliance with voluntary regulatory standards like those for U.S. Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) organic food
label and the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) Energy Star label.
In all but two of the eight programs, the regulated entity has no choice but
to contract with a third party if it wants to show compliance with the mandatory or voluntary standard. Four of the programs were established before
2003 (with one dating to the late 1980s), and four others have been established since 2008.

23.
Id. at 7–8 (“Several types of programs that share some similarities but do not meet
this description are outside the scope of this Article. Examples include (1) where a federal
agency places responsibility for inspecting and providing information about compliance
directly on regulated entities; (2) where a federal agency relies on state agency personnel to
inspect and provide information about compliance [as in the USDA’s Good Agricultural
Practices/Good Handling Practices (GAP/GHP) Audit Program]; (3) where a federal
agency takes into account whether a regulated entity is certified as meeting an [International
Organization for Standardization/International Electrotechnical Commission (ISO/IEC)]
standard or other similar privately-established standard in determining its inspection priorities; and (4) where an agency uses private third parties to assess compliance with its own
procurement or federal assistance policies.”).
24.
Congress has required the use of third-party verification in two recent major
reforms of regulatory legislation: the Food Safety Modernization Act of 2011, see infra Part
II.A.1; and the Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008, see infra Part II.A.2.
25.
The author’s research showed these eight programs to be the most significant and
well-documented examples of third-party verification in federal environmental, health, and
safety regulation. See supra note 23 and associated text for specification of types of programs
that fell outside the scope of the research.
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The third part develops a set of metrics of success for third-party programs. While a variety o� forces are leading public regulators to consider
third-party programs, there has been little analysis and discussion of what a
successful program looks like. The metrics of success identified and discussed include the reliability of the compliance assessments made by thirdparty verifiers, the rates at which regulated entities comply with standards
when third-party verification is used, the sufficiency of agency resources for
establishing and maintaining a third-party program, and the acceptance of
the program by the public and by industry. In the case of programs that
allow but do not require regulated entities to use third-party verifiers, the
rate at which regulated entities do so is another relevant metric of success.
The fourth and final part consists of policy recommendations to federal
agencies about whether and how to establish a third-party program. The
first set of recommendations pertains to federal agencies that are considering whether to establish a third-party program. Agencies are advised, for
example, to consult available public and private resources, consider the
suitability of the regulatory problem for third-party verification, and compare this approach with others. The second set of recommendations is
directed toward those agencies that have already decided to establish such a
program, whether required by law or on their own initiative. Here, agencies
are advised to calibrate the program to the risks presented, rely on existing
conformity assessments standards and activities, ensure agency and public
access to appropriate program information, and undertake necessary oversight. The recommendations contained in this part were the basis for a
formal Recommendation issued by the Administrative Conference of the
United States (ACUS) in December 2012. 26 The text of the ACUS Recommendations is included in an appendix.

I. PRIVATE REGULATION AND ITS HARNESSING
Regulation is typically understood by lawyers to refer to the rules that
administrative agencies promulgate to implement statutes. 27 In a slightly
broader view, regulation encompasses not just rulemaking, but also the
implementation and enforcement of rules. 28 In current academic parlance,
26.
Agency Use o� Third-Party Programs to Assess Regulatory Compliance, 78 Fed.
Reg. 2939, 2941-45 (Jan. 15, 2013).
27.
Cf. Vandenbergh, supra note 1, at 134 (describing the “standard model” of environmental law in which it is assumed that “the actor is the government and the action is
some form of positive law”). For a broad survey of various meaning and uses of the term
regulation, see LEVI-FAUR, supra note 14, at 3–11.
28.
LEVI-FAUR, supra note 14, at 4 (“Some contend that regulation comprises mostly
rule making while others extend it to include rule monitoring and rule enforcement.”).

McAllister_to_PDF

Spring 2014]

9/26/2014 9:42 AM

Harnessing Private Regulation

299

however, a much broader understanding of regulation has prevailed that
includes not just rules made by governmental actors but also those made by
private actors: regulation is “the promulgation of prescriptive rules as well
as the monitoring and enforcement of these rules by social, business, and
political actors on other social, business, and political actors.” 29 Regulation
is “decentred”: government does not have a monopoly on it, and it can
occur within and between other social actors without the government’s
involvement. 30
Notably, in this broader understanding, regulation can still be said to
have three aspects. 31 First is rule creation, in which regulatory objectives—
often referred to as standards—are established. 32 Second is rule implementation, wherein mechanisms are developed and deployed to monitor for
compliance. And third is rule enforcement, through which deviations are
corrected. Regulation accordingly refers to “any process or set of processes
by which norms are established, the behavior of those subject to the norms
monitored or fed back into the regime, and for which there are mechanisms
29.
Id. at 9.
30.
Julia Black, Decentring Regulation: Understanding the Role of Regulation and SelfRegulation in a “Post-Regulatory” World, 54 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 103, 103 (2001); see also
Colin Scott, Regulatory Governance and the Challenge of Constitutionalism, in THE
REGULATORY STATE: CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS 15, 21 (Dawn Oliver et al. eds.,
2010) (stating that regulation is fragmented, “within the state and beyond the state, substantial involvement of supranational and non-state organizations at every stage, including the
making, monitoring and enforcement of norms”).
31.
Scott, supra note 20, at 1333 (stating that regulation comprises norm creation,
detection of deviation, and correcting deviation). The regulatory process can be defined into
more stages, but the terms rule making, implementation and enforcement are intended to
encompass the whole. See, e.g., Tim Büthe, Private Regulation in the Global Economy: A
(P)Review, 12 BUS. & POL., no. 3, art. 2, 2010 at 1, 1 n.1 (specifying as regulations components: “agenda-setting, rule-making, implementation, monitoring, adjudication, and
enforcement”); see also Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, The Governance Triangle:
Regulatory Standards Institutions and the Shadow of the State, in THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL
REGULATION 44, 63 (Walter Mattli & Ngaire Woods eds., 2009) (setting forth components
of regulation as agenda, negotiation, implementation, monitoring, enforcement, with discussion about overlap among them); Errol Meidinger, Private Import Safety Regulation and
Transnational New Governance, in IMPORT SAFETY: REGULATORY GOVERNANCE IN THE
GLOBAL ECONOMY 233, 237 (Cary Coglianese et al. eds., 2009) (“Regulatory programs can
be broken down into several basic functions, including standard-setting and rule-making,
adoption, implementation, inspection and monitoring, and sanctioning.”).
32.
The term standard is broadly defined as “[c]ommon and repeated use of rules,
conditions, guidelines or characteristics for products or related processes and production
methods, and related management systems practices.” OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET,
EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, CIRCULAR NO. A-119, REVISED, MEMORANDUM FOR
HEADS OF EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES: FEDERAL PARTICIPATION IN THE
DEVELOPMENT AND USE OF VOLUNTARY CONSENSUS STANDARDS AND IN CONFORMITY
ASSESSMENT ACTIVITIES (1998).
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for holding the behavior of regulated actors within the acceptable limits of
the regime.” 33
With this broad definition, one can speak of public regulation, private
regulation, or a combination of the two, which is sometimes referred to as
co-regulation. 34 As used in this Article, public regulation refers to the exercise of public authority to make, implement, and enforce rules. 35 Private
regulation means that private actors play a major role in one or more of
these elements of regulation. 36 The first part of this section further explains
the concept of private regulation and how private regulators perform standard setting, implementation, and enforcement functions in common forms
of private regulation. The second part of this section analyzes the interaction of public and private regulation, with a focus on how public regulation
can harness private regulation.

A. Elements of Private Regulation
Private regulation is long-standing, widespread, and varied. 37 Organizations like the American Society for Testing Materials (now ASTM
International) and professional societies like the American Society of Civil
33.
Colin Scott, Analysing Regulatory Space: Fragmented Resources and Institutional
Design, PUB. L., Summer 2001, at 329, 331.
34.
See, e.g., Edward J. Balleisen & Marc Eisner, The Promise and Pitfalls of CoRegulation: How Governments Can Draw on Private Governance for Public Purpose, in NEW
PERSPECTIVES ON REGULATION 129 (David Moss & John Cisternino eds., 2009); NEIL
GUNNINGHAM & PETER GRABOSKY, SMART REGULATION: DESIGNING ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY 55 (1998) (stating that in co-regulation, “[g]overnment may directly engage in the
self-regulatory process by jointly negotiating targets and strategies, and providing, if necessary, external verification and/or ratification”); Lesley K. McAllister, Co-Regulation in
Mexican Environmental Law, 32 UTAH ENVTL L. REV. 181 (2012).
35.
Public regulation thus encompasses the “standard model” of regulatory law. Cf.
Vandenbergh, supra note 1, at 131. Notably, this standard model is “already co-regulatory” in
the sense that it “relies significantly on private participation in implementation, even though
this is largely hidden from public view.” Freeman, supra note 3, at 350–51.
36.
Büthe, supra note 31, at 1 n.1 (“Private regulation in a broad sense entails private
actors playing a major role—at one or more stages beyond implementation or compliance
. . . .”).
37.
A variety of terms have been used for private regulation. For example, Vogel
defines global civil regulation as “voluntary, private, nonstate industry and cross-industry
codes that specify the responsibilities of global firms for addressing labor practices, environmental performance, and human rights policies.” Vogel, supra note 6, at 68. Transnational
private regulation is an active area of scholarship among international law scholars. See
especially Cafaggi, supra note 6. Private regulation can be understood as an aspect of private
governance, namely that part of private governance that is about “steering the flow of events
and behavior, as opposed to providing and distributing [public goods and services].” John
Braithwaite et al., Can Regulation and Governance Make a Difference?, 1 REG. & GOVERNANCE
1, 3 (2007).
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Engineers have been writing safety standards for over a hundred years. 38 By
the early 1920s, Underwriters Laboratory (UL) had established itself as the
primary regulator o� fire safety, with the largest fire-testing laboratory in
the world and over 500 million products stamped with the UL label each
year. 39 The Orthodox Union established a rigorous certification system for
Kosher food in the 1950s and 1960s, such that by 1970 it employed more
than 750 supervisors to certify more than 2,500 products for 475 companies. 40
Private regulators have been called a fifth branch of government. 41 Like
their counterparts in public agencies, private regulators essentially “make
laws and adjudicate disputes.” 42 While some private regulators specialize in
setting standards or assessing compliance, others perform functions that
span the regulatory process. This section explains how private regulators of
different types carry out the three elements of regulation: setting, implementing, and enforcing standards.

1. Standard Setting
In line with the diversity of private regulation, private regulators of
various types set private standards of various types. As described below,
standards development organizations (SDOs) at the national and international levels have set tens of thousands of private standards. Standards are
also often set by firms, industry associations, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the form of voluntary codes to guide their own behavior
and that of other organizations with which they conduct business.
Just in the United States, there are hundreds of private SDOs with diverse institutional characteristics. 43 Most are industry or trade associations
like the American Petroleum Institute; scientific or professional societies
like the Society of Automobile Engineers; or membership organizations
38.
Notable Milestones, ASTM INT’L, http://www.astm.org/HISTORY/milestones.
html (last visited Nov. 25, 2013); History of ASCE, AM. SOC’Y OF CIVIL ENG’RS,
http://content.asce.org/history/150/150years.html (last visited Nov. 25, 2013).
39.
SCOTT GABRIEL KNOWLES, THE DISASTER EXPERTS: MASTERING RISK IN
MODERN AMERICA 122 (2011)
40.
Timothy D. Lytton, Competitive Third-Party Regulation: How Private Certification
Can Overcome Constraints that Frustrate Government Regulation, 15 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES
L. (forthcoming 2014).
41.
Abramson, supra note 19, at 168.
42.
Id.; see also Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Towards a Hybrid Regulatory Scheme for the Internet, UNIV. CHI. LEGAL F. 215, 250 (2001) (“Private regulatory regimes are a form of
government . . . . Private legislators make the rules, private judges apply them to concrete
situations, and private sheriffs enforce the rules against violators.”).
43.
Standards Development in the United States, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH.,
http://gsi.nist.gov/global/index.cfm/L1-5/L2-44/A-165 (last visited Nov. 8, 2013).
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specifically established to set standards, such as ASTM. 44 Writing private
standards is costly, so an important question regards why private standard
setting occurs. 45 Industry associations may set standards in the expectation
of private gains, as their standards may lower their compliance costs or
create barriers to entry in ways that enhance their profits. 46 Professional
societies and membership organizations may establish standards to position
themselves as experts in a given regulatory field and derive revenues from
selling their copyrighted standards. 47 Not uncommonly, private actors compete to establish the dominant standards. 48
Many SDOs seek to establish standards that will be considered “voluntary consensus standards” based on their adherence to certain procedures. 49
In the United States, American National Standards Institute (ANSI) accredits SDOs that meet its requirements for developing voluntary
consensus standards. 50 Accreditation requires, for example, that SDOs open
standards development to all directly affected persons, notify the public in
suitable media, ensure a balance of participation from diverse interests and
a lack of domination by a single interest, promptly consider the written
views and objections of all participants, and maintain an appeal process. 51 In
addition, accredited SDOs must use consensus voting. Instead of a unanimity requirement, consensus voting refers to a process that seeks the greatest
possible agreement by hearing and responding to negative votes that are

44.
TIM BÜTHE & WALTER MATTLI, THE NEW GLOBAL RULERS: THE
PRIVATIZATION OF REGULATION IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 148 (2011) (stating that the
U.S. private-sector standards consists of about 300 trade associations, 130 professional
societies, 40 general membership organizations, and 150 consortia); Cheit, supra note 7, at
23–24; see also OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONG., OTA-TCT-512, GLOBAL
STANDARDS: BUILDING BLOCKS FOR THE FUTURE 49–51 (1992).
45.
Büthe, supra note 31, at 12.
46.
Id. at 13.
47.
Id.; see OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, supra note 44, at 50–51.
48.
Büthe, supra note 31, at 14–15 (discussing competition among industry actors and
between industry and civil society NGOs); BÜTHE & MATTLI, supra note 44, at 148 (describing how SDO’s in the United States have been spurred by competition to develop high
quality standards).
49.
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 32.
50.
BÜTHE & MATTLI, supra note 44, at 150 (discussing ANSI and the American
system of standardization); AM. NAT’L STANDARDS INST., ANSI ESSENTIAL
REQUIREMENTS: DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS FOR AMERICAN NATIONAL STANDARDS 4–
5 (2013), available at http://publicaa.ansi.org/sites/apdl/Documents/Standards%20Activities/
American%20National%20Standards/Procedures,%20Guides,%20and%20Forms/2013_ANSI
_Essential_Requirements.pdf.
51.
AM. NAT’L STANDARDS INST., supra note 50, at 8–9 (setting forth requirements
for “[e]vidence of consensus and consensus body vote”).
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accompanied by related comments. 52 In 2012, there were over 200 ANSI
accredited SDOs, collectively responsible for approximately 10,000 voluntary consensus standards. 53 ASTM, the largest developer of consensus
standards in the United States, with over 12,000 standards promulgated by
2013, has similar procedural requirements. 54
The International Organization of Standards (ISO) and the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) are major SDOs at the
international level. 55 ISO alone has developed more than 18,000 standards,
and together ISO and IEC account for about 85 percent of all known international standards. 56 Founded in 1946, the ISO’s membership consists of
the one body from each country that is most responsible for coordinating
private standard setting in that country. 57 ISO members in developing
countries are often governmental departments, whereas ISO members in developed countries tend to be “non-governmental organizations recognized by their
government as the entity responsible for such voluntary standardization.” 58 In
the United States, the non-governmental ANSI is the ISO member body. 59
52.
Id.; see also BÜTHE & MATTLI, supra note 44, at 145–46 (explaining that consensus-based standard setting means that the process tries to incorporate negative opinions
“striving for the greatest feasible agreement”); CHEIT, supra note 7, at 176 (noting the rule in
consensus decisionmaking that there be no “unresolved negatives”).
53.
Domestic Programs (American National Standards) Overview, AM. NAT’L
STANDARDS INST., http://www.ansi.org/standards_activities/domestic_programs/overview.
aspx?menuid=3#.UcikGZxuuJs (last visited Nov. 8, 2013). No estimate of the number of
standards set by all private SDOs is available, but twenty-five years ago, it was estimated
that 400 SDOs had promulgated over 30,000 private standards. MAUREEN A.
BREITENBERG, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., NISTIR 6014, THE ABC’S OF THE
U.S. CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT SYSTEM 3 (1997). Also, a 1996 study by the National
Institute of Science and Technology counted 49,000 private standards. OFFICE OF
STANDARDS SERV., NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., SPECIAL PUBLICATION 806,
STANDARDS ACTIVITIES OF ORGANIZATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (Robert B. Toth ed.,
1996), available at http://gsi.nist.gov/global/docs/SP%20806.pdf.
54.
Robert W. Hamilton, Prospects for the Nongovernmental Development of Regulatory
Standards, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 455, 462–64 (1983) (discussing how standard setting by ASTM
requires balance of participation, consensus adoption, special procedure for no votes, written
procedures, and an appeal mechanism); Annual Book of ASTM Standards, ASTM INT’L,
http://www.astm.org/BOOKSTORE/BOS/standard_track1.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2013)
(stating that ASTM’s Annual Book of Standards contains over 12,000 ASTM standards).
55.
BÜTHE & MATTLI, supra note 44, at 5.
56.
Id. at 137.
57.
Id. at 131, 138.
58.
INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS AND “PRIVATE
STANDARDS” 4 (2010), available at www.iso.org/iso/private_standards.pdf; see also BÜTHE &
MATTLI, supra note 44, at 138–39 (stating that such bodies are often private-sector organizations funded largely by industry).
59.
David A. Wirth, The International Organization for Standardization: Private Voluntary Standards as Swords and Shields, 36 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 79, 81 (2009).
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ISO standard setting is coordinated by a secretariat in Geneva and carried out by tens of thousands of experts organized into hundreds of
technical committees and subcommittees, and thousands of associated working groups. 60 Seeking to establish international consensus standards, ISO
purports to abide by principles of transparency, openness, impartiality, and
consensus set out in World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements. 61 As
explained by ISO, other SDOs at the international level such as private
consortia in the fields of information and communications, agri-food industry organizations, and retailers that develop private standards relating to
social and environmental aspects often do not adhere to the WTO principles of international standardization. 62
Many standards developed by private bodies are technical standards designed to ensure that parts or products made by one manufacturer function
with those of others. They generally “regulate uniformity or interchangeability,” with limited relevance for health, safety, and environmental
protection. 63 Economic actors generally have strong incentives to comply
with such standards because they enhance the market for their products and
services. 64 Industry has a long history of establishing and promoting these
uniformity and interchangeability standards. For example, the pharmaceutical, automotive parts, railroad, and aviation industries have adopted such
standards. 65
Other private standards, however, can be considered to be regulatory
standards that “have significant implications for the public interest.” 66 They
may, for example, regulate the maximum age of pilots, the level of pesticide
residues in agricultural products, and the level of cadmium and other heavy

60.
INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, supra note 58, at 5; BÜTHE & MATTLI, supra
note 44, at 139.
61.
INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, supra note 58, at 2, 8 (particularly mentioning annex 3 of the WTO TBT Agreement Code of Good Practice for the preparation,
adoption and application of standards).
62.
Id. at 6–7.
63.
See CHEIT, supra note 7, at 5; cf. Strauss, supra note 19, at 499 (stating that SDOs
have “long existed to create voluntary private standards by which to declare or measure the
characteristics of goods on the marketplace”). Even technical standards, however, may have
negative public interest impacts if they, for example, create barriers to market entry, freeze
technological innovation, or reduce consumer choices. Cf. OFFICE OF COMMERCIAL SPACE
TRANSP., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., VOLUNTARY INDUSTRY STANDARDS AND THEIR
RELATIONSHIP TO GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS 9 (1993), available at http://www.strategic
standards.com/files/GovernmentStandards.pdf.
64.
See Büthe, supra note 17, at 17.
65.
OFFICE OF COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSP., supra note 63, at 3–4 (describing the
history of standard setting in various industries).
66.
See CHEIT, supra note 7, at 23.
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metals in the surface coating of toys. 67 In contrast to technical standards
that address network externalities, regulatory standards address social and
environmental externalities. 68 Economic actors are less likely to have market incentives to privately create and enforce regulatory standards because
such standards make them internalize the negative externalities of their
activities. 69 Of ANSI standards that had been developed by 1990, roughly
10 percent related to the health and safety of industrial products and processes. 70 ISO has increasingly promulgated standards relevant to the
environment and health and safety, including: standards for environmental
management, environmental labeling, lifecycle assessment, greenhouse gas
measurement, drinking water and wastewater services, and social responsibility. 71
Aside from consensus standards, a wide variety of voluntary codes have
been promulgated by industries, firms, and NGOs to regulate themselves or
those with whom they establish business relationships. 72 Voluntary codes
setting forth responsible business practices “now exist for virtually every
global industry and internationally traded commodity, including forestry,
fisheries, chemicals, computers and electronic equipment, apparel, rugs,
coffee, cocoa, palm oil, diamonds, gold, toys, minerals and mining, energy,
tourism, financial service, and athletic equipment.” 73 They primarily address labor and environmental practices, often focusing on high-profile
issues like sweatshops and sustainability. 74

67.
Hamilton, supra note 54, at 455 (mentioning the rule that pilots be under a certain
age). The test method ASTM F963-08, Standard Consumer Safety Specification for Toy Safety,
places limits on the amount of antimony, arsenic, barium, cadmium, chromium, lead, mercury, and selenium in toys. FAQs: Lead In Paint (And Other Surface Coatings), U.S. CONSUMER
PROD.
SAFETY
COMM’N,
http://www.cpsc.gov/en/Business--Manufacturing/
Business-Education/Lead/FAQs-Lead-In-Paint-And-Other-Surface-Coatings/ (last visited
Jan. 26, 2014).
68.
Abbott & Snidal, supra note 31, at 45; see also Hamilton, supra note 54, at 455
(“Creating a regulatory standard requires an estimate of acceptable levels of risk . . . . Regulatory standards thus almost always involve social or political as well as technological
issues.”).
69.
Büthe, supra note 17, at 17.
70.
Cf. CHEIT, supra note 7, at 22 (stating that 900 out of 8,500 ANSI standards in
1990 were considered to relate to health and safety).
71.
INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, supra note 58, at 7. On ISO’s environmental
management systems standard, see especially Wirth, supra note 59, at 82.
72.
Stepan Wood, Voluntary Environmental Codes and Sustainability, in
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FOR SUSTAINABILITY 230 (Benjamin J. Richardson & Stepan Wood
eds., 2006) (using the term code “in its ordinary sense as ‘a set of rules on any subject’ ”).
73.
Vogel, supra note 6, at 71–72.
74.
David Vogel, Private Global Business Regulation, 11 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 261, 269
(2008).
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Voluntary codes are often developed by industry associations and
NGOs. 75 For example, the International Chamber of Commerce’s Business
Charter for Sustainable Development, endorsed by more than 2,000 global
firms, sets out sixteen principles for environmental management. 76 The
chemical industry’s Responsible Care requires chemical companies “to
recognize and respond to community concerns,” “to develop and produce
chemicals that can be manufactured, transported, used and disposed of
safely,” and “to report promptly to officials, employees, customers and the
public, information on chemical-related health or environmental hazards.” 77
The Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) established sustainable forestry
goals for forest management operations that included, inter alia, complying
with applicable laws, respecting the rights of indigenous peoples, and conserving biodiversity. 78
Other private standards are established by individual firms to regulate
themselves. Standards for self-regulation often seek to accomplish objectives that are not legally required, and they may be embodied in a corporate
code of conduct. 79 Examples discussed in the literature include ARCO’s
voluntary development of standards for reformulated cleaner gasoline in the
late 1980s and voluntary codes adopted by the Body Shop, the Shell Group,
and Interface Flooring. 80 Other self-regulatory standards involve the development of a management system. For example, some companies have
established environmental management systems, which include policies and
programs that help reduce the company’s environmental impact. 81
75.
Vogel, supra note 6, at 73–74 (citing examples of codes initiated by NGOs, trade
associations, trade unions, and international standards bodies); see also Vandenbergh, supra
note 4, at 922 (describing “collective standards”).
76.
Vogel, supra note 6, at 72; see also ICC Business Charter for Sustainable Development,
INT’L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., http://www.iisd.org/business/tools/principles_icc.asp
(last visited Jan. 26, 2014).
77.
Neil Gunningham, Environmental Management Systems and Community Participation: Rethinking Chemical Industry Regulation, 16 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 319, 338 (1998).
78.
Errol E. Meidinger, The New Environmental Law: Forest Certification, 10 BUFF.
ENVTL. L.J. 211, 218 (2002).
79.
Short & Toffel, supra note 18, at 361 (stating that self-regulation is commonly
undertaken either “to demonstrate a commitment to comply with legal mandates or bring
corporate conduct into line with widely shared normative ideals like workplace fairness or
environmental sustainability”). For an interesting discussion of the forms of self-regulation
and their various problems, see Black, supra note 30. On corporate codes of conduct, see,
e.g., Elizabeth F. Brown, No Good Deed Goes Unpunished: Is There a Need for a Safe Harbor for
Aspirational Corporate Codes of Conduct?, 26 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 367 (2008).
80.
Lyon & Maxwell, supra note 7, at 93; Wood, supra note 72, at 238.
81.
See McAllister, supra note 21, at 16 n.105; Stepan Wood, Environmental Management Systems and Public Authority in Canada: Rethinking Environmental Governance, 10 BUFF.
ENVTL. L.J. 129 (2002). Firms may also adopt international environmental management
systems such as ISO 14001 or European Eco-Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS). See
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Private firms also engage in regulatory standard setting when they impose social and environmental requirements on their suppliers. 82 Every
Fortune 500 Company and thousands of other major transnational corporations have adopted supplier codes of conduct, which usually set forth their
expectations of suppliers with regard to the environment, labor, and human
rights. 83 These codes of conduct may then be incorporated into supplier
contracts. 84 Alternatively, or in addition, the parties to the contract may
create a private standard or incorporate voluntary codes developed by industry groups or non-governmental organizations. 85 By including private
standards of these various sorts, supply chain contracts often require suppliers to exceed public regulatory requirements. 86 A 2007 study found that
more than half of the top firms in eight different sectors imposed private
environmental requirements on their suppliers. 87

2. Implementation
In regulatory implementation, mechanisms are developed and deployed
to monitor for compliance. Diverse private standards are implemented in
diverse ways. As noted above, those private technical standards developed
by SDOs that further the goals of uniformity and interchangeability are
readily implemented by interested private actors for reasons of market
expansion and profitability. 88 Even voluntary consensus standards that deal
with health and safety are likely to attract high levels of compliance because
they are generally developed with industry participation and compliance

Magali A. Delmas, Barriers and Incentives to the Adoption of ISO 14001 by Firms in the United
States, 11 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 1, 3–4 (2000).
82.
Vandenbergh, supra note 1, at 156 (stating that “a growing number of corporate
buyers impose environmental requirements on their global suppliers”).
83.
Mayer & Gereffi, supra note 6, at 6 (explaining that Levi Strauss was one of the
first multinational companies to tout its corporate code of conduct in 1991); Michael W.
Toffel, et al., Reinforcing Regulatory Regimes: How States, Civil Society, and Codes of Conduct
Promote Adherence to Global Labor Standards 6, (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 13045, 2012) (stating that codes typically call for the supplier to comply with domestic labor,
environmental, and human rights law as well as forbid practices such as child labor and
prison labor).
84.
Toffel et al., supra note 83, at 2.
85.
Vandenbergh, supra note 1, at 154–55.
86.
Id.
87.
Vandenbergh, supra note 4, at 927–36.
88.
See Tim Büthe, The Power of Norms; the Norms of Power: Who Governs International
Electrical and Electronic Technology, in WHO GOVERNS THE GLOBE? 292, 324 (Deborah D.
Avant et al. eds., 2010); Scott, supra note 30, at 7.
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with them may reduce legal risk. 89 In these situations, private standards are
often reliably implemented at the firm level.
Implementation of voluntary codes developed by industries, NGOs,
and firms tend to require more complex mechanisms. Voluntary codes
developed by industry associations and NGOs are often implemented
through voluntary programs. In voluntary programs, participating firms
(often referred to as members) commit to adhering to a set of requirements
designed to produce social benefits. 90 Voluntary programs relating to environmental and labor practices have particularly proliferated in the past
several decades. 91 They often award a product label or other public recognition to their members. Examples include the FSC label for sustainable
forest management and Social Accountability International’s SA8000 logo
for decent workplaces. 92 Firms can implement self-regulatory standards
through internal behavior modifications and supply-chain standards
through contracts with their suppliers.
The audit is a common mechanism to monitor for compliance in private regulation. 93 Audits may be conducted by firms subject to regulation
(commonly referred to as self-audits), another organization interested in the
firm’s compliance (for example, a purchaser of its products or an industry
association to which it belongs), or an external entity paid by either the firm
or an interested organization (commonly referred to as an independent or
third-party audit). Voluntary programs increasingly rely on independent
auditors to verify compliance. As explained by one observer, “[e]xternal
inspection and monitoring have also become a standard part of private
89.
Büthe, supra note 88, at 327 (discussing how international standards are often
considered “best practices” and may provide a safeguard in civil litigation, particularly
product liability litigation).
90.
Matthew Potoski & Aseem Prakash, Voluntary Clubs: An Introduction, in
VOLUNTARY PROGRAMS: A CLUB THEORY PERSPECTIVE 2 (Matthew Potoski & Asseem
Prakash eds., 2009).
91.
Tim Bartley & Shawna N. Smith, Communities of Practice as Cause and Consequence
of Transnational Governance: The Evolution of Social and Environmental Certification, in
TRANSNATIONAL COMMUNITIES: SHAPING GLOBAL ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE 347 (MarieLaure Djelic & Sigrid Quack eds., 2010) (stating that the “transformation of certification
into a mode of social/environmental regulation has occurred mainly since the 1990s”);
ASEEM PRAKASH & MATTHEW POTOSKI, THE VOLUNTARY ENVIRONMENTALISTS: GREEN
CLUBS, ISO 14001, AND VOLUNTARY REGULATIONS 60 (2006).
92.
Vandenbergh, supra note 1, at 148–49 (discussing the FSC). See generally Tim
Bartley, Standards for Sweatshops: The Power and Limits of the Club Approach to Voluntary Labor
Standards, in VOLUNTARY PROGRAMS: A CLUB THEORY PERSPECTIVE, supra note 90 (on
programs for labor standards).
93.
For a theorization of the phenomenon of audit, see MICHAEL POWER, THE
AUDIT SOCIETY: RITUALS OF VERIFICATION (1997); Michael Power, Expertise and the Construction of Relevance: Accountants and Environmental Audit, 22 ACCT., ORGS. & SOC’Y, 123,
126 (1997).
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regulation.” 94 Others comment that third-party auditing is considered a
“best practice” in voluntary programs. 95 Third-party audits are also used to
assess compliance with self-regulation and supply-chain regulation. 96
Dubbed the private “assurance industry” by one commentator, private
auditing companies form a “rapidly growing global army of privately
trained and authorized inspectors and certifiers.” 97
While third-party audits are considered more rigorous than self-audits,
many issues of reliability remain. 98 The auditors are formally independent
but may still lack objectivity because the companies whose products or processes are being audited often arrange and pay for the audit. 99 Scholars o�
financial accounting have identified many reasons for auditor bias in this
situation. 100 Concerns about auditor competence also arise. Because of competitive pressures, third-party verifiers will seek to reduce their costs, which
may result in inadequate audits. An observer of garment factory audits in
Asia conducted by a major auditing firm found that auditors had not effectively gathered information because they made short visits and failed to
conduct sufficient interviewing or inspection. 101 A related concern is that
94.
Meidinger, supra note 31, at 238; see also Wood, supra note 72, at 242–43 (noting
the trend toward increased third party verification of voluntary codes). But see Vogel, supra
note 74, at 269 (“Relatively few industry and corporate codes are independently monitored;
some contain no monitoring provisions at all, and others are monitored by the firms themselves.”).
95.
PRAKASH & POTOSKI, supra note 91, at 59.
96.
See, e.g., Dara O’Rourke, Outsourcing Regulation: Analyzing Nongovernmental Systems
of Labor Standards and Monitoring, 31 POL’Y STUD. J. 1, 11 (2003) (describing the “small army
of monitors”); Toffel et al., supra note 83 (analyzing data obtained from one of the largest
social auditing forms).
97.
Margaret M. Blair, Cynthia A. Williams & Li-Wen Lin, The New Role for Assurance Services in Global Commerce, 33 J. CORP. L. 325, 329 (2008); see also Wood, supra note 72,
at 261 (referring to the “huge industry of auditors, certifiers, and accreditation bodies that
has emerged”).
98.
See, e.g., Neil Gunningham & Joseph Rees, Industry Self-Regulation: An Institutional
Perspective, 19 LAW & POL’Y 363, 368 (1997) (discussing how the Gap’s sourcing standards
initially included only “seriously defective” internal monitoring, but then the company
agreed to use third-party monitoring which was much more effective); McAllister, supra note
21, at 38–45 (discussing the problems of auditor independence and competence).
99.
Blair et al., supra note 97, at 334.
100.
See, e.g., Max H. Bazerman et al., Why Good Accountants Do Bad Audits, HARV.
BUS. REV., Nov. 2002, at 97, 98; Jonathan Macey & Hillary A. Sale, Observations on the Role
of Commodification, Independence, and Governance in the Accounting Industry, 48 VILL. L. REV.
1167, 1167 (2003); Patricia A. McCoy, Realigning Auditors’ Incentives, 35 CONN. L. REV. 989,
990 (2003) (stating that the basic problem afflicting the accounting industry is that “accounting firms work for the companies they audit”).
101.
Dara O’Rourke, Monitoring the Monitors: A Critique of Corporate Third-Party Labor
Monitoring, in CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY AND LABOUR RIGHTS: CODES OF CONDUCT IN
THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 196–208 (Rhys Jenkins et al. eds., 2002) (documenting observa-
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auditing might consist of mechanically applied checklists and “box-ticking”
that fail to capture the true compliance situation of a regulated entity. 102
Given the importance to business actors of auditing themselves and
others for compliance with private standards, ISO and IEC developed a
series of applicable international standards. ISO/IEC’s 17000 series standardizes “conformity assessment,” defined as the “demonstration that
specified requirements relating to a product, process, system, person or
body are fulfilled.” 103 These standards set forth the various types of conformity assessment and how organizations that conduct conformity
assessment should look and act. As specified in ISO/IEC 17000, first-party
conformity assessment is performed by the organization that provides the
object of the assessment, second-party conformity assessment is performed
by an organization that has a user interest in the object, and third-party
conformity assessment is performed by a body independent o� both the
organization that provides the object and organizations with user interests. 104
The main forms of conformity assessment under ISO/IEC standards
are testing, inspection, and certification. 105 “Testing” means the “determination of one or more characteristics of an object of conformity assessment,
according to a procedure,” while inspection is an “examination of a product
design, product, process or installation and determination of its conformity” with requirements. 106 “Certification” refers to the issuance of a
statement by a third party whose products, processes, systems, or persons
fulfill specified requirements. 107 Different ISO/IEC standards in the 17000
series apply to testing bodies (usually laboratories), inspection bodies, and

tions o� factory audits in Asia by PriceWaterhouseCoopers, which was the world’s largest
private monitor o� labor and environmental practices).
102.
Friederike Albersmeier et al., The Reliability of Third-Party Certification in the Food
Chain: From Checklists to Risk-Oriented Auditing, 20 FOOD CONTROL 927, 933 (2009); Gunningham, supra note 77, at 360; McAllister, supra note 21, at 43.
103.
INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION & INT’L ELECTROTECHNICAL COMM.
[ISO/IEC], ISO/IEC DOC. 17000:2004, CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT—VOCABULARY AND
GENERAL PRINCIPLES 2.1 (2004) [hereinafter CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT] (internal crossreferences omitted).
104.
Id. at 2.2–2.4.
105.
What is conformity assessment?, INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION,
http://www.iso.org/iso/home/about/conformity-assessment.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2013).
106.
CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT, supra note 103, at 4.2–4.3. INT’L ORG. FOR
STANDARDIZATION & UNITED NATIONS INDUSTRIAL DEV. ORG. [ISO/UNIDO], BUILDING
TRUST: THE CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT TOOLBOX 34–35 (2010), available at
http://www.iso.org/iso/casco_building-trust.pdf.
107.
CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT, supra note 103, at 5.5 (defining certification with the
use of the term attestation) and 5.2 (defining attestation).
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certification bodies, which are collectively referred to as conformity assessment bodies. 108
Certification is the most well-known form of conformity assessment,
and it differs from testing and inspection in an important way. 109 Unlike
testing or inspection, certification is by definition performed by a third
party, and it requires that the third party conduct not just initial conformity
assessment activities like testing and inspection but also the surveillance
necessary to attest to the continuing conformity of a product, process, system, or person. 110 “Surveillance” is defined by ISO/IEC as a “systematic
iteration of conformity assessment activities as a basis for maintaining the
validity of the statement of conformity.” 111 Market surveillance is a particular form of surveillance used in some certification schemes where samples
of certified products in the marketplace are tested to determine whether
they conform to specified requirements. 112
Accreditation is another key aspect of conformity assessment under
ISO standards. 113 “Accreditation” is a “third-party attestation related to a
conformity assessment body conveying formal demonstration of its competence to carry out specific conformity assessment tasks.” 114 Accreditation
bodies determine whether testing, inspection, and certification bodies are
operating in accordance with the ISO/IEC standards that apply to them.
108.
Testing is regulated by ISO/IEC 17025. ISO/IEC, ISO/IEC DOC. 17025:2005,
GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE COMPETENCE OF TESTING AND CALIBRATION
LABORATORIES (2005). Inspection is regulated by ISO/IEC 17020. ISO/IEC, ISO/IEC
DOC. 17020:2012, CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT—REQUIREMENTS FOR THE OPERATION OF
VARIOUS TYPES OF BODIES PERFORMING INSPECTION (2012). Certification is regulated by
ISO/IEC Guide 65 or ISO/IEC 17065. ISO/IEC, ISO/IEC GUIDE 65:1996, GENERAL
REQUIREMENTS FOR BODIES OPERATING PRODUCT CERTIFICATION SYSTEMS (1996),
revised by ISO/IEC, ISO/IEC DOC. 17065:2012, CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT—
REQUIREMENTS FOR BODIES CERTIFYING PRODUCTS, PROCESSES AND SERVICES (2012)
(replacing Guide 65, with the transition to the new standard expected to be completed by
September 2015).
109.
INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, supra note 105 (stating that testing is most
common, but certification is best known).
110.
Telephone Interview with Gordon Gillerman, Chief, Standards Servs. Div., Nat’l
Inst. of Standards & Tech. (Aug. 15, 2012); ISO/UNIDO, supra note 106, at 52–55 (setting
forth various systems that include surveillance and meet the definition of product certification).
111.
CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT, supra note 103, at 6.1; ISO/UNIDO, supra note 106,
at 44.
112.
ISO/UNIDO, supra note 106, at 45.
113.
Accreditation is regulated by ISO/IEC 17011. ISO/IEC, ISO/IEC DOC.
17011:2004, G ENERAL R EQUIREMENTS FOR A CCREDITATION B ODIES A CCREDITING
CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT BODIES (2004).
114.
CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT, supra note 103, at 5.6; ISO/UNIDO, supra note 106,
at 24.
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Accreditation bodies may be public or private entities, and some countries
have one or more private accreditation bodies in addition to or instead of a
national accreditation body. 115 Accreditation bodies, in turn, are often members of either the International Accreditation Forum (IAF) or the
International Laboratory Accreditation Cooperation (ILAC), which require
adherence to international standards for accreditation bodies and use a
system of peer evaluation to assess accreditation bodies for membership. 116
Their objective is that conformity assessment bodies accredited by member
accreditation bodies will be recognized as competent in multiple jurisdictions and markets. 117 In the words of the accreditation industry, “tested or
certified once—accepted everywhere.” 118
It is useful to understand that conformity assessment encompasses a
spectrum of rigor and independence. 119 Depending on the level of confidence or assurance required, the technical activities of conformity
assessment may be more or less rigorous, and the organizations that conduct
conformity may be more or less independent. When the user of a conformity assessment system—for example, a purchaser—needs just a basic level of
assurance, a first-party testing or inspection may be adequate. When the
purchaser needs more assurance, it could require, for example, testing in an
accredited third-party laboratory. When the purchaser needs much more
115.
ISO/UNIDO, supra note 106, at 25, 86–88.
116.
See e.g., INT’L LAB. ACCREDITATION COOPERATION, https://www.ilac.org/ (last
visited Nov. 29, 2013). IAF is comprised of accreditation bodies that accredit certification
bodies whereas ILAC is comprised of accreditation bodies that accredit laboratories. Both
IAF and ILAC have established voluntary agreements through which member accreditation
bodies agree to adhere to international standards when accrediting testing and certification
bodies: the IAF Multilateral Recognition Agreement (IAF MLA) and the ILAC Mutual
Recognition Agreement (MRA). OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE [USTR],
REPORT ON TECHNICAL BARRIERS TO TRADE 28 (2012), available at http://www.us
tr.gov/webfm_send/3323; see also I NT ’ L A CCREDITATION F ORUM & I NT ’ L L AB .
ACCREDITATION COOPERATION [IAF/ILAC], IAF/ILAC-A3:01/2013, IAF/ILAC MULTIL ATERAL M UTUAL R ECOGNITION A RRANGEMENTS (A RRANGEMENTS ): N ARRATIVE
FRAMEWORK FOR REPORTING ON THE PERFORMANCE OF AN ACCREDITATION BODY (AB)
(2013), available at https://www.ilac.org/documents/IAF-ILAC_A3_01_2013.pdf.
117.
ISO/UNIDO, supra note 106, at 89; see also USTR, supra note 116, at 28 (explaining that by demonstrating the equivalence of the accreditation bodies that accredit testing
and certification bodies, they aim to “provide governments, as well as suppliers, assurances
that a body—regardless of its location—is competent to test and certify products for relevant markets”).
118.
IAF: What is the International Accreditation Forum, INC.?, U.K. ACCREDITATION
SERVICE, http://www.ukas.com/technical-information/international-role/iaf.asp (last visited
Nov. 29, 2013); see also INT’L ACCREDITATION FORUM, http://www.iaf.nu/ (last visited Nov.
29, 2013) (showing the slogan “certified once, accepted everywhere” in the bottom right
hand corner of the page).
119.
Telephone Interview with Gordon Gillerman, supra note 110.
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assurance, it could require certification by an accredited third party based
on testing conducted in an accredited third-party laboratory.
ISO conformity assessment standards are increasingly being adopted by
private regulators. For example, since 2006, FSC has required that its certification bodies be accredited by ASI International, which operates in
accordance with the ISO/IEC standard for accreditation bodies. 120 Also, in
2009, FSC promulgated a standard specifying the requirements for FSC
certification bodies that explicitly incorporates many of the requirements of
the ISO/IEC standard for certification bodies. 121

3. Enforcement
Enforcement, the process by which deviance from regulatory standards
is corrected, is often a weakness of private regulatory regimes that impose
requirements relating to health, safety, and the environment. 122 According
to one scholar of private regulation, few voluntary codes contain explicit
sanctions for nonconformity or formal mechanisms for enforcement or
dispute resolution. 123 In the words of another, “business compliance with
most codes has been uneven” and few are effectively enforced. 124
Notably, the subjects of private regulation—whether they are members
of a voluntary program, firms that self-regulate, or suppliers subject to
contract conditions—have incentives to cheat. Companies may establish
codes of conduct or join voluntary programs for public relations reasons and
lack a serious commitment to changing their behavior. 125 Companies may
find monitoring their compliance with codes to be costly and have limited
incentives to enforce them. 126 Not all voluntary programs require third-

120.
Programs, ACCREDITATION SERVICES INT’L, http://www.accreditation-services.co
m/programs (last visited Nov. 29, 2013).
121.
FOREST STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, FSC-STD-20-001 (VERSION 3-0) EN, FSC
I NTERNATIONAL S TANDARD : G ENERAL R EQUIREMENTS FOR FSC A CCREDITED
CERTIFICATION BODIES—APPLICATION OF ISO/IEC GUIDE 65:1996 (E) (2009), available
at http://ic.fsc.org/download.fsc-std-20-001-v3-0-en-general-requirements-for-fsc-accredit
ed-certification-bodies.a-1130.pdf.
122.
Cf. Gunningham & Rees, supra note 98, at 370 (“According to the critics, selfregulatory standards are usually weak, enforcement is ineffective and punishment is secret
and mild.”).
123.
Wood, supra note 72, at 261–62 (stating further that “[t]his lack of sanctions and
enforcement is often identified as one of the key weaknesses of voluntary codes”).
124.
Vogel, supra note 6, at 80.
125.
Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, Management-Based Regulation: Prescribing Private
Management to Achieve Public Goals, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 691, 708 n.14 (2003) (discussing
the incentives o� firms to cheat).
126.
Mayer & Gereffi, supra note 6, at 19.
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party monitoring, and even fewer involve the public disclosure of monitoring information and sanctions for members that do not comply. 127
Even companies that impose codes of conduct on their global suppliers
may have weak incentives to enforce them. Companies have often developed codes in response to pressure from NGOs, shareholders, and
governments. This pressure may subside once the code is adopted. 128 Also,
rigorously enforcing compliance with codes is likely to increase the cost of
doing business, which runs against the very reason for global supply
chains. 129 Importantly, it is easy for buyer and supplier firms to hide code
violations, given that supplier firms tend to be numerous and geographically dispersed and their identities are often confidential. 130
When private regulators are serious about enforcement, there are a variety of sanctions they may employ to correct deviations. In voluntary
programs that award a label or recognition, the private regulators may revoke or threaten to revoke this benefit. 131 Removal from a voluntary
program might also involve expulsion from an industry association, which
may limit the firm’s economic opportunities. 132 When the administrator of a
voluntary program has such strong sanctions available, it may also be able to
impose remedial measures such as product recalls or environmental reparations. 133 Buyers that include private standards in supply chain contracts can
respond to violations by refusing to buy from offending suppliers.
Public disclosure of code violations also constitutes a powerful sanction.
Private regulators can require the public release of third-party audit reports
regarding the compliance o� firms with voluntary programs or supply chain
requirements. Also, a label or other recognition may be revoked in a way
that involves a public process of “naming and shaming.” 134 NGOs, trade
unions, consumers, and investors may thereby contribute to the sanction by
denying a company’s “social license to operate.” 135
127.
Potoski & Prakash, supra note 90, at 27 (referring to programs that require all
three components as “strong sword” programs).
128.
Toffel et al., supra note 83, at 7.
129.
Id. at 8.
130.
Id. at 9.
131.
Gunningham & Rees, supra note 98, at 396; see also Meidinger, supra note 31, at
238 (stating that “[t]he only formal sanction in most private regulatory systems is the loss of
the certifying organization’s approval, or the threat of that loss”).
132.
Gunningham & Rees, supra note 98, at 396.
133.
Id.
134.
Edward J. Balleisen, The Prospects for Effective Coregulation in the United States: A
Historian’s View from the Early Twenty-First Century, in GOVERNMENT AND MARKETS:
TOWARD A NEW THEORY OF REGULATION 443, 447 (Edward J. Balleisen & David A. Moss
eds., 2009); Vandenbergh, supra note 1, at 137–38.
135.
Gunningham et al., SHADES OF GREEN: BUSINESS, REGULATION, AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 36–37 (2003) (introducing the concept of the social license to operate, that
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Responsible Care illustrates how enforcement mechanisms can be weak
even in a voluntary program characterized by significant industry mobilization and other conditions favoring effective private regulation. 136 While
Responsible Care has been implemented by fifty-five national chemical
industry associations and thousands of their member companies participate,
revocations of a company’s Responsible Care status have occurred rarely, if
at all, over its twenty-five-year history. 137 Moreover, third-party auditing is
generally not required and national industry associations do not make
membership contingent on participation in Responsible Care. 138
The FSC stands as an example of a private regulatory regime with relatively well-developed monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. 139 The
FSC requires that an accredited third party certify that a forestry operation
is in compliance with its standards. 140 The FSC has at times removed the
accreditation status of certifiers, 141 and forestry operations have at times had
their certifications revoked. 142 The negative impact of a certification revocation

depend on a firm meeting social expectations concerning environmental performance and
other forms of social responsibility); RHYS JENKINS, UNITED NATIONS RESEARCH INST.
FOR SOC. DEV., CORPORATE CODES OF CONDUCT: SELF-REGULATION IN A GLOBAL
ECONOMY 8–18 (2001) (discussing the attitudes of various stakeholders toward selfregulation).
136.
See Gunningham, supra note 77, at 339–44 (discussing the characteristics of the
chemical industry and the Responsible Care program that favor its effectiveness).
137.
INT’L COUNCIL OF CHEM. ASS’NS, ICCA RESPONSIBLE CARE PROGRESS
REPORT: GROWING OUR FUTURE (2012), available at www.icca-chem.org/ICCADocs/
RC%20annual%20report.pdf (documenting membership and practices in various countries,
with no reference to revocation actions); Freeman, supra note 16, at 647 (stating that there
have been no expulsions from Responsible Care); Gunningham, supra note 77, at 348 (stating that the likelihood of expulsion is very low and there have been no documented cases).
138.
See INT’L COUNCIL OF CHEM. ASS’NS, supra note 137, at 22–50 (surveying the
“verification and performance” descriptions).
139.
Scott, supra note 14, at 73 (referring to FSC as one of the “more complete regimes,
which involve not only the setting of norms but also the generation of mechanisms for
monitoring and enforcement”).
140.
FSC relies on another private organization, Accreditation Services International,
to perform the accreditation. Accreditation Program: Ensuring Excellence in Certification,
FOREST STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, https://ic.fsc.org/accreditation.28.htm (last visited Nov. 5,
2013). As of 2013, there were thirty-three accredited certification bodies for the program.
Certification Bodies for FSC, ACCREDITATION SERVS. INT’L, http://www.accreditation-servic
es.com/archives/standards/fsc (last visited Jan. 27, 2014).
141.
Errol Meidinger, The Administrative Law of Global Private-Public Regulation: The
Case of Forestry, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 47, 74 (2006).
142.
See, e.g., Jeremy Hance, Paper Company Loses Green Certification After Rainforest
Destruction in Indonesia, MONGABAY.COM (Apr. 18, 2010), http://news.mongabay.com/2010/
0418-hance_april.html.
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is amplified by NGOs that publicize the loss of certification and buyers that
are committed to buying only certified forest products. 143

B. Harnessing Private Regulation
Under certain circumstances, private regulation may “prove more effective than public regulation.” 144 As early as 1937, one legal commentator
observed that actors who are “part of the relation to be regulated are likely
to have a more urgent sense of the problem and the possibilities of effective
solution: experience and experiment lie immediately at hand” and therefore
suggested that “public administrations . . . should not be the exclusive
method of regulation.” 145 Oft-cited advantages of private regulation include
the proximity of the regulator to the regulated activity, the flexibility of the
regulatory process, greater compliance, and additional regulatory resources. 146 Private regulation developed to certify Kosher food and the fire
safety o� building materials and electrical products have been cited as two
cases in which private certification overcame political and resource constraints that hampered government regulation. 147
However, private regulation often suffers from limitations that reduce
its effectiveness. An important limitation is the inherently voluntary nature
of participation. Firms that no longer want to comply can choose not to
participate. Other “[p]otential disadvantages include conflicts of interest,
inadequate enforcement and accountability, and insufficient monitoring of
compliance.” 148 In the evaluation of one observer, private regulatory
schemes are often not “effectively enforced and most cover only a minority
of relevant global producers.” 149 Scholars have noted that private regulation
is more likely to be effective in some contexts than others. Factors favoring
more effective private regulation include the extent to which companies
care about their reputation, “the existence of sufficient bureaucratic capacity

143.
Meidinger, supra note 141, at 75.
144.
Fabrizio Cafaggi & Andrea Renda, Public and Private Regulation: Mapping the
Labyrinth 12 (CEPS Working Document, No. 370, 2012).
145.
Louis L. Jaffe, Law Making by Private Groups, 51 HARV. L REV. 201, 212 (1937)
(further observing that “group self-government” is likely to develop positive qualities such
as efficiency and the sense of responsibility).
146.
Cafaggi & Renda, supra note 144, at 12; see also Lytton, supra note 40 (citing
technical expertise, flexibility, monitoring, responsiveness, cooperation, and efficiency as
comparative institutional advantages of private certification over government regulation).
147.
Lytton, supra note 40.
148.
Cafaggi & Renda, supra note 144, at 12.
149.
Vogel, supra note 6, at 80.
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and autonomy on the part of nongovernmental regulators,” and “the degree
of transparency in [the] regulatory process.” 150
Recognizing that private regulation is prevalent and that it may have
advantages over public regulation in certain situations raises the question o�
how private and public regulation might be combined to create stronger,
more effective regulatory regimes. Scholarly writing on co-regulation and
“public-private partnerships” has explored this idea to some extent. 151
Scholars tend to approach the issue from one of two directions. They may
analyze how the effectiveness and legitimacy of private regulation might be
improved by being more closely integrated into public regulation. 152 Alternatively, they may recognize that private actors are “regulatory resources
capable of contributing to the efficacy and legitimacy” of public regulation
and ask how “private capacity [could be harnessed] to serve public goals.” 153
Harnessing, as used in this Article, analyzes how public legislators and
regulators can intentionally construct regulatory frameworks that rely upon
and incorporate private regulation. When private regulation is harnessed by
public regulation, “structures of private governance” are embedded and
integrated into a “broader framework of public oversight.” 154 Public regulators tap into private regulatory capacity, constituting a “state-sanctioned
150.
Balleisen & Eisner, supra note 34, at 131.
151.
See especially Balleisen, supra note 134, at 468–76; Balleisen & Eisner, supra note
34, at 129; Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV. L.
REV. 1285, 1288 (2003); Freeman, supra note 16, 549.
152.
See Coglianese & Lazer, supra note 125, at 726 (discussing how management-based
regulation gets an enforcement edge from government presence); Freeman, supra note 151, at
1285 (examining how privatization might extend public norms); Mayer & Gereffi, supra note
6, at 19 (“In our view, unless private governance is supplemented and reinforced by public
institutions of governance, it cannot provide adequate governance capacity for the global
economy.”); Scott, supra note 20, at 1334–35 (discussing how private regulatory regimes can
gain legitimacy though having relationship to governmental policy); Vogel, supra note 6, at
83 (“Until the world’s developed countries are willing to more closely integrate the norms of
civil regulations into their domestic laws and international relations, the global regulatory
failures private social regulation was intended to redress will persist.”).
153.
Freeman, supra note 16, 549; see also Balleisen, supra note 134, at 445 (stating that
this “essay offers an analytical framework for evaluating the growing reliance on nongovernmental rule making and oversight as a basic tool of regulatory policy”); Ian Bartle &
Peter Vass, Self-Regulation within the Regulatory State: Towards a New Regulatory Paradigm?, 85
PUB. ADMIN. 885, 885, 903 (2007) (discussing how “the achievement of regulatory outcomes
can be delegated downwards to the regulated organizations and self-regulatory bodies while
being offset by increasing public regulatory oversight based on systems of accountability and
transparency”); Gunningham & Rees, supra note 98, at 399–400 (asking “how should coregulatory mechanisms best be designed, in order to take advantage of the strengths and
virtues of industry self-regulation, while compensating for its weaknesses as a stand alone
mechanism?”); Meidinger, supra note 31, at 243 (discussing how government agencies can act
as conductors when public and private regulation interacts).
154.
Balleisen & Eisner, supra note 34, at 129.
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and state-bolstered involvement of private actors in governance processes.” 155 The public policy objective o� harnessing private regulation is to
exploit the strength and resources of private regulatory institutions and
actors in support of public goals. 156 Concerns likely to be raised about harnessing include the legality of delegating power to private actors and the
ability of government to ensure that private power does not impede the
attainment of those goals. 157
This Article is concerned primarily with strong forms o� harnessing in
which public regulation incorporates elements of private regulation such
that they become an essential part of the regulatory regime. In weaker
forms o� harnessing, public regulation may provide incentives to private
actors to fulfill one or more complementary regulatory function, but the
private regulatory function does not become essential. An example is EPA’s
Audit Policy, which provides an incentive to regulated entities for selfauditing by reducing the penalties for violations that entities discover
through environmental audits. 158 Weak harnessing is also effectuated by
provisions in federal environmental laws that grant a right of action to
private citizens to sue violators. 159 Citizen enforcement is thought to motivate and improve governmental enforcement by serving as a “competitive
spur” and helping to “keep compliance issues high on the agendas of top
agency officials.” 160
In strong forms o� harnessing, the private regulatory function can take
the place of or substitute for a public regulatory function in a regulatory
regime constructed by public actors. In strong harnessing, legal regulation
155.
See ANDREAS KRUCK, PRIVATE RATINGS, PUBLIC REGULATIONS: CREDIT RATING
AGENCIES AND GLOBAL FINANCIAL GOVERNANCE 5 (2011).
156.
Cf. Perritt, supra note 42, at 215 (“Hybrid regulation—the combination o� broad
public law frameworks within which private regulatory regimes work out the details—is a
promising way to realize the advantages of private regulation while mitigating the disadvantages.”).
157.
See especially Coglianese, supra note 125, at 721–23; Hamilton, supra note 19, at
1437–38; McAllister, supra note 21, at 29–30; Miriam Seifter, Rent-a-Regulator: Design and
Innovation in Privatized Governmental Decisionmaking, 33 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1091, 1125–27
(2006); Shapiro, supra note 17, at 410–11.
158.
Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correction and Prevention o�
Violations, 65 Fed. Reg. 19,618, 19,625 (Apr. 11, 2000) (defining environmental audit as a
“systematic, documented, periodic and objective review by regulated entities o� facility
operations and practices related to meeting environmental requirements”); see also Short &
Toffel, supra note 18, at 366–67.
159.
On environmental citizen suits, see especially Barry Boyer & Errol Meidinger,
Privatizing Regulatory Enforcement: A Preliminary Assessment of Citizen Suits Under Federal
Environmental Laws, 34 BUFF. L. REV. 833 (1985); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Continuing
Innovation of Citizen Enforcement, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 185.
160.
Boyer & Meidinger, supra note 159, at 957.
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and private governance are “yoked together” and “integrated into a single
system in which the functioning of each element is necessary for the successful operation of the other.” 161 When strong harnessing is present,
public regulators often assume new roles relating to the evaluation and
oversight of the private regulators. 162

1. Incorporation o� Private Standards
A longstanding example of strong harnessing is the incorporation of
private standards into public law. 163 A 1978 study reported “that most regulatory standards applicable today were developed initially by the
nongovernmental sector and made mandatory by incorporation by reference” and that “government-developed standards were a relatively
insignificant fraction of all mandatory standards.” 164 By 2013, over 9,500
private standards had been incorporated by reference into federal regulation. 165 A variety of public benefits may be attained through public reliance
on existing private standards. As explained by one commentator, relying on
private standards is more cost-effective for the federal government, allows
agencies to tap into expertise in the private sector, and facilitates industry
compliance. 166
Federal regulatory laws such as the Occupational Safety and Health Act
of 1970 and the Consumer Products Safety Act of 1972 directed agencies to
rely on existing voluntary standards in various ways. 167 In its first two years,
161.
Trubek & Trubek, supra note 17, at 541, 543.
162.
Cf. Gunningham et al., Harnessing Third Parties as Surrogate Regulators: Achieving
Environmental Outcomes by Alternative Means, 8 BUS. STRATEGY & ENV’T 211, 219 (1999)
(explaining that “there is an essential policy role for government to shape market orderings
and to facilitate the constructive activities of non-governmental institutions”); Perritt, supra
note 42, at 250 (“Hybrid regulation can be understood as providing public law frameworks
to assure accountability.”).
163.
See, e.g., Bremer, supra note 19; Mendelson, supra note 19; Strauss, supra note 19, at
502 (explaining that private standards are sometimes converted into regulatory requirements).
164.
Hamilton, supra note 54, at 459 (considering, for example, building codes, plumbing codes, electrical codes, fire protection).
165.
Bremer, supra note 19, at 135; Standards Incorporated by Reference (SIBR) Database,
NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., https://standards.gov/sibr/query/index.cfm (last
visited Nov. 26, 2013) (showing 10,562 records in the “All Regulatory” link).
166.
Bremer, supra note 19, at 140. But see Shapiro, supra note 17, at 406–11 (analyzing
the possibilities for opportunistic behavior, incomplete contracting, and hold-up problems).
167.
Cf. Hamilton, supra note 19; Elliot Klayman, Standard Setting Under the Consumer
Product Safety Amendments of 1981—A Shift in Regulatory Philosophy, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
96, 100–01 (1982); see also OFFICE OF COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSP., supra note 63 (citing
additional examples in the work of the U.S. Coast Guard, the Federal Aviation Administration, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and other agencies).
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the Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA) was directed
to adopt voluntary consensus standards as governmental standards unless
such adoption would not result in improved worker health or safety. 168 After
this initial period, a preference for consensus standards was maintained by
the law’s requirement that OSHA state its reasons for adopting any rule
that differs substantially from an existing consensus standard. 169 Similar
statutory support for the use of consensus standards led the Consumer
Products Safety Administration to adopt a policy not to develop governmental standards if “acceptable” consensus standards were developed and
adhered to by consumer product manufacturers. 170
The federal government has also endorsed the public use of private
standards in general laws and policies. In 1982, the Office o� Management
and Budget (OMB) issued a Circular stating that it was the “policy of the
Federal Government in its procurement and regulatory activities to [r]ely
on voluntary standards, both domestic and international, whenever feasible
and consistent with law and regulation pursuant to law.” 171 Congress gave
statutory force to this endorsement in 1995 with the National Technology
Transfer Advancement Act (NTTAA), mandating that federal agencies use
technical standards developed by voluntary consensus standards bodies
rather than government-unique standards as a means of carrying out policy
objectives unless “inconsistent with applicable law or otherwise impractical.” 172 While the Act’s legislative history acknowledges a distinction
between technical standards and regulatory standards, this Congressional
endorsement strengthened the authority o� federal agencies to rely on
voluntary consensus standards in carrying out their regulatory objectives. 173
168.
169.

Freeman, supra note 16, at 640 n.401; Hamilton, supra note 19, at 1388.
HARM SCHEPEL, THE CONSTITUTION OF PRIVATE GOVERNANCE: PRODUCT
STANDARDS IN THE REGULATION OF INTEGRATING MARKETS 95 (2005) (discussing OSHA
Section 6(b)(8)).
170.
Hamilton, supra note 54, at 467.
171.
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, CIRCULAR
NO. A-119, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE PARTICIPATION IN THE DEVELOPMENT AND USE
OF VOLUNTARY STANDARDS (1983), available at http://www.osec.doc.gov/opog/
dmp/daos/dao216_14.html (revised by the passage of the National Technology Transfer
Advancement Act, 63 Fed. Reg. 8546 (Feb. 19, 1998)).
172.
National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-113,
110 Stat. 775, § 12(d)(3) (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
173.
The NTTAA formally covers only technical standards, as distinguished from
regulatory standards. See Strauss, supra note 19, at 526, 526 n.201 (discussing legislative
history o� NTTAA suggesting that the Act’s and the Circular’s endorsement of incorporation by reference applies to technical standards and not regulatory standards, wherein the
former pertain to matters such as the “size, strength, or technical performance of a product,
process, or material” and the latter “establish[] overall regulatory goals and outcomes”).
However, as Strauss recognizes, the Act and Circular are used to support the incorporation
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Although a longstanding practice, incorporation of private standards
continues to raise important policy concerns. One is that public regulation
will incorporate standards that were created without the due process protections of public standardization. To some extent, this concern has been
addressed by the norms that govern the creation of voluntary consensus
standards. 174 According to one commentator, “private standardization has
assimilated the canons of administrative law to such an extent that it is hard
to find a difference” between its procedures and those of public law. 175
Yet while procedures may seem similar, private interests may overwhelm public interests more than in public rulemaking. A 1990 study that
compared public and private safety standards in several industries found
that private standard setting may be “controlled by those who want the least
done,” resulting in standards that are “watered down.” 176 The study also
found that the consensus process allows industry interests to outweigh
consumer and other public interests. 177 A consumer advocate, for example,
may cast a negative vote, but be overridden by a larger number of industry
advocates. 178 While consumer advocates are not excluded from the process,
they are less likely to have the resources for effective participation. 179
Another significant concern is raised by the copyrighted status of many
private standards that are incorporated by reference. 180 When private standards are incorporated by reference in regulation, the text of the regulation
simply refers to the standard by name or other identifying information
rather than reproducing it in the Federal Register. 181 Often, to be accessed,
these incorporated private standards must be purchased from SDOs at
of regulatory standards as well. Id. at 558–59 (recommending that regulatory standards not
be able to be incorporated by reference); see also Mendelson, supra note 19, at 792 (discussing
how “[s]o-called ‘technical’ standards often function to define substantive policy”).
174.
See supra notes 49–52 and associated text; see also Hamilton, supra note 54, at 462–
64 (describing the development process for consensus standards).
175.
SCHEPEL, supra note 169, at 409; cf. CHEIT, supra note 7, at 15 (stating “there is a
surprising degree of similarity in procedural requirements in the public and private sectors”); Meidinger, supra note 31, at 237 (stating that “certain institutional patterns have
become common in private regulation for each of these functions [standard setting, etc.],
and they bear many similarities to government regulation”).
176.
CHEIT, supra note 7, at 176.
177.
Id. at 176–77.
178.
Id. at 176.
179.
Id. at 177. But see Hamilton, supra note 54, at 467 (observing that SDOs have been
sensitive to the charge that consumer and other public interests are not well represented and
citing ASTM and other organizations’ policies to encourage participation).
180.
Lawrence A. Cunningham, Private Standards in Public Law: Copyright, Lawmaking
and the Case of Accounting, 104 MICH. L. REV. 291, 292 (2005) (“Government increasingly
leverages its regulatory function by embodying in law standards that are promulgated and
copyrighted by non-governmental organizations.”).
181.
Bremer, supra note 19, at 133.
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commercial prices. 182 This practice undermines the principle that the content of public law should be publicly available. 183
Various reforms have been proposed to make incorporated standards
publicly accessible. A 2011 recommendation of the Administrative Conference of the United States recommended that agencies “work with the
copyright owner to ensure that material will be reasonably available to
regulated and other interested parties both during rulemaking and following promulgation.” 184 One observer has argued that, at a minimum,
incorporated standards should be available to all interested parties without
charge through digital, read-only access. 185 Another recommends that the
federal government derecognize the copyright of incorporated standards in
certain situations. 186

2. Public Endorsement of Self-Regulation
Strong harnessing is also present in regulatory approaches like enforced
self-regulation and audited self-regulation where the government endorses
the role of private regulators in making and implementing their own rules.
In enforced self-regulation, firms are required to propose particularized
regulatory standards that will fulfill the public regulator’s policy objectives,
and then these standards can be enforced by the public regulator. 187 In
audited self-regulation, a private self-regulatory organization (SRO) is
182.
183.
184.

Mendelson, supra note 19, at 743–44 (discussing the prices charged by SDOs).
Id. at 767–76.
ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE
RECOMMENDATION 2011-5: INCORPORATION BY REFERENCE, at 5 (adopted Dec. 8, 2011),
available at http://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/Recommendation-2011-5-Incorporationby-Reference_0.pdf; see also Mendelson, supra note 19, at 744 (referring to it as a “tepid
recommendation”).
185.
Mendelson, supra note 19, at 799–800; see also Strauss, supra note 19, at 558 (calling for the “[c]reation of a digital archive of incorporated standards to replace (or
supplement) the current physical archive”).
186.
Cunningham, supra note 180, at 338–41 (calling on the Director of the Federal
Register to, in certain circumstances, derecognize copyright).
187.
Cf. IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION:
TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 101 (1992) (referring to this approach as
“enforced self-regulation”); Robyn Fairman & Charlotte Yapp, Enforced Self-Regulation,
Prescription, and Conceptions of Compliance within Small Businesses: The Impact of Enforcement,
27 LAW & POL’Y 491, 493 (2005) (explaining that enforced self-regulation “refers to the
regulator imposing a requirement for business to determine and implement their own
internal rules and procedures to fulfill the regulator’s policy objectives”). This approach has
also been called management-based regulation. See Coglianese & Lazer, supra note 125, at
691 (stating that the public regulator directs regulated companies to “engage in a planning
process that aims toward the achievement of public goals, offering firms flexibility in how
they achieve public goals”).

McAllister_to_PDF

Spring 2014]

9/26/2014 9:42 AM

Harnessing Private Regulation

323

empowered “to implement and enforce laws or agency regulations with
respect to the regulated entities, with powers of independent action and
review retained by the agency.” 188 The former involves public endorsement
o� firm-level self-regulation, while the latter involves public endorsement of
industry-level self-regulation. In both, firms generally devise their own
rules and standards, subject to review and oversight by a public regulatory
agency.
The USDA’s Hazards Analysis and Critical Control Points (HACCP)
regulation serves as an example of enforced self-regulation. 189 The HACCP
regulation requires firms to assess the risks of potential hazards associated
with all stages o� food processing and then identify all points in the production process at which hazards can likely be eliminated, minimized, or
reduced. 190 Similarly, OSHA’s Process Safety Management (PSM) regulation requires that certain firms “implement a multistep management
practice to assess risks for chemical accidents, develop procedures designed
to reduce those risks, and take actions to ensure that procedures are carried
out in practice.” 191 The agencies assess compliance by reviewing the management plans and other documentation generated by the firms and by
undertaking inspections and other activities to determine whether firms are
implementing their plans.
In audited self-regulation, the SRO is generally an industry-level organization, which sets rules and standards that regulate the firms in its
industry. 192 A long-standing use of audited self-regulation is provided by
the 1965 law that created Medicare. 193 The law determined that hospitals
accredited by a hospital industry association, the Joint Commission (JC),
would have “deemed status,” meaning that it was deemed to have met the
federal standards referred to as the Medicare Conditions o� Participation
and was thus eligible to provide Medicare-funded services. 194 In this way,
188.
Douglas C. Michael, Federal Agency Use of Audited Self-Regulation as a Regulatory
Technique, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 171, 251 (1995).
189.
See Coglianese & Lazer, supra note 125, at 697–98.
190.
Id. at 697.
191.
Id. at 698.
192.
Cf. Gunningham & Rees, supra note 98, at 365–66; see also AYRES &
BRAITHWAITE, supra note 187, at 102 (calling this “industry co-regulation”).
193.
42 U.S.C. § 1395bb(a) (2012). See generally Freeman, supra note 16, at 649; Eleanor
D. Kinney, Private Accreditation as a Substitute for Direct Government Regulation in Public
Health Insurance Programs: When Is It Appropriate? 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47 (1994);
Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Medicare and the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare
Organizations: A Healthy Relationship? 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15 (1994).
194.
Jost, supra note 193, at 18 (“Since its inception, the Medicare program has accepted, or ‘deemed,’ Joint Commission accreditation as equivalent to compliance with Medicare
certification standards.”).
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the JC’s accreditation process served as a substitute for direct public regulation of the quality o� hospital care by the Department o� Health and
Human Services (HHS). 195 Amid concerns that HHS lacked necessary
oversight power, a 2008 amendment to the Medicare law removed the automatic deeming authority of the Joint Commission and made it necessary
for the JC to apply to HHS for approval to maintain its accrediting status. 196

3. Third-Party Verification
A final example of strong harnessing is third-party verification, which
is the focus of the remaining parts of this Article. In third-party verification, governmental agencies rely on private third parties to verify
regulatory compliance. 197 Regulated entities are either required or have the
option to contract with a verifier or verification body that has been approved, or accredited, by an agency or an agency-designated accreditation
body. Third-party verification harnesses the private testing, inspection, and
certification capacity that has been developed to implement and monitor
compliance with private regulation. In this way, third-party verification can
substitute for direct compliance monitoring by a governmental agency. 198
A variety of state and federal regulatory programs in the United States
employ third-party verification. At the state level, Massachusetts and California require third-party verification in their greenhouse gas reporting
regulations. 199 In Massachusetts, third-party verifiers assess compliance
with underground storage tank laws 200 and hazardous waste site remediation
standards, a practice that has been dubbed “rent-a-regulator” by one observ195.
Id. at 15; see also Michael J. Astrue, Health Care Reform and the Constitutional Limits
on Private Accreditation as an Alternative to Direct Government Regulation, 57 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 75, 77 (1994) (noting that the subagency within the Department o�
Health and Human Services responsible for the accreditation process resisted becoming an
independent regulator and instead chose to contract its work out to private accrediting
agencies).
196.
Juliet Battard Menendez, The Impetus for Legislation Revoking the Joint Commission’s
Deemed Status as a Medicare Accrediting Agency, 12 JONA’S HEALTHCARE L. ETHICS & REG.
69, 69 (2010) (noting that the legislative change was preceded by a 2004 GAO report: U.S.
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-850, MEDICARE: CMS NEEDS ADDITIONAL
AUTHORITY TO ADEQUATELY OVERSEE PATIENT SAFETY IN HOSPITALS (2004)). In November 2009, CMS approved the continuation of the Joint Commission’s deeming authority
for hospitals through July 15, 2014. The Joint Commission’s Hospital Accreditation Recognized by
CMS, 30 JOINT COMMISSION PERSP., no. 1, Jan. 2010, at 1.
197.
McAllister, supra note 21, at 2 (providing an overview of third-party verification,
its strengths, and potential weaknesses).
198.
Id. at 3.
199.
Id. at 7.
200.
Id. at 10.
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er. 201 Private smog-check stations and building inspectors are relied on by
regulatory agencies in many states and localities. 202
At the federal level, agencies in diverse areas of regulation are using private third parties to carry out inspections and verify that regulated entities
are in compliance with federal standards and other requirements. Third
parties are charged with assessing the safety of imported food, children’s
products, medical devices, cell phones, and other telecommunication and
electrical equipment used in workplaces. 203 Third parties also ensure that
products labeled as organic, energy-efficient, and water-efficient meet applicable federal standards. 204 In these regulatory third-party programs, third
parties carry out product testing, facility inspections, and other regulatory
compliance activities in the place of regulatory agencies. Regulatory agencies take on new roles in coordinating and overseeing these private actors.
A variety of reasons motivate the use of third-party verification. It is a
form of public-private partnership, which many view as a promising way to
capitalize on the different strengths of public and private regulation while
compensating for their different weaknesses. 205 In particular, third-party
verification taps into the monitoring and compliance expertise held by the
large private verification industry that has developed through private regulation. 206 Moreover, third-party verification seems suited for an era of
growing regulatory demands and diminishing governmental resources. 207
New regulatory programs such as cap-and-trade need very accurate compliance data, old regulatory programs suffer from serious deficiencies in comcompliance monitoring, and the budgetary resources of regulatory agencies
seem to grow ever scarcer. 208 Also, some regulatory goals are particularly
difficult to meet using traditional monitoring approaches such as ensuring
the safety of imported food and other products manufactured in complex
international chains of production.
Yet concerns about third-party verification also abound. Compliance
monitoring could be considered a core governmental function that should

201.
Seifter, supra note 157, at 1091, 1096–97; Third-Party UST Inspector Frequently Asked
Questions, MASS. OFFICE OF ENERGY & ENVTL. AFFAIRS, http://www.mass.gov/eea/
agencies/massdep/toxics/ust/third-party-ust-inspector-frequently-asked-questions.html (last
visited Nov. 7, 2013).
202.
McAllister, supra note 21, at 10.
203.
See infra Part II.A.
204.
See infra Part II.B.2–4.
205.
Cf. Balleisen, supra note 134, at 454–59 (discussing how the strengths of selfregulation can help overcome the weaknesses of governmental regulation).
206.
McAllister, supra note 21, at 15–20.
207.
Id. at 2.
208.
Id. at 20–28.
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not be performed by private actors. 209 Third-party verifiers may not be
adequately independent from the regulated entities they assess or adequately competent to reliably detect noncompliance. Potential problems of
accountability arise in third-party verification, as they do in other forms of
public-private partnerships. 210 And while third-party verification offers the
possibility of shifting some of the cost of assessing compliance from government agencies to regulated industry, it also creates new types of costs for
both, which may not be cost-effective. 211

4. Harnessing in the European Union
These various forms of strongly harnessing private regulation are more
prevalent in the European Union than the United States. The “New Approach,” established by EU directive in 1985 to harmonize the health, safety,
and environmental requirements o� EU Member States and thereby facilitate trade, gave European standards bodies a great deal of regulatory
authority. 212 Under the New Approach, EU directives lay down the “essential requirements” for product safety, and technical specifications are drawn
up by one of three European standards bodies. 213 These “harmonized standards” are automatically transposed into member state standards, and
conflicting standards must be withdrawn. 214 Companies that comply with
209.
Id. at 28–31.
210.
Balleisen, supra note 134, at 465–68; Freeman, supra note 151, at 1326–27; Minow,
supra note 3, at 1259.
211.
McAllister, supra note 21, at 44–46.
212.
Council Resolution on a New Approach to Technical Harmonization and Standards, 1985 O.J. (C 136) 1, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUri
Serv.do?uri=OJ:C:1985:136:0001:0009:EN:PDF; SCHEPEL, supra note 169, at 63–65;
EUROPEAN COMM. FOR ELECTROTECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION, PRIMER ON STANDARDS:
UNCOVERING THE MYSTERIES OF STANDARDIZATION IN EUROPE 30–31 (2002), available at
http://oek.ove.at/CenelecInfo.pdf.
213.
NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., A GUIDE TO EU STANDARDS AND
CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT 14 (Helen Delaney & Rene van de Zande eds., 2000), available
at http://gsi.nist.gov/global/docs/EU_Stds&CA_2000.pdf. New Approach directives exist
for example on topics such as energy efficiency requirements, low-voltage equipment,
medical devices, and toy safety. Id. at 5–6. The three European standards bodies are CEN,
the European Committee for Standardization, responsible for standards in all fields except
electrotechnology and telecommunications; CENELEC, the European Committee for
Electrotechnical Standardization, responsible for electrotechnology standards; and ETSI,
the European Telecommunications Standards Institute, responsible for telecommunications
standards. EUROPEAN COMM. FOR ELECTROTECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION, supra note 212,
at 31.
214.
EUROPEAN COMM. FOR ELECTROTECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION, supra note 212,
at 17; The “New Approach”, EUROPEAN COMM., http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/
european-standards/harmonised-standards/new-approach_en.htm (last updated Feb. 2,
2013).
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the harmonized standards are presumed to be in compliance with the EU
directive and their products can circulate freely in the EU. 215 Manufacturers
can also choose not to comply with the harmonized standards, but member
states can impose costly testing and certification requirements to ensure
that their products still comply with the directive’s essential requirements. 216
Also, European countries have employed various forms of co-regulation
to a greater extent than the United States. 217 Enforced self-regulation is
widespread in European health, safety, and environmental regulation. 218 In
the Netherlands, audited self-regulation pertaining to the environment has
taken the form of “negotiated agreements,” wherein industry legally binds
itself to achieve the environmental objectives embodied in legislation. 219
Such agreements have been common in agriculture, oil refining, and waste
disposal. 220 In France, the Ministries o� Industry and Environment negotiated with car manufacturers, importers, and trade associations to reduce the
amount o� landfill waste resulting from automobile disposal. 221
Forms of third-party verification are also much more common in European regulation. Complementing its New Approach to set product safety
standards, the EU developed a Global Approach to Testing and Certification to implement standards. 222 The global approach relies on third-party
verifiers, referred to as “notified bodies,” to certify that products
215.
SCHEPEL, supra note 169, at 64–65.
216.
Id. at 65.
217.
See, e.g., Eric W. Orts & Kurt Deketelaere, Introduction: Environmental Contracts
and Regulatory Innovation, in ENVIRONMENTAL CONTRACTS: COMPARATIVE APPROACHES
TO REGULATORY INNOVATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 5 (Eric W. Orts &
Kurt Deketelaere eds., 2001) (stating that “environmental ‘agreements’ or ‘covenants’ have
been used for several decades in many European countries” including Belgium, France,
Germany, and the Netherlands).
218.
Fairman & Yapp, supra note 187, at 493.
219.
Anastasia Telesetsky, Experimenting with International Collaborative Governance for
Climate Change Mitigation by Private Actors: Scaling Up Dutch Co-Regulation, 4 EUR. J. OF
LEGAL STUD. 58, 64–65 (2011); see also Dennis D. Hirsch, Understanding Project XL: A
Comparative Legal and Policy Analysis, in ENVIRONMENTAL CONTRACTS: COMPARATIVE
APPROACHES TO REGULATORY INNOVATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE, supra
note 217, at 115, 122–26; Orts & Deketelaere, supra note 217, at 6–7.
220.
Telesestsky, supra note 219, at 65.
221.
Lyon & Maxwell, supra note 7, at 80.
222.
Commission Proposal for a Global Approach to Certification and Testing, COM (1989)
209 final (July 24, 1989) (completed by Council Decision 90/683/EEC, 1990 O.J. (L380)
(EEC), replaced and updated by Council Decision 93/465, 1993 O.J. (L 220) (EEC));
EUROPEAN COMM. FOR ELECTROTECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION, supra note 212, at 43; see
also MICHELLE EGAN, CONSTRUCTING A EUROPEAN MARKET: STANDARDS, REGULATION,
AND GOVERNANCE 125–28 (2001) (describing negotiations to develop the Global Approach
in the 1980s).
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conform to relevant EU directives. 223 Notified bodies are accredited by
national accreditation bodies and “notified” to the European Commission,
which is the reason for their name. 224 As explained by one commentator,
the “EU has created an administrative structure . . . supported, above all, by
private entities, which ultimately and bindingly decide on market access for
products in their function as ‘Notified Bodies.’ ” 225 Member states have the
authority to withdraw the accreditation of notified bodies and are required
to conduct surveillance activities to ensure that marketed products comply
with legal requirements. 226
Third-party verification is also used in a variety of other EU regulatory
programs. Entities regulated by the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, for
example, must generally contract with an accredited third party to verify
the accuracy of their annual emissions reports. 227 Also, a company or other
organizations can earn the right to display the European Eco-Management
and Audit Scheme (EMAS) logo by having an accredited third party verify
that it has established an environmental management system, carried out an
internal audit, and provided a public statement of its environmental performance. 228

II. FEDERAL THIRD-PARTY VERIFICATION PROGRAMS
Third-party verification programs operated by federal agencies in the
United States vary in important ways. In many cases, Congress provided
223.
Hans Christian Röhl, Conformity Assessment in European Product Safety Law, in
THE EUROPEAN COMPOSITE ADMINISTRATION 201, 206 (Oswald Jansen and Bettina
Schöndorf-Haubold eds., 2001) (explaining that certified products receive the CE mark and
noting that manufacturers can often certify themselves, but for more dangerous products,
they must consult a Notified Body).
224.
Id. at 206, 222–23 (explaining that notified bodies are generally accredited to ISO
standards 17000 and 17011).
225.
Id. at 201.
226.
Id. at 223–25.
227.
McAllister, supra note 21, at 7; see also Commission Decision 2004/156, Establishing Guidelines for the Monitoring and Reporting of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Pursuant to
Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, arts. 1–2, 2004 O.J.
(L 59) 1, 1. The Commission adopted a revised version of these guidelines on July 18, 2007.
Commission Decision 2007/589, Establishing Guidelines for the Monitoring and Reporting
of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, arts. 2–3, 2007 O.J. (L 229) 1, 3.
228.
European Eco-Management & Audit Scheme, EMAS Reporting, Question 7 of
Frequently Asked Questions, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/environment/emas/
tools/faq_en.htm#Section7Question1 (last updated Jan. 16, 2014); see also David W. Case,
Corporate Environmental Reporting as Informational Regulation: A Law and Economics Perspective, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 379, 402 (2005); Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89
NW. U. L. REV. 1227, 1290 (1995).
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legislative authority for the third-party program and set forth certain design
elements in statutes. In other cases, agencies have implemented third-party
programs under existing statutory authority. Several programs are a decade
or two old, but most have been established more recently. Depending on
the program, third parties assess compliance with mandatory or voluntary
regulatory standards, and regulated entities may either be required or may
have the option to contract with third parties for such assessment. Table 1
summarizes several relevant program attributes such as the assessment
activities that third parties perform, whether the applicable standard is set
by the government or privately (i.e. a voluntary consensus standard), and
whether the agency directly accredits the third parties or relies on private
accreditation bodies.
Notably, federal agencies have increasingly incorporated ISO standards
and terminology relating to conformity assessment into their third-party
programs. Agencies have most often relied on international standards that
concern how testing bodies should conduct testing (ISO/IEC 17025); how
certification bodies should conduct certifications (ISO/IEC Guide 65 or
ISO/IEC 17065, issued in 2012 to replace Guide 65); and how accreditation
bodies should conduct accreditations (ISO/IEC 17011). By doing so, agencies tap into the international networks of accreditation bodies, certification
bodies, and testing bodies that operate in accordance with these standards
and perform the work of conformity assessment.
In most of the programs discussed below, regulatory agencies rely on
third parties that serve the function of certification bodies. Regulatory
agencies have used a variety of names for these third parties, such as ThirdParty Auditors, Telecommunications Certification Bodies, and Accredited
Persons. The programs tend to share the same basic structure (see Figure
1). Regulated entities contract with a third-party certification body to assess
and certify whether they are in conformity with an applicable regulatory
standard. The certification bodies are generally private entities that have
been accredited to perform this task by an accreditation body that has been
approved or recognized by the regulatory agency.
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TABLE 1: FEDERAL REGULATORY THIRD-PARTY PROGRAMS WITH
SELECTED PROGRAM ATTRIBUTES
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Figure 1: General Structure o� Third-Party Programs to Assess Regulatory
Compliance
A Regulatory Agency
approves
Accreditation Bodies
that accredit
Certification Bodies
that certify
Regulated Entities or Regulated Products
are in conformity with
A Regulatory Standard
However, this general structure varies. In some programs, for example,
the regulatory agency itself accredits the certification bodies directly, without reliance on an accreditation body. In other programs the regulatory
agency may require the certification body to be accredited by an accreditation body, but the agency may not explicitly approve or recognize
accreditation bodies. Also, several of the programs rely on a combination of
certification bodies and testing bodies.
The first section below discusses four programs designed to assess
compliance with mandatory standards, with which regulated companies
must comply. The second section discusses four programs designed to
assess compliance with voluntary standards with which companies can
choose to comply.

A. Programs for Mandatory Standards
Several federal laws enable regulatory agencies to rely on third parties
to assess compliance with mandatory standards. Mandatory standards are
those that regulated entities must comply with in order to legally operate or
sell a regulated product. In two of the programs—imported food programs
administered by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and children’s
product safety rules administered by the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC)—the third-party certifier is an obligatory part of the
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compliance process: the regulated company is required to contract with the
third party for compliance assessment. 229 In FDA’s programs for medical
devices, in contrast, the use of a third party is optional: companies have the
choice o� hiring a third party or having the agency conduct the review or
inspection instead. 230 In the FCC’s program for telecommunications
equipment, the use of a third party was optional for most types of equipment in the past, but a proposed regulation would make it obligatory for all
types. 231

1. Imported Food
As amended by the Food Safety Modernization Act of 2011 (FSMA),
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) enables the FDA to
rely on third-party audits in its regulation of imported foods. 232 Overall,
the FDA is responsible for ensuring the safety of about 80% of the U.S.
food supply, all but the meat, poultry, and processed egg products that are
regulated by U.S. Department of Agriculture. 233 Increasingly, much of this
food supply is imported, including 80% of seafood and 60% o� fruits and
vegetables. 234
FSMA significantly strengthened FDA’s authority to regulate imported
food, and it relies on accredited third-party auditors in two different ways.
First, the law provides that the FDA may require that an importer present a
certification from a third-party auditor in order to import food into the
United States. 235 With this authority, the FDA may require that imported
food be accompanied by a certification that it satisfies the applicable requirements of the FDCA. 236 To decide whether a food import requires
certification, the law instructs FDA to consider factors such as the safety
risks of the food and its place of origin. 237 The law also instructs the FDA
to make a scientifically supported finding that the “food safety programs,
systems, and standards in the country, territory, or region of origin of the
229.
See infra Part II.A.1–2.
230.
See infra Part II.A.3.
231.
See infra Part II.A.4.
232.
See FDA Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA) of 2011 § 307, Pub. L. No. 111353, 124 Stat. 3885, 3959 (codified at 21 U.S.C. 384d (2012)).
233.
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-933, FOOD SAFETY: FDA CAN
BETTER OVERSEE FOOD IMPORTS BY ASSESSING AND LEVERAGING OTHER COUNTRIES’
OVERSIGHT RESOURCES 1 (2012).
234.
Id.
235.
See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) § 801(q), 21 U.S.C. § 381(q)
(2012) (amended by the FDA Food Safety Modernization Act § 303); see also 21 U.S.C.
§ 384d(c)(2)(B)(i) (2012).
236.
21 U.S.C. § 381(q) (2012).
237.
Id. § 381(q)(2).
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food are inadequate to ensure that the article o� food is as safe as a similar
article o� food that is manufactured, processed, packed, or held in the United States in accordance with the requirements of this chapter.” 238
Second, the law requires FDA to create a Voluntary Qualified Importer
Program (VQIP) through which participating importers may receive expedited importation if the facility from which the imported food comes has
been certified by a third-party auditor. 239 In contrast to mandatory food
certifications, these facility certifications are voluntary. Importers that
import foods from facilities that have received certification from a thirdparty auditor may request to have that food become part of the VQIP. 240
The law directs the FDA to consider a range o� factors to make a determination on whether the food should receive expedited review and importation
through the VQIP, including the safety risks of the food, the compliance
history of the suppliers used by the importer, and the capability of the
exporting country’s regulatory system. 241
In both programs, the third-party auditors would be responsible for
performing the audits to assess and certify compliance with the mandatory
requirements of the law. 242 Under the statute, a third-party auditor refers to
a “foreign government, agency of a foreign government, foreign cooperative, or any other third party” as deemed appropriate by the FDA in its
regulations. 243 Private third-party auditors can be single individuals, but are
more likely to be companies that employ “audit agents.” 244 Under the statute, the audits for food and facility certifications are termed “regulatory
audit[s].” 245 Importers and other regulated entities may also contract with
238.
Id. § 381(q)(2)(C)(i).
239.
FDCA § 806, 21 U.S.C. § 381(b) (2012) (amended by FSMA § 302); see also 21
U.S.C. § 384d(c)(2)(B)(ii) (2012).
240.
An importer “means the person that brings food, or causes food to be brought,
from a foreign country into the customs territory of the United States.” 21 U.S.C. § 384b(g)
(2012). Elsewhere the law defines an importer as “the United States owner or consignee of
the article o� food at the time of entry,” or if none, “the United States agent or representative of a foreign owner or consignee of the article o� food at the time of entry.” 21 U.S.C.
§ 384a (2012).
241.
21 U.S.C. § 384b(d) (2012).
242.
The law provides that the FDA may provide certifications, 21 U.S.C.
§ 384d(c)(2)(C)(ii) (2012), but it seems likely that FDA will generally require the use of an
accredited third-party auditor.
243.
Id. § 384d(a)(3).
244.
Id. § 384d(a)(3) (stating that a third-party auditor may be a single individual and
third-party auditors may employ “audit agents,” defined at 21 U.S.C. § 384d(a)(1) (2012) as
“an individual who is an employee or agent of an accredited third-party auditor and, although not individually accredited, is qualified to conduct food safety audits on behalf of an
accredited third-party auditor”).
245.
Id. § 384d(a)(7).
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an accredited third-party auditor to conduct a “consultative audit,” defined
in the law to be for internal purposes only. 246
The structure of the third-party program contemplated by FSMA is
shown in Figure 2. The law provides that the FDA will recognize accreditation bodies that will, in turn, accredit the third-party auditors that can audit
and certify foreign food imports and facilities. 247 An accreditation body is
“an authority that performs accreditation of third-party auditors.” 248 The
law requires FDA to establish a system for the recognition of accreditation
bodies 249 and to develop model accreditation standards, including requirements for regulatory audit reports. 250 If the FDA has not recognized any
accreditation bodies within two years after establishing a system, the FDA
may directly accredit third-party auditors. 251 The law further provides that
FDA will establish a user-fee program through which accredited third-party
auditors and audit agents will reimburse the FDA for “the work performed
to establish and administer the accreditation system.” 252

246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.

Id. § 384d(a)(5).
See generally FDCA § 808, 21 U.S.C. § 384d (2012) (amended by FSMA § 307).
Id. § 384d(a)(2).
Id. § 384d(b)(1)(A)(i).
Id. § 384d(b)(2).
Id. § 384d(b)(1)(A)(ii).
Id. § 384d(c)(8).
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FIGURE 2: STRUCTURE OF THIRD-PARTY PROGRAM FOR FOOD
AND FACILITY CERTIFICATIONS
FDA
recognizes
Accreditation Bodies
that accredit
Third-Party Auditors
that audit and certify
Food Imports and Foreign Facilities
are in conformity with
Requirements of the FDCA
The statute sets forth certain requirements for the accreditation of different types of third-party auditors. It states that foreign governments and
their agencies may be accredited based on a review of their food safety
programs to ensure that the foreign government is capable of determining
that U.S. requirements are met. 253 Foreign cooperatives and other third
parties may be accredited based on a review of internal systems and the
training and qualifications of their audit agents to ensure conformity with
the model standards to be issued by the FDA. 254
The statute addresses the potential of conflicts of interest between accredited third-party auditors and the companies that contract with them to
perform audits. 255 It provides that third-party auditors may not perform a
regulatory audit of an entity for which it has performed a consultative audit
or a regulatory audit in the previous thirteen months. 256 It also states that
third-party auditors cannot be owned or operated by the same person as the
entities they certify, must have procedures to protect against financial conflicts of interest, and must annually disclose to the FDA how they have
253.
254.
255.
256.

Id. § 384d(c)(1)(A).
Id. § 384d(c)(1)(B).
Id. § 384d(c)(5)(C).
Id. § 384d(c)(4)(C)(i).
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complied with conflicts-of-interest rules and procedures. 257 Similarly, audit
agents cannot own or operate the entity they certify, must have procedures
to protect against financial conflicts of interest, and must make an annual
disclosure. 258 The law also requires FDA to promulgate regulations to further protect against conflicts of interest. 259
The law contains several specific provisions regarding how the FDA
should oversee accreditation bodies and accredited third-party auditors and
what audit information must be made available to the agency and to the
public. Accreditation bodies are required to provide a list of all third-party
auditors they have accredited and their audit agents, 260 and the FDA is
required to establish a public registry of all accreditation bodies and accredited third-party auditors. 261 FDA must re-evaluate accreditation bodies at
least once every four years 262 and must revoke the recognition of an accreditation body that is out of compliance with its rules. 263
Accredited third-party auditors are directly answerable to the FDA in a
variety of ways. The FDA may at any time require an accredited auditor to
submit an onsite audit report from a regulatory audit and any related reports or documents. 264 In contrast, the FDA may not directly require an
auditor to submit the reports from a consultative audit, but can still access
the results of such audits based on its general authority to inspect records
when FDA has a reasonable belief that an article o� food “presents a threat
of serious adverse health consequences or death to humans or animals.” 265
Also, an accredited auditor must immediately notify the FDA if it “discovers a condition that could cause or contribute to a serious risk to the public
health” during either a regulatory or a consultative audit. 266

257.
Id. § 384d(c)(5)(A).
258.
Id. § 384d(c)(5)(B).
259.
Id. § 384d(c)(5)(C) (further stating that FDA’s conflict-of-interest regulations
shall require that audits performed by accredited third-party auditors be unannounced; shall
establish timing, disclosure, fee payment and other rules that decrease the potential for
conflicts of interest; and shall place limits on the extent to which there may be financial
affiliations between auditors and audit agents and the entities they certify).
260.
Id. § 384d(b)(1)(B).
261.
Id. § 384d(g).
262.
Id. § 384d(�)(1).
263.
Id. § 384d(b)(1)(C).
264.
Id. § 384d(c)(3)(B).
265.
Id. § 384d(c)(3)(C) (referring to FDA’s authority to inspect records at 21 U.S.C.
§ 350c (2012)).
266.
21 U.S.C. § 384d(c)(4)(A) (2012); see also Imports, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/food/guidanceregulation/fsma/ucm257980.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2013)
(answering in the affirmative the question, “I.4.2 Is the accredited auditor required to notify
the FDA if a condition of concern is found during a consultative audit?”).
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In addition, FDA is required to evaluate the performance of each accredited third-party auditor at least once every four years, which should
include the review of its regulatory audit reports and the compliance history of its certified entities. 267 The FDA may also conduct its own onsite
audit of any certified entity whether or not the certifying third-party auditor is present. 268 The FDA may withdraw accreditation from an auditor i�
food from a facility it has certified is linked to a serious outbreak o� foodborne illness, i� FDA evaluates it and finds it to be out of compliance with
accreditation requirements, if it refuses to allow the government to conduct
necessary audits and investigations, or if the FDA revokes the recognition
of the accreditation bodies which accredited it. 269 Also, false statements or
representations made to an accredited third-party auditor by a regulated
entity or to the FDA by an accredited third-party auditor are subject to
criminal penalties. 270
In July 2013, FDA proposed a rule to implement many of these statutory provisions. 271 The regulations set forth FDA’s system for recognizing
accreditation bodies, including the requirements and procedures for recognition. To be recognized, accreditation bodies must be able to, inter alia,
show certain levels of competency and capacity, protect against conflicts of
interest, assess and monitor third-party auditors, and meet recordkeeping
and reporting requirements. 272 The regulations also address the requirements and procedures for the accreditation of third-party auditors.
Accredited third-party auditors, like recognized accreditation bodies, must
show certain levels of competency and capacity, protect against conflicts of
interests, and meet recordkeeping and reporting requirements. 273 The rule
further specifies how third-party auditors must ensure the competence of
its audit agents, conduct audits, write audit reports, and monitor foods and
facilities that it has certified. 274 While the proposed rule contains a framework for accreditation standards, FDA has committed to issuing Model
267.
268.
269.
270.

21 U.S.C. § 384d(�)(2) (2012).
Id. § 384d(�)(3).
Id. § 384d(c)(6)(A)-(B).
Id. § 384d(e); see also CHARLES F. WOODHOUSE, IMPORTED FOOD PROVISIONS
OF THE FOOD SAFETY MODERNIZATION ACT (2011), available at http://www.food-labelcompliance.com/Sites/5/Downloads/White-Paper-FSMA-IMPORT-PROVISIONSWoodhouse-Nov-8-2011.pdf (a white paper emphasizing the significance of specific inclusion of provisions relating to False Statements).
271.
Accreditation o� Third-Party Auditors/Certification Bodies to Conduct Food
Safety Audits and to Issue Certifications, 78 Fed. Reg. 45,782 (Jul. 29, 2013) (to be codified
at 21 C.F.R. pts. 1, 16).
272.
Id. at 45,827–31.
273.
Id. at 45,831–38.
274.
Id. at 45,832–34.
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Accreditation Standards that will elaborate on the framework and detail the
qualifications that third-party auditors must demonstrate for accreditation. 275
It is worth noting that the FSMA also requires FDA to establish a system for the accreditation o� laboratories to conduct food safety tests. 276
Accredited labs must be used to test food in certain situations, such as when
FDA identifies or suspects a food safety problem. 277 Similar to its accredited auditor program, FDA is to establish an accredited laboratory program
and publish a registry of accreditation bodies and accredited laboratories. 278
The statute also states that FDA shall develop model accreditation standards that include, for example, appropriate sampling methods and employee
training requirements. 279

2. Children’s Products
Pursuant to the Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008
(CPSIA), the CPSC requires manufacturers and importers of nearly all
children’s products to demonstrate that they meet mandatory product safety
standards through third-party testing. 280 Testing must be conducted by a
Third Party Conformity Assessment Body (TPCAB), defined by regulation
as “a testing laboratory whose accreditation has been accepted by the CPSC
to conduct certification testing on children’s products.” 281 Based on the
275.
Id. at 45785.
276.
21 U.S.C. § 350k.
277.
Id. § 350k(b)(1).
278.
Id. § 350k(a)(1).
279.
Id. § 350k(a)(6).
280.
Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008 § 102(a)(2), 15 U.S.C.
§ 2063(a)(2) (2012). The law defines a “children’s product” as a consumer product designed
or intended primarily for children twelve years of age or younger. 15 U.S.C. § 2052(a)(2)
(2012). In 2011, Congress enacted amendments to the CPSIA that, among other things,
provided an exemption from third-party testing for some products produced by “small batch
manufacturers,” defined as those that produce fewer than 7,500 units and collect less than $1
million in consumer products revenues. Authority and Discretion—Consumer Product
Safety Commission § 2(a)(4), Pub. L. No. 112-28, 125 Stat. 273 (codified at 15 U.S.C.
2063(d) (2012)); see also Small Batch Manufacturers and Third Party Testing, U.S. CONSUMER
PROD. SAFETY COMM’N, http://www.cpsc.gov/en/business--manufacturing/small-businessresources/small-batch-manufacturers-and-third-party-/ (last visited Feb. 1, 2014). An exemption was also provided for ordinary books for children aged four to twelve. 15 U.S.C.
§ 2063(d)(5)(A)(i) (2012).
281.
16 C.F.R. § 1107.2 (2014); see also 15 U.S.C. § 2063(�)(2)(A) (2012) (defining a
“third party conformity assessment body” to mean a conformity assessment body that is not
owned, managed, or controlled by the manufacturer or private labeler of a product assessed
by the laboratory, unless such a laboratory has satisfied certain statutory criteria). It is worth
noting that while the statute uses the term certification, the third-party program that it
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results of the third-party testing, the manufacturer or importer submits a
Children’s Product Certificate indicating compliance. 282 Under the law,
third-party testing is mandatory: manufacturers cannot opt out of the thirdparty testing system and rely instead on CPSC to assess compliance. The
structure of this third-party program is shown in Figure 3.
Different rules and standards apply depending on the product. For example, the CPSC has promulgated safety rules with standards for products
such as bicycle helmets, 283 bunk beds, 284 infant bath seats, 285 and electrically
operated toys or articles. 286 CPSC product safety rules containing standards
for flammability, 287 small parts, 288 and lead content 289 may also apply. In
addition, CPSC has mandated compliance with a variety of toy safety
standards established by ASTM regarding, for example, toy chests, stuffing
materials, and sound producing toys. 290

requires is a third-party testing program rather than a certification program under the
definitions of international standards.
282.
15 U.S.C. § 2063(a)(2) (2012); see also Consumer Product Safety Act Regulations,
16 C.F.R. § 1110 (2014).
283.
Safety Standard for Bicycle Helmets, 16 C.F.R. § 1203 (2014).
284.
Id. § 1513 (Requirements for Bunk Beds).
285.
Id. § 1216 (Safety Standards for Infant Walkers).
286.
Id. § 1505 (Requirements for Electrically Operated Toys or Other Electronically
Operated Articles Intended for Use by Children).
287.
Id. §§ 1610–11, 1615–16, 1630–33.
288.
Id. § 1501 (Method for Identifying Toys and Other Articles Intended for Use by
Children Under 3 Years of Age Which Present Choking, Aspiration, or Ingestion Hazards
Because of Small Parts).
289.
See DIV. OF CHEMISTRY, U.S. CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY COMM’N, TEST
METHOD CPSC-CH-E1001-08 (2008); DIV. OF CHEMISTRY, U.S. CONSUMER PROD.
SAFETY COMM’N, TEST METHOD CPSC-CH-E1001-08.1 (2010).
290.
ASTM F963 Standard Consumer Safety Specifications for Toy Safety, provided as a
reference for List of CPSC-Accepted Testing Laboratories, U.S. CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY
COMM’N, http://www.cpsc.gov/cgi-bin/labsearch/ (last visited Feb. 1, 2014) (list of rules that
require third-party testing and certification).
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FIGURE 3: STRUCTURE OF THIRD-PARTY PROGRAM FOR
CHILDREN’S PRODUCT TESTING
CPSC
Accepts the accreditation of

Accreditation Bodies
accredit

Third Party Conformity Assessment Bodies (laboratories)
that test whether
Children’s Products
are in conformity with
CPSC safety rules and/or ASTM standards
The CPSIA established a schedule for implementing third-party testing and included a timeline for the accreditation of third-party conformity
assessment bodies. 291 The law specifies that “third party testing requirements apply to any children’s product manufactured more than 90 days
after the [CPSC] has published requirements for accreditation of third
party testing laboratories to assess conformity with a children’s product
safety rule.” 292 For example, the CPSC published such a notice of requirements for the lead paint rule on September 22, 2008 and the third-party
testing requirement for lead paint became effective December 22, 2008 for
products manufactured on or after that date. 293 In total, CPSC published

291.
15 U.S.C. § 2063(a)(3) (2012).
292.
Memorandum from Scott Heh, Special Assistant, and Robert J. Howell, Acting
Assistant Exec. Dir., Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n, to the Consumer Prod. Safety
Comm’n (Sept. 2, 2008), available at http://www.cpsc.gov//PageFiles/88264/thirdp.pdf; see
also 15 U.S.C. § 2063(a)(3)(A) (2012); Requirements Pertaining to Third Party Conformity
Assessment Bodies, 77 Fed. Reg. 31,086 (May 24, 2012) (stating that the third-party testing
requirement does not commence until “more than 90 days” after the Commission publishes a
notice of requirements pertaining to the regulation or standard to which the children’s
product is subject).
293.
U.S. CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY COMM’N, GUIDANCE DOCUMENT: TESTING AND
CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY
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nineteen notices of requirements between 2008 and 2011. 294 However, there
have been delays and stays of enforcement that have led to departures from
the statutory schedule. For example, the CPSC stayed the enforcement of
testing and certification requirements that would have gone into effect in
February 2009 for new total lead content limits, phthalates limits for certain products, and mandatory toy standards, among other things. 295 As of
January 2012, almost all stays had been lifted, and third-party certification
and testing was required under nearly all the children’s product safety
rules. 296
Rulemaking for the CPSC third-party program has also progressed. In
2011, the CPSC issued a final rule that establishes the “protocols and standards” for certification and testing of children’s products and details the
requirements for the labeling of certified products. 297 In 2012, the CPSC
issued a final rule that sets forth requirements for the periodic audit of
third party conformity assessment bodies as a condition of their continuing
accreditation. 298 And in 2013, the CPSC issued a final rule to establish the
requirements related to CPSC acceptance of the accreditation o� laboratories for purposes of testing children’s products. 299 The requirements in this
IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 2008 (2009), available at http://www.cpsc.gov/library/foia/foia10/
brief/102testing.pdf (proposed guidance document).
294.
U.S. CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY COMM’N, PROPOSED RULE: REQUIREMENTS
PERTAINING TO THIRD PARTY CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT BODIES 6 (2012), available at
http://www.cpsc.gov/library/foia/foia12/brief/tprequirements.pdf.
295.
Press Release, U.S. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n, CPSC Grants One Year
Stay o� Testing and Certification Requirements for Certain Products (Jan. 30, 2009), available at http://www.cpsc.gov/en/Newsroom/News-Releases/2009/CPSC-Grants-One-YearStay-of-Testing-and-Certification-Requirements-for-Certain-Products/; see Notice of Stay
o� Enforcement o� Testing and Certification Requirements, 74 Fed. Reg. 6396 (Feb. 9, 2009)
(staying the enforcement of certain provisions of section 14(a) of the CPSA); Consumer
Product Safety Act: Notice of Commission Action on the Stay o� Enforcement o� Testing
and Certification Requirements, 74 Fed. Reg. 68,588 (Dec. 28, 2009) (revising the terms of
stay of enforcement); Consumer Product Safety Act: Notice of Commission Action on the
Stay o� Enforcement o� Testing and Certification Requirements, 76 Fed. Reg. 6765 (Feb. 8,
2011) (continuing the stay of enforcement for testing and certification of children’s products
for which a notice of requirements for accreditation o� laboratories had not yet been published).
296.
FAQs—Certification and Third Party Testing, U.S. CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY
COMM’N, http://www.cpsc.gov/en/business--manufacturing/testing-certification/third-partytesting/faqs-certification-and-third-party-testing/ [hereinafter CPSC FAQs] (last visited Feb.
1, 2014).
297.
CPSC Testing and Labeling Pertaining to Product Certification, 76 Fed. Reg.
69,482 (Nov. 8, 2011) (codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 1107).
298.
CPSC Audit Requirements for Third Party Conformity Assessment Bodies, 77
Fed. Reg. 31,074 (May 24, 2012) (codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 1112).
299.
CPSC Requirements Pertaining to Third Party Conformity Assessment Bodies,
78 Fed. Reg. 15,836 (Mar. 12, 2013) (codified at 16 C.F.R. pts. 1112, 1118).
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final rule are largely the same as the requirements that the CPSC had set
forth in the various notices of requirements that it published since 2008.
There are three types of third-party testing: (1) initial certification testing, (2) material change testing, and (3) periodic testing. 300 Initial testing is
required for all children’s products. They must be tested by a CPSCaccepted, third-party laboratory to ensure compliance with applicable children’s product safety rules. 301 Material change testing by a third-party
CPSC-accepted laboratory is required if a material change is subsequently
made to any component part of that children’s product. 302 Periodic testing
refers to ongoing testing during production of the children’s product. Regardless of whether a material change occurs, the production of certified
children’s products is subject to periodic testing to ensure compliance with
children’s product safety rules. These periodic and material testing requirements went into effect in February 2013. 303 The requirements to test
children’s products when there is a material change and to undertake periodic testing became effective in February 2013. 304
The law provides that accreditation o� TPCABs may be conducted either by the CPSC or by a designated accreditation body. 305 Three types o�
TPCABs are contemplated by the law: (1) those that are not owned, managed, or controlled by a manufacturer or private labeler of a children’s
product to be tested for certification purposes (“independent” laboratories);
(2) those that are owned, managed, or controlled by a manufacturer or
private labeler of the children’s product (“firewalled conformity assessment
bodies”); and (3) those owned or controlled, in whole or in part, by a government (“governmental laboratories”). 306
For a TPCAB to be accepted to test children’s products for conformity
with children’s product safety rules, it must be accredited by an accreditation body that is a signatory to the ILAC MRA. 307 To be an ILAC-MRA
signatory, an accreditation body must, inter alia, operate in accordance with
300.
CPSC FAQs, supra note 296. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 2063 (2012).
301.
15 U.S.C. § 2063(d)(2)(B)(i) (2012); CPSC FAQs, supra note 296.
302.
15 U.S.C. § 2063(d)(2)(B)(i) (2012); CPSC FAQs, supra note 296.
303.
CPSC FAQs, supra note 296.
304.
Id.
305.
15 U.S.C. § 2063(a)(3)(C) (2012).
306.
See CPSC Requirements Pertaining to Third Party Conformity Assessment
Bodies, 78 Fed. Reg. at 15859 (codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 1112.11); see also 15 U.S.C.
§ 2063(�)(2) (2012).
307.
See CPSC Requirements Pertaining to Third Party Conformity Assessment
Bodies, 78 Fed. Reg. at 15860 (codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 1112.13(a)(2)); see also Requirements
Pertaining to Third Party Conformity Assessment Bodies, 73 Fed. Reg. 54564 (Sept. 22,
2008), available in unpublished form at http://www.cpsc.gov/PageFiles/91441/tprequire
ments.pdf.
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ISO/IEC 17011. 308 To make an accreditation determination, the accreditation body assesses the laboratory’s conformity with ISO/IEC 17025. 309 As
described by the CPSC, ISO/IEC 17025 includes technical requirements
relating to the competence o� laboratory staff, suitability and maintenance
of test equipment, and quality assurance of test data. 310 It also includes
management requirements relating to organization, management systems,
document controls, audits, and management reviews. 311
Laboratories are accredited with a defined scope of accreditation, which
indicates the “children’s product safety rule and/or test methods” for which
it is accredited to test. 312 As required by the CPSIA, the commission maintains an online listing of accredited TPCABs and their scopes of
accreditation. 313 The current list includes hundreds o� laboratories in about
thirty-five countries. 314 For example, the U.S.-based laboratory NSF International is accredited by International Accreditation Services Inc. (IAS),
and its scope of accreditation includes about forty-five different product
safety rules and ASTM standards. 315
Several measures exist to address conflicts of interest that could raise
doubts about the impartiality of product certifications. As part o� being
accredited to ISO/IEC 17025, a laboratory must “have policies and procedures to avoid involvement in any activities that would diminish confidence
in its competence, impartiality, judgment or operational integrity.” 316 A
laboratory must further demonstrate that its personnel are free from any
undue “commercial, financial and other pressures and influences that may
308.
See ILAC MRA and Signatories, INT’L LABORATORY ACCREDITATION
COOPERATION, http://www.ilac.org/ilacarrangement.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2013).
309.
CPSC Requirements Pertaining to Third Party Conformity Assessment Bodies,
78 Fed. Reg. at 15860 (codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 1112.13(a)(2)).
310.
U.S. CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY COMM’N, THIRD PARTY CONFORMITY
ASSESSMENT BODY ACCREDITATION REQUIREMENTS FOR TESTING COMPLIANCE WITH 16
C.F.R. PART 1501 (SMALL PARTS REGULATIONS) 4 (2008), available at http://www.cpsc.gov
//PageFiles/127865/smallparts.pdf.
311.
Id.
312.
See CPSC Form 223—Lab Accreditation, U.S. CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY COMM’N,
http://www.cpsc.gov/cgibin/labregentry/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2013).
313.
See 15 U.S.C. § 2063(a)(3)(E) (2012) (requiring that the Commission maintain
on its website an up-to-date list of entities that have been accredited to assess conformity
with children’s product safety rules).
314.
List of CPSC-Accepted Testing Laboratories, supra note 290.
315.
Id. (detailed information displayed by highlighting the laboratory name and
clicking “submit”).
316.
ISO/IEC, ISO/IEC DOC. 17025, GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
COMPETENCE OF TESTING AND CALIBRATION LABORATORIES 3 (2005), available at
http://www.saba.org.ir/saba_content/media/image/2011/04/1821_orig.pdf (last visited Feb. 3,
2014).
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adversely affect the quality of their work.” 317 Accredited laboratories are
subject to either an on-site surveillance or a full reassessment every two
years to ensure that they maintain their standards of independence and
technical expertise. 318
In addition to the baseline accreditation requirements, firewalled laboratories and governmental laboratories seeking CPSC approval must meet
additional requirements that relate to their impartiality and independence.
The CPSIA specifies that the CPSC may approve a firewalled laboratory if
the laboratory has established procedures to ensure that “its test results are
protected from undue influence by the manufacturer” and other interested
parties, the CPSC is “notified immediately of any attempt by the manufacturer . . . or other interested party to hide or exert undue influence over test
results,” and “allegations of undue influence may be reported confidentially.” 319 Similarly, the CPSIA contains five criteria that a governmental
laboratory must satisfy for its accreditation to be accepted by the CPSC,
including that manufacturers located in any nation are permitted to choose
a laboratory that is not owned or controlled by the government of that
nation and that the governmental laboratory does not exercise undue influence on the decisions of other governmental authorities that make decisions
affecting its operation or controlling distribution of products. 320
TPCABs undergo a periodic audit that includes reassessment by its accreditation body and reregistration with CPSC. 321 CPSC does not specify
the frequency of the periodic audit but rather says that it must occur at a
minimum “at the frequency established by its accreditation body.” 322 CPSC
observes that, according to ISO/IEC 17011, a full reassessment must occur
at least every two years, unless an accreditation body undertakes less comprehensive surveillance visits every six months. 323 In this case, the time
between reassessments must be no more than five years. 324
The law provides that the CPSC may withdraw its acceptance of a
TPCAB if it finds that “(A) a manufacturer, private labeler, or governmental entity has exerted undue influence on such conformity assessment body
or otherwise interfered with or compromised the integrity of the testing
process with respect to the certification of a children’s product under this
317.
Id.
318.
U.S. CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY COMM’N, supra note 310, at 4.
319.
15 U.S.C. § 2063(�)(2)(D)(ii) (2012).
320.
Id. at § 2063(�)(2)(B).
321.
CPSC Audit Requirements for Third Party Conformity Assessment Bodies, 77
Fed. Reg. at 31083–85.
322.
Id. at 31085 (codified at 16 C.F.R pt. 1112.35).
323.
Id. at 31083.
324.
Id.
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section; or (B) such conformity assessment body failed to comply with an
applicable protocol, standard, or requirement established by the Commission.” 325 The law also provides that the CPSC may suspend a laboratory’s
accreditation if it fails to cooperate with the CPSC in an investigation
regarding its certification activities. 326 Implementing these provisions,
CPSC has issued regulations that establish whether, when, and how the
CPSC may deny a TPCAB’s application, suspend accreditation, and withdraw accreditation. 327

3. Medical Devices
In fulfillment of statutory requirements, the FDA has developed two
programs through which regulated entities can opt to have third parties
perform compliance assessment tasks related to medical devices that the
regulatory agency would otherwise perform. Through the first program,
manufacturers of certain medical devices may have third parties review
their 510(k) premarket notifications (“510(k) Review Program”). Through
the second program, third parties may conduct inspections o� facilities that
manufacture certain medical devices (“Accredited Person (AP) Inspection
Program”). In both, third-party organizations recognized by FDA evaluate a
manufacturer’s compliance with mandatory standards in the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act. 328
The 510(k) Review Program was established pursuant to the FDA
Modernization Act of 1997 (FDAMA). Congress directed FDA to accredit
private third parties (referred to as either Accredited Persons (APs) or
Recognized Third Parties) to conduct premarket review for low risk (Class
I) and certain moderate risk (Class II) devices. 329 FDA established
325.
15 U.S.C. § 2063(e)(1) (2012); see also § 2063(e)(2) (setting forth procedures for
accreditation withdrawals).
326.
15 U.S.C. § 2063(e)(3) (2012).
327.
CPSC Requirements Pertaining to Third Party Conformity Assessment Bodies,
78 Fed. Reg. at 15860 (codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 1112.41).
328.
As used in the program, the term “Persons” refers to organizations. See U.S.
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-157, MEDICAL DEVICES: STATUS OF FDA’S
PROGRAM FOR INSPECTIONS BY ACCREDITED ORGANIZATIONS 3 (2007) [hereinafter
STATUS OF FDA’S PROGRAM].
329.
See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Implementation of Third Party Programs under the
FDA Modernization Act of 1997: Final Guidance for Staff, Industry and Third Parties (2001),
available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/
GuidanceDocuments/ucm094459.pdf [hereinafter Implementation of Third Party Programs]
(noting that “FDA’s policy permitted third party review of class II devices only if devicespecific guidance or recognized consensus standards existed”); see also 21 U.S.C. § 360m
(2012) (containing the statutory requirement). See generally U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
Guidance for Third Parties and FDA Staff: Third Party Review of Premarket Notifications (2004),
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accreditation criteria (including criteria to prevent conflicts of interest) and
conducted accreditations, 330 published a list of APs, 331 and conducted a
training program for APs. 332 By creating this option for device manufacturers, Congress intended “to enable FDA to use its scientific review resources
for higher-risk devices, while maintaining a high degree of confidence in
the review o� low-to-moderate risk devices by Accredited Persons, and to
provide manufacturers of eligible devices an alternative review process that
may yield more rapid 510(k) decisions.” 333
Several years later, the Medical Device User Fee and Modernization
Act of 2002 (MDUFMA) authorized FDA to establish a program by which
APs would be able to conduct inspections of certain medical device facilities. 334 Under the AP Inspection Program, certain manufacturers of Class II
(medium-risk) and Class III (high-risk) medical devices may voluntarily
contract with an AP to conduct a “Third-Party Inspection” of their facility.
The structure of the program is shown in Figure 4.

available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/
GuidanceDocuments/ucm082194.pdf.
330.
See Medical Devices; Implementation o� Third Party Review under the Food and
Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997; Emergency Processing Request Under
OMB Review, 63 Fed. Reg. 28,388 (May 22, 1998) (publishing these criteria); Implementation of Third Party Programs, supra note 329.
331.
See Current List of Accredited Persons for 510(k) Review under the FDA Modernization
Act of 1997, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/
cfthirdparty/accredit.cfm (last visited Feb. 28, 2014).
332.
Implementation of Third Party Programs, supra note 329, at 13.
333.
Id. at 4.
334.
See Medical Device User Fee and Modernization Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–
250, § 201, 116 Stat. 1588 (2002) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 374 (g) (2012)) (amended section
704 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act by adding subsection (g)). The rest of this
section focuses on this program rather than the premarket program because information
about it was more readily available.
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FIGURE 4: STRUCTURE OF THIRD-PARTY PROGRAM FOR MEDICAL
DEVICE FACILITIES
FDA (Third Party Recognition Board)
accredits
Accredited Persons (APs)
that inspect
Medical Device Facilities
to assess conformity with
Quality System (QS) regulation and other requirements
FDA considers an inspection by an AP to be “an alternative to the traditional inspection by an FDA official.” 335 In requiring its establishment,
Congress sought to address the FDA’s inability to meet its inspection burden. 336 The program also purported to offer an advantage to manufacturers
that produce for both the U.S. market and foreign markets by providing the
opportunity to undergo a single inspection process that satisfies multiple
jurisdictions. 337
The mandatory standard that applies in such inspections is the Quality
System (QS) regulation and other device requirements in the FDCA and
its regulations. 338 The QS regulation requires that domestic and foreign
manufacturers establish a quality system that implements current good
manufacturing practices relevant to the “design, manufacture, packaging,
labeling, storage, installation, and servicing of all finished devices intended

335.
Accredited Persons Inspection Program, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/PostmarketRequiremen
ts/ThirdPartyInspection/ucm125410.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2014) (stating that accredited
third parties may conduct inspections “in lieu” of the FDA).
336.
See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-428T, MEDICAL
DEVICES: CHALLENGES FOR FDA IN CONDUCTING MANUFACTURER INSPECTIONS (2008)
[hereinafter CHALLENGES FOR FDA] (statement o� Marcia Crosse, Director, Health Care,
United States Government Accountability Office) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 107-728, pt. 1, at
35–36 (2002)).
337.
Id.
338.
21 C.F.R. § 820 (2010).
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for human use” in the United States. 339 In a QS inspection, FDA inspectors
“examine manufacturing controls, processes, and records.” 340 When a manufacturer participates in the AP Inspection Program, the AP prepares and
submits its reports to FDA, which remains responsible for making a final
compliance assessment. 341
FDA has also implemented the MDUFMA’s third-party inspection
provisions through its Pilot Multipurpose Audit Program (PMAP). 342
PMAP was established in 2006 in partnership with FDA’s Canadian counterpart Health Canada, which also had a third-party certification and
inspection program for medical devices. 343 PMAP aimed to include ten
inspections in which manufacturers would hire a single accredited third
party to conduct an audit that would serve the regulatory purposes o� both
FDA and Health Canada. 344 In total, eleven such inspections were conducted, and the agencies produced a final joint report to summarize lessons
learned. 345
Importantly, the AP Inspection Program is completely voluntary. Eligible manufacturers may choose to utilize an AP to conduct an inspection or
they may continue to have FDA perform inspections. 346 If a manufacturer
is inspected by an AP, FDA removes the manufacturer from its routine
inspection work plan for two years. 347 In effect, the manufacturer receives a

339.
Id. § 820.1(a)(1).
340.
STATUS OF FDA’S PROGRAM, supra note 328, at 1.
341.
See Accredited Persons Inspection Program, supra note 335; see also 21 U.S.C.
§ 374(g)(7)(A) (2012) (stating that APs shall prepare an inspection report and that “[a]ny
official classification of the inspection shall be determined by the Secretary”).
342.
See Pilot Multi-Purpose Audit Program (PMAP)—Questions and Answers Related to
the Pilot, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/Device
RegulationandGuidance/PostmarketRequirements/ThirdPartyInspection/ucm125453.htm
(last visited Feb. 3, 2014) [hereinafter PMAP Q&A]; see also CHALLENGES FOR FDA, supra
note 336, at 9, 19–21.
343.
PMAP Q&A, supra note 342.
344.
Final Joint Report of the Pilot Multipurpose Audit Program (PMAP), U.S. FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/Postma
rketRequirements/ThirdPartyInspection/ucm232806.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2014) [hereinafter PMAP Report]. On international cooperation in regulation, see generally ADMIN.
CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE RECOMMENDATION 2011-6
(2011),
available
at
http://www.acus.gov/acus-recommendations/internationalregulatorycooperation/.
345.
PMAP Report, supra note 344; Telephone Interview with Kim Trautman, Assoc.
Dir., Int’l Affairs, Office of the Ctr. Dir., Ctr. for Devices and Radiological Health, U.S. Food
& Drug Admin. (Jun. 5, 2012) (reporting that eleven PMAP inspections were conducted).
346.
Accredited Persons Inspection Program, supra note 335.
347.
Telephone Interview with David Kalins, Senior Policy Advisor, Office of Compliance, Ctr. for Devices and Radiological Health, U.S. Food & Drug Admin. (July 31, 2012).
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two-year “inspection holiday” from regular FDA inspections unless FDA
receives a complaint or has other cause to inspect.
Only certain manufacturers are eligible to participate in the program.
The manufacturer must manufacture a Class II or Class III device. 348 Further, it must market at least one of these medical devices in the United
States and also market or plan to market at least one of these medical devices in a foreign country that certifies, accredits, or otherwise recognizes
the chosen AP as having the authority to conduct device inspections. 349
Also, the program was limited to establishments whose “most recent inspection . . . [was classified] as ‘no action indicated’ or ‘voluntary action
indicated.’ ” 350 The Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of
2007 (FDAAA) “streamlined the Accredited Person for Inspection Program
by eliminating the requirement that a device establishment must seek prior
FDA approval for a Third Party Inspection” and by “eliminat[ing] the limit
of two consecutive Third Party Inspections unless FDA granted a waiver.” 351 After the amendments, eligible manufacturers may simply submit
notification of their intent to use the program. 352
Unlike the two programs reviewed above, FDA does not utilize independent accreditation bodies in this program. Rather, accreditation
348.
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, FDA STAFF, AND FDAACCREDITED THIRD PARTIES: MANUFACTURER’S NOTIFICATION OF THE INTENT TO USE
AN ACCREDITED PERSON UNDER THE ACCREDITED PERSONS INSPECTION PROGRAM
AUTHORIZED BY SECTION 228 OF THE FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION AMENDMENTS
ACT OF 2007 (FDAAA) (2009), available at http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/
DeviceRegulationandGuidance/GuidanceDocuments/ucm085187.htm#3.
349.
Id. at 6 (stating that “[a]t least one foreign country where you market or intend to
market your class II or class III device must certify, accredit, or otherwise recognize the AP
you have chosen as a person authorized to conduct device inspections”); see 21 U.S.C.
§ 374(g)(6)(A)(ii)(IV)(bb) (2012).
350.
21 U.S.C. § 374(g)(6)(A)(i); see also STATUS OF FDA’S PROGRAM, supra note 328,
at 6 (“Based upon its findings during inspection, FDA classifies completed inspections into
one of three categories based on the extent to which the establishment deviates from applicable requirements of the quality system regulation: No action indicated (which indicates no
deviations or only minor deviations), voluntary action indicated (which indicates minor to
significant deviations), or official action indicated (which indicates significant deviations
and warnings).”); U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, FDA STAFF,
AND THIRD PARTIES: INSPECTION BY ACCREDITED PERSONS UNDER THE MEDICAL
DEVICE USER FEE AND MODERNIZATION ACT OF 2002 AND THE FDA AMENDMENTS ACT
OF 2007; ACCREDITATION CRITERIA (2009), available at http://www.fda.gov/Medical
Devices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/GuidanceDocuments/ucm089702.htm (last visited
Feb. 3, 2014) [hereinafter GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY].
351.
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 350 at 4.
352.
Manufacturer’s Notification of the Intent To Use an Accredited Person Under the
Accredited Persons Inspection Program, 76 Fed. Reg. 29,764 (May 23, 2011); see also
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 350, at 4 (noting the specific information that the
notice must include).
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determinations are made by FDA’s Third Party Recognition Board (TPRB),
which was established in 1998 to make accreditation determinations for the
510(k) Review Program. 353 MDUFMA required FDA to establish criteria
for the accreditation of APs and to conduct further activities to approve
their employees to conduct inspections. 354 Under the law, an applicant for
accreditation must not be a federal government employee and must be a
legally constituted independent entity with no organizational, material, or
financial affiliation with a manufacturer, supplier, or vendor of articles
regulated under the Act. 355
According to FDA guidance, the applicant must agree to “operate in
accordance with generally accepted professional and ethical business practices and agree in writing” to, inter alia, limiting its “work to that for which
competence and capacity are available,” promptly responding and attempting to resolve complaints regarding accredited activities, and protecting
against officer and employee financial conflicts of interest. 356 FDA also
requires that APs have sufficiently trained personnel, including at least one
individual with supervisory capability and authority, and the necessary
infrastructure “to interface with FDA’s electronic data systems” and protect
confidential information. 357 After an organization is approved as an AP, its
employees must complete classroom training and perform several inspections jointly with FDA. 358
FDA instructs APs to prepare an inspection report to be submitted to
both the manufacturer and the FDA “using the format defined in the Inves353.
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 350, at 5. The Third Party Recognition
Board is situated within the FDA’s Center for Devices and Radiological Health and chaired
by William Sutton. Id. at 22. On how the TPRB interacts with applicants and reviews
applications, see Implementation of the Inspection by Accredited Persons Program under
the Medical Device User Fee and Modernization Act of 2002; Accreditation Criteria:
Guidance for Industry, FDA Staff, and Third Parties; Availability, 68 Fed. Reg. 22,400,
22,402–03 (Apr. 28, 2003). On the 510(k) program generally, see supra notes 322–25 and
accompanying text.
354.
21 U.S.C. § 374(g)(2) (2012). These criteria were published at 68 Fed. Reg.
22,400–01 (Apr. 28, 2003), and most recently revised in 2009. See GUIDANCE FOR
INDUSTRY, supra note 350.
355.
21 U.S.C. § 374(g)(3) (2012). See also GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 350.
356.
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 350, at 6–8.
357.
Id. at 6–8, 13 (noting that an AP “must protect from public disclosure trade secret,
confidential commercial or financial information, and private personal identifier information
in records . . . except that such information may be made available to FDA”); see also 21
U.S.C. § 374(g)(2) (2012); § 374(g)(3)(E)(iii); GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 350, at
5 (indicating that AP personnel should be as qualified as FDA personnel).
358.
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 350, at 9–10 (providing that APs are not
eligible to conduct independent inspections until they successfully complete classroom
training and three joint inspections with FDA).

McAllister_to_PDF

Spring 2014]

9/26/2014 9:42 AM

Harnessing Private Regulation

351

tigations Operations Manual (IOM).” 359 The report must describe in detail
each significant nonconformity found and identify any “other matters that
relate or that may influence compliance with this act.” 360 The report must
also “describe any recommendations made to the establishment during the
inspection or at the inspection’s closing meeting” and “describe any promised corrective actions or other discussions with the management at the
conclusion of the inspection.” 361 APs are required to maintain certain records regarding their initial and continuing qualifications to be APs and
regarding each inspection. 362 The law also requires an AP that discovers a
problem that “could cause or contribute to an unreasonable risk to public
health” to immediately report it to FDA. 363
MDUFMA and its regulations require that APs and their employees
(including contract employees) be “free from conflicts of interest and the
appearance of conflicts of interest” that could “affect the inspection process”
or the preparation of reports. 364 APs may not be owned, operated, or controlled by a “manufacturer, supplier, or vendor” of any article “regulated
under the [A]ct,” and no “personnel” of an “AP involved in inspections,” nor
“their spouse or minor children,” may have ownership of or other financial
interest in any product, manufacturer, supplier or vendor regulated under
the Act. 365 Potential conflicts of interest are also present if the AP or any of
its inspection personnel “provides consultative services to any manufacturer,
supplier, or vendor of products regulated under the [A]ct”; if inspection
personnel participate “in an inspection of a firm they were employed by
within the last 12 months”; or if the “fees charged or accepted are contingent or based upon the observations in the report made by the AP.” 366
FDA is also required by statute to monitor manufacturers’ requests to
use a particular AP, and it can “stop inspections by APs who may have
developed inappropriate business relationships” with manufacturers. 367 As
described by FDA, “[b]usiness relationships that may undermine the
359.
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 350, at 12; see 21 U.S.C. § 374(g)(7)(A)
(2012) (stating that APs are required to prepare inspection reports in the form and manner
designated by U.S. FDA); Investigations Operation Manual, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/Inspections/IOM/default.htm (last updated Sept. 5, 2013).
360.
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 350, at 12.
361.
Id.
362.
Id. at 13–14.
363.
21 U.S.C. § 374(g)(7)(E) (2012); GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 350, at 12.
364.
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 350, at 17; see 21 U.S.C. § 374(g)(2)-(3)
(2012). FDA uses a rating criteria checklist to evaluate whether APs have adequately protected against conflicts of interest. GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 350, at 15.
365.
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 350, at 8; see 21 U.S.C. § 374(g)(3) (2012).
366.
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 350, at 9.
367.
Id. at 11.
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independence or objectivity of an AP include contracts between a manufacturer and an AP that represent a significant share of the AP’s income such
that continuation or termination of the contract may create undue financial
influence or at least the appearance of such influence.” 368 Evidence of a
“financial conflict of interest between the AP and the owner or operator of
the inspected device establishment” may constitute cause for withdrawal of
the AP’s accreditation. 369 Finally, the statute requires each AP to “annually
make available to the public the extent to which the AP complies with
conflict of interest requirements.” 370 Also, “inspection records and information collected from the manufacturer and submitted to FDA by APs” are
generally available for public disclosure “after the agency issues a compliance decision, unless such information is exempt from disclosure by law.” 371
The law provides that FDA will audit APs on a periodic basis, and the
FDA states in guidance that it will “make onsite visits on a periodic basis to
each AP to audit performance and inspect records, correspondence, and
other materials relating to” the AP Inspection Program. 372 FDA may withdraw accreditation when an AP is substantially not in compliance with the
standards of accreditation, poses a threat to the public health, or fails to act
in a manner consistent with the Act. 373 FDA may also “withdraw accreditation” where “FDA determines that there is a financial conflict of interest
between the AP and the owner or operator of a device establishment that
the AP has inspected.” 374 Before FDA withdraws an AP’s accreditation, it
notifies the AP and provides “an opportunity for an informal hearing.” 375
Since 2003, the FDA has accredited sixteen U.S.- and foreign-based
organizations as APs. 376 For example, the U.S.-based Underwriters Laboratories, Inc. (UL) is recognized to inspect facilities that make all regulated
medical devices, as are other organizations based in the U.K. and China. 377
368.
Id. at 11–12.
369.
21 U.S.C. § 374(g)(5) (2012); GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 350, at 12.
370.
21 U.S.C. § 374(g)(3)(E) (2012); GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 350, at 17.
371.
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 350, at 13. Applicable disclosure laws
include the Freedom o� Information Act (5 U.S.C. § 552), the Trade Secrets Act (18 U.S.C.
§ 1905), relevant provisions of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C.
§ 331(j)) and FDA regulations implementing these statutes (see, for example, 21 C.F.R. § 20
(2013) (the FDA regulations implementing the Freedom o� Information Act) and Freedom of
Information, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/RegulatoryInformation/
foi/default.htm) (last visited Feb. 3, 2014).
372.
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 350, at 5, 11 (further stating that it audits
APs on a periodic and “for cause” basis); see 21 U.S.C. § 374 (g)(5)(A)(i) (2012).
373.
21 U.S.C. § 374(g)(5) (2012); GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 350, at 14.
374.
21 U.S.C. § 374(g)(5) (2012); GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 350, at 14.
375.
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 350, at 14.
376.
Id. at 3–4.
377.
For a list of APs, see Accredited Persons Inspection Program, supra note 335.
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However, by 2012, the AP Inspection Program was largely inactive and a
single FDA employee administered the program as a collateral duty. 378 Also
by 2012, the 510(k) Review Program had no full-time positions committed
to it; rather, administrative responsibilities were spread over three employees as part of their other workload. 379

4. Telecommunications Equipment
In 1998, the FCC adopted rules for the establishment o� Telecommunication Certification Bodies (TCBs) that have the authority to certify that
equipment meets the FCC’s requirements and issue a written grant of
equipment authorization. 380 FCC requirements generally apply to all devices that generate radio frequency (RF) energy to ensure that they operate
effectively without causing harmful interference to radio communications.
Certain devices must also be evaluated for radiofrequency radiation exposure to protect human health. 381
Only certain types of equipment require certification, and often the
certification can be conducted by either a TCB or the FCC. 382 Examples of
devices that may be submitted to either include, but are not limited to cell
phones, RF lights, microwave ovens, RC transmitters, family radios, telemetry transmitters, wireless phones, and walkie-talkies. 383 Some devices may
only be submitted to the FCC (such as certain new technologies) or TCBs
378.
E-mail from Jean Cooper, Senior Staf� Fellow, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., to
author (July 17, 2012) (on file with author).
379.
Id.
380.
Frequency Allocations and Radio Treaty Matters, 64 Fed. Reg. 4995 (Feb. 2,
1999); 47 C.F.R. §§ 2.960–62, 68.160–62 (2013). The applicable telecommunications equipment regulations are at 47 C.F.R. §§ 0-101. See also OFFICE OF ENG’G & TECH., FED.
COMMC’NS COMM’N, TCB POST-MARKET SURVEILLANCE 1 n.1 (2008), available at
http://ftp.tiaonline.org/tr-41/TR-41.9/Public/0-Archive/2008-Archive/2008-02-New%20Or
leans/TR41.9-08-02-011-TCB%20Survelliance%20Guidelines.pdf (“The requirements for
Telecommunication Certification Bodies (TCBs) were specified in the Commission’s Report
and Order (R&O) in GEN Docket 98-68 (FCC 98-338), adopted on December 17, 1998.
Further guidance on the requirements for TCBs was given in Public Notice DA 99-1640,
FCC Provides Further Information on the Accreditation Requirements for Telecommunication
Certification Bodies GEN Docket 98-68, released on August 17, 1999.”).
381.
47 C.F.R. §§ 2.1091, 2.1093 (2013); see also Radio Frequency Safety, FED.
COMMC’NS COMM’N, http://www.fcc.gov/encyclopedia/radio-frequency-safety (last visited
Nov. 27, 2013).
382.
See 47 C.F.R. § 2.907 (2013) (on “certification”). Equipment with a low risk of
causing harmful interference may generally satisfy FCC requirements through a manufacturer’s “verification,” 47 C.F.R. § 2.902 (2013), or “Declaration of Conformity,” 47 C.F.R.
§ 2.906 (2013).
383.
See Office o� Eng’g & Tech., Equipment Authorization (EA), FED. COMMC’NS
COMM’N, http://transition.fcc.gov/oet/ea/procedures.html (last updated Mar. 22, 2013).
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(all computers and computer peripherals). When a manufacturer seeks
certification directly from the FCC, equipment authorization fees apply. 384
Figure 5 shows the third-party structure of the TCB program. TCBs
are required to be accredited as operating in accordance with ISO/IEC
Guide 65 and FCC’s technical requirements for TCBs. 385 Under its National Voluntary Conformity Assessment Evaluation (NVCASE) program, the
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is responsible for
recognizing the private accreditation bodies that accredit TCBs in the United States. The two recognized accreditation bodies are American National
Standards Institute (ANSI) and the American Association for Laboratory
Accreditation (A2LA). 386 “Certification bodies located outside the United
States may be recognized [by the FCC] as a TCB when there is a government-to-government [Mutual Recognition Agreement] between the
country they are located in and the United States.” 387 In that case, the TCB
is accredited by appropriate authorities in that country. 388 An online list of
recognized TCBs is maintained by FCC. 389 The TCB program went into
effect in June 2000 with thirteen recognized TCBs, and as of 2012, there are
thirty-four recognized TCBs. 390

384.
See Office o� Eng’g & Tech., What Fees Are Applicable to an Equipment Authorization?, FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, https://apps.fcc.gov/oetcf/kdb/forms/FTSSearchResult
Page.cfm?id=41712&switch=P (last visited Feb. 9, 2014) (showing fees ranging from $490$3,870 for certification of devices).
385.
OFFICE OF ENG’G & TECH., FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, TCB PROGRAM ROLES
AND RESPONSIBILITIES (2006), available at https://apps.fcc.gov/kdb/GetAttachment.html?
id=LRwF49tahbJq3RjO7IgzAg%3D%3D; see also 47 C.F.R. § 68.160(b) (2013).
386.
See OFFICE OF ENG’G & TECH., supra note 385, at 1.
387.
Id.; see also 47 C.F.R. § 68.160(c) (2013).
388.
See OFFICE OF ENG’G & TECH., supra note 385, at 1; see also 47 C.F.R. § 68.160(c)
(2013).
389.
See Office o� Eng’g & Tech., OET Telecommunications Certification Bodies System,
FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, https://apps.fcc.gov/tcb/index.html (last visited Nov. 27, 2013).
390.
David A. Case & William Graff, Approval Options: A Look at the FCC and TCB
Approval Processes, COMPLIANCE ENGINEERING, Sept.-Oct. 2001, available at http://www.cemag.com/archive/01/09/case.html (providing 2001 number); Telephone Interview with
George Tannahill, Office o� Eng’g and Tech., Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, (Aug. 27, 2012)
(providing 2012 number).
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FIGURE 5: STRUCTURE OF THIRD-PARTY PROGRAM FOR
TELECOMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT
FCC

NVCASE
recognizes
Accreditation Bodies

recognizes

that accredit
Telecommunication Certification Bodies (TCBs)
that certify
Products
are in conformity with
FCC requirements
The task of the TCB has two steps: first, to evaluate the product
(which involves laboratory testing or reliance on testing conducted by the
manufacturer); and second, to make the certification decision. 391 TCBs are
accredited with certain scopes, which indicate the product types they may
approve (e.g., Scope A: Unlicensed Radio Frequency Devices; Scope B:
Licensed Radio Service Equipment). For accreditation, TCBs must
“demonstrate expert knowledge of the regulations” for the product types in
each of their scopes. 392 Also, the TCB must have the “technical expertise
and capability to test the equipment it will certify and shall also be accredited in accordance with ISO/IEC Guide 25 to demonstrate it is competent
to perform such tests.” 393 Testing of products may be performed by subcontractors o� TCBs, but the TCB must maintain oversight and remains
responsible for the test results. 394 The FCC has not established conflict-of-

391.
See OFFICE OF ENG’G & TECH., supra note 380, at 2–3; see also 47 C.F.R.
§ 68.162(b)(2) (2013).
392.
47 C.F.R. § 68.162(c)(2) (2013).
393.
47 C.F.R. § 68.162(c)(3) (2013); OFFICE OF ENG’G & TECH., supra note 380, at 2.
394.
See 47 C.F.R. § 68.162(d) (2013).
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interest rules for TCBs beyond what is required for accreditation to ISO
Guide 65. 395
Before a TCB can grant an equipment authorization, it must submit all
required information to the FCC’s online system. 396 After the system automatically performs certain validity checks, it can be used to grant the
authorization. FCC reserves to itself thirty days to review the completed
action and set aside the authorization if necessary. Much of the information
that is uploaded, such as pictures of the product, pictures of the label, and
certain testing data, becomes publicly available. Other information entered
into the system may be considered proprietary and kept confidential.
Also, the FCC requires TCBs to conduct certain surveillance testing of
equipment they certify. 397 TCBs must test additional equipment samples
for at least 5 percent of the grants they issue and electronically submit an
annual surveillance report. If a TCB finds that a certified product fails to
comply, it must notify FCC and the manufacturer, which will be asked to
take actions to correct the situation. 398 Subject to certain procedural requirements, the FCC retains authority to withdraw its recognition o� TCBs
and revoke the certification of products by TCBs. 399 FCC itself also conducts market surveillance activities that may include pre-grant testing, postgrant testing, and off-the-shelf product testing. Upon receiving a complaint
from a TCB or the public about a problem with another TCB or certified
equipment, FCC may pursue the complaint itself, request an assessment by
the relevant accreditation body, or require further testing by the relevant
TCB. 400
In May 2013, the FCC issued a proposed rule that would significantly
reform the TCB program. 401 Under the new rule, the FCC would rely on

395.
Guide 65 states that a certification body should “ensure that activities of related
bodies do not affect the confidentiality, objectivity and impartiality of its certifications, and
it shall not 1) supply or design products of the type it certifies, 2) give advice or provide
consultancy services to the applicant as to methods of dealing with matters which are barriers to the certification requested, 3) provide any other products or services which could
compromise the confidentiality, objectivity or impartiality of its certification process and
decisions.” ISO/IEC, GUIDE 65: GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR BODIES OPERATING
PRODUCT CERTIFICATION SYSTEMS, at 3 (1996).
396.
Telephone Interview with George Tannahill, supra note 390.
397.
See 47 C.F.R. § 2.962(g)(2) (2013); see also OFFICE OF ENG’G AND TECH., FED.
COMMC’NS COMM’N, TCB Post-Market Surveillance 1 (2011), available at https://apps.fcc.
gov/oetcf/kdb/forms/FTSSearchResultPage.cfm?id=20540&switch=P.
398.
See 47 C.F.R. § 68.162(g)(3) (2013).
399.
Cf. 47 C.F.R. § 68.162(�)(6) (2013).
400.
Telephone Interview with George Tannahill, supra note 390.
401.
See Authorization o� Radiofrequency Equipment, 78 Fed. Reg. 25,916 (May 3,
2013) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pts. 0, 2, 15, 68).
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TCBs to perform all certifications. 402 The rule clarifies the post-market
surveillance that is required o� TCBs and the steps that the FCC can take
when the performance of a TCB is deficient. 403 It also incorporates updated
ISO/IEC standards, replacing ISO/IEC Guide 65 with ISO/IEC 17065. 404

B. Programs for Voluntary Standards
In four programs, federal agencies rely on third parties to assess and
certify compliance with voluntary standards. Unlike mandatory standards,
companies do not have to comply with voluntary standards in order to
conduct their business. Rather, companies may choose to comply in order to
receive a marketing label or other desired benefit. The four programs described below all offer companies the opportunity to display a label on their
products attesting to their compliance. In all of them, the use of third parties is obligatory: to participate in the program, the company that sells the
labeled product has to contract with a third party.

1. Workplace Product Safety
Since 1988, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) has operated a third-party program through which it ascertains
that specified equipment and materials (products) used in OSHA-regulated
workplaces meet safety standards. 405 The program’s structure is illustrated
in Figure 6. Under OSHA’s Nationally Recognized Testing Laboratory
(NRTL) Program, private sector organizations approved by OSHA are
hired by manufacturers of specified products to test and certify them. The
NRTL then authorizes the manufacturer to affix a label (or mark) on the
products, which is visible to the OSHA workplace inspector.
OSHA requires NRTL certification for many different types of products, such as printers and copiers, electric heaters and air conditioners,
alarm systems, fire extinguishers, acetylene torches, and liquefied petroleum

402.
Id. at 25,920.
403.
Id. at 25,922–24.
404.
Id. at 25,925.
405.
See Safety Testing or Certification of Certain Workplace Equipment and Materials, 53 Fed. Reg. 12,102 (Apr. 12, 1988) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 1907, 1910); 29
C.F.R. § 1910, sbpt. S (2013); see also Bernard Pasquet, OSHA Requirements for Nationally
Recognized Testing Laboratory Approval of Products, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.osha.
gov/dts/otpca/nrtl/NRTLarticle.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2014) (stating that workplaces
subject to OSHA’s jurisdiction include the “vast majority of private employers in the United
States and its territories”; “most Federal Government places of employment”; and “State
and local government places of employment in States that have received OSHA approval to
administer their own occupational safety and health program”).

McAllister_to_PDF

358

9/26/2014 9:42 AM

Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law

[Vol. 3:2

gas ovens. 406 The standards that the products must meet to be certified by
an NRTL are voluntary consensus standards, rather than governmentunique OSHA standards. 407 These standards are set by national standardsproducing organizations such as ANSI, ASTM, Factory Mutual Research
Corporation (FMRC), and UL. 408 In effect, manufacturers are not required
by law to meet these standards to market their products, but workplaces
that are regulated by OSHA are required to utilize products that are certified to these standards.
NRTLs are private organizations that are recognized by OSHA to be
qualified to perform safety testing and product certification. 409 OSHA
regulations set forth the requirements for NRTLs. 410 NRTLs must be
capable of performing the proper testing, meaning that they must have the
proper equipment and facilities, staff, procedures, and quality control programs. 411 They shall, as necessary, implement control procedures, inspect
the production of items at factories, and conduct field inspections to monitor the proper use of their marks on products. 412 They must be “completely
independent” o� both the manufacturers and vendors of equipment subject
to testing and the employers subject to the tested equipment requirements. 413 NRTLs must maintain effective procedures for producing
objective and unbiased reports and for fairly handling complaints and disputes. 414
406.
See Pasquet, supra note 405; see also Occupational Safety & Health Admin.
[OSHA], Type of Products Requiring NRTL Approval, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.os
ha.gov/dts/otpca/nrtl/prodcatg.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2014) (setting forth thirty-seven
product categories, of which electrical equipment is the largest, and citing to General Industry Standards, 29 C.F.R. pt. 1910 (2013)).
407.
See OSHA, Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, https://www.osha.
gov/dts/otpca/nrtl/faq_nrtl.html#8 (answering the question “What product safety test
standards can an NRTL use in certifying products?”).
408.
See OSHA, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, NATIONALLY RECOGNIZED TESTING
LABORATORY PROGRAM APPLICATION GUIDELINES 1 (2000), available at https://www.osha.
gov/dts/otpca/nrtl/applguid.pdf [hereinafter OSHA APPLICATION GUIDELINES]. A list of
standards recognized by OSHA is available at https://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owasrch.
search_form?p_doc_type=STANDARDS&p_toc_level=0&p_keyvalue=.
409.
See OSHA, Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs), U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.
osha.gov/dts/otpca/nrtl/faq_nrtl.html#1 (last visited Nov. 8, 2013) (“OSHA’s recognition is
not a government license or position, or a delegation or grant of government authority.
Instead, the recognition is an acknowledgment that an organization has necessary qualifications to perform safety testing and certification of the specific products covered within its
scope of recognition.”).
410.
See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.7 (2013).
411.
See id. § 1910.7(b)(1).
412.
Id. § 1910.7(b)(2).
413.
Id. § 1910.7(b)(3).
414.
Id. §§ 1910.7(b)(4)(i)–(ii).
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FIGURE 6: STRUCTURE OF THIRD-PARTY PROGRAM FOR
WORKPLACE PRODUCT SAFETY
OSHA
recognizes
National Recognized Testing Laboratories (NRTLs)
that test and certify
Certain products used in OSHA-regulated workplaces
are in conformity with
Voluntary Consensus Standards for Product Safety (i.e.
ASTM standards)
If its application is approved by OSHA, an NRTL’s initial recognition
is valid for five years. 415 OSHA approves NRTLs with certain “scopes of
recognition” by specifying the test standards with which they can certify
conformity. OSHA maintains an online registry o� NRTLs and their scopes
of recognition. 416 Currently, fifteen NRTLs are recognized by OSHA. 417
Twelve are headquartered in the United States, and three NRTLs are headquartered in other countries. 418 Some NRTLs are based in one country but
also have offices in others. For example, CSA International is based in
Toronto, Canada and also has offices in Ohio and California, and UL is
based in Illinois and also has offices in four other U.S. states and ten foreign countries.
NRTLs and applicants for NRTL recognition must pay fees. 419 OSHA
assesses fees for processing applications for “initial recognition, expansion
of recognition, or renewal of recognition, including on-site reviews; review
and evaluation of the applications; and preparation of reports, evaluations

415.
416.

See OSHA APPLICATION GUIDELINES, supra note 408 at 1.
See OSHA, Nationally Recognized Testing Laboratories (NRTLs), U.S. DEP’T OF
LABOR, http://www.osha.gov/dts/otpca/nrtl/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2013) (listing recognized
NRTLs).
417.
E-mail from Kevin Robinson, OSHA, U.S. Dep’t o� Labor (Oct. 11, 2012).
418.
Id.
419.
29 C.F.R. § 1910.7(�) (2013).
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and Federal Register notices; and audits of sites.” 420 Fees first went into
effect on October 1, 2000. 421 They were revised in 2002, 2007, and 2011. 422
A current listing of the applicable fees is maintained online. 423 For example,
total fees to become recognized as an NRTL currently amount to over
$40,000 (including an initial application review fee of $17,750, an assessment fee of $4,440 plus travel expenses, and a final report and Federal
Register notice fee of $19,520). 424 Substantial fees also apply when an
NRTL expands or renews its recognition. For the audits that OSHA requires of recognized NRTLs, OSHA charges at least $4,400 plus travel
expenses for an on-site audit and $1,120 for an office audit. 425 Audit fees are
significantly higher if nonconformances are found or if more than one day
is required.

2. Organic Food
The National Organic Program (NOP), administered by the United
States Department of Agriculture’s Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS),
relies on a system of third-party certification. The Organic Foods Production Act of 1990, the authorizing legislation for the NOP, states that the
“Secretary shall implement the program . . . through certifying agents.” 426
In regulations promulgated in 2000, AMS set the organic standards that
cover the production, postharvest handling, and processing of organic foods
and specified the third-party certification system that would determine
whether a certain product met those standards. 427
These regulatory standards are voluntary in that food producers or
handlers are only required to conform to them if they label their products
420.
Id. § 1910.7(�)(1)(i)–(ii) (describing how fees are determined and stating that the
fees reflect the full cost of performing the listed activities).
421.
OSHA, Fee Payment Instructions and Information, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR,
http://www.osha.gov/dts/otpca/nrtl/nrtlfees.html (last visited Nov. 29, 2013); see also OSHA,
Nationally Recognized Testing Laboratories—Fees; Public Comment Period on Recognition
Notices, 65 Fed. Reg. 46,798 (July 31, 2000) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1910), available
at http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=FEDERAL_REGIS
TER&p_id=15480.
422.
Nationally Recognized Testing Laboratories Fees, 76 Fed. Reg. 10,500 (Feb. 25,
2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2011-02-25/html/2011-3937.htm (last
visited Nov. 29, 2013) (revising the fee regulations).
423.
OSHA, Fee Schedule (effective March 28, 2011), U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR,
http://www.osha.gov/dts/otpca/nrtl/nrtlschedule.html (last visited Sept. 11, 2012).
424.
Id.
425.
Id.
426.
7 U.S.C. § 6503(d) (2012).
427.
The final organic rule was published on December 21, 2000, and the regulations
implementing the NOP became effective October 21, 2002. See 7 C.F.R. § 205 (2013).
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as organic. However, i� food producers or handlers label their products as
organic, it is mandatory that they use an accredited third party to provide
the required certification. 428 The certifying agents are responsible for all
aspects of the certification process: conducting inspection as necessary to
verify compliance with regulatory requirements, issuing certification decisions, issuing notices of noncompliance, and suspending or revoking the
certification of clients that are out of compliance. 429
As shown in Figure 7, third-party certifying agents are directly accredited by the AMS. They may be private or governmental entities, and under
certain circumstances, the agency may accept a foreign government’s accreditation o� foreign certifying agents. 430 To be accredited, the entity must
have sufficient expertise and adequately trained personnel to comply with
the terms of the organic certification program. 431 Certifying agents must
also conduct an annual program review of their certification activities and
correct any noncompliance, 432 and they must maintain records of certification processes and make them available for inspection upon request. 433 As
of 2012, about ninety entities—about fifty domestic and forty foreign—
were accredited by the NOP to act as certifying agents. 434 Examples of
domestic certifying agents include private organizations like Global Organic
Alliance, Inc., based in Ohio, and the Idaho State Department of Agriculture’s Division o� Plant Industries. 435 Overall, state agencies constituted
seventeen of the fifty-one domestic organic certifiers. 436 Examples o� foreign domestic certifying agents include Argencert S.A., based in Argentina,
and CAAE Certification Service, based in Spain. 437
The NOP regulations include several provisions to avoid potential conflicts of interest. 438 Certifying agents are required to prevent conflicts of
interest by not certifying operations that they have any commercial interest
428.
National Organic Program: Organic Certification & Accreditation, U.S. DEP’T OF
AGRIC., http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSv1.0/ams.fetchTemplateData.do?template=Template
N&navID=NationalOrganicProgram&leftNav=NationalOrganicProgram&page=NOPAccre
ditationandCertification&description=Accreditation%20and%20Certification&acct=nopgen
info (last visited Nov. 29, 2013).
429.
7 C.F.R §§ 205.403–205.406 (2013).
430.
Id. § 205.500(c) (2013).
431.
Id. § 205.501(a)(1)–(6) (2013).
432.
Id. § 205.501(a)(7) (2013).
433.
Id. § 205.501(a)(9) (2013).
434.
National Organic Program: Organic Certification & Accreditation, supra note 428.
435.
See Complete Domestic ACA List, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., http://www.ams.usda.gov/
AMSv1.0/getfile?dDocName=STELPRDC5074486 (last visited Nov. 29, 2013).
436.
Id.
437.
See Complete Foreign ACA List, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., http://www.ams.usda.gov/AM
Sv1.0/getfile?dDocName=STELPRDC5074487 (last visited Nov. 29, 2013).
438.
7 C.F.R. § 205.501(a)(11) (2013).
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in, excluding the participation of employees or contractors that have any
such commercial interests, not permitting employees or contractors to
accept any payment or gifts other than prescribed fees for certification, not
providing consultation services to certified operations, requiring employees
and contractors to complete annual conflict-of-interest disclosure reports,
and requiring that the decision to certify be made by someone different
from those conducting prior certification activities. 439

FIGURE 7: STRUCTURE OF THIRD-PARTY PROGRAM FOR ORGANIC
FOOD LABEL
AMS
accredits
Third-Party Certifying Agents
that certify
Food Products marketed as Organic
are in conformity with
Organic Standards
The regulations provide that AMS will conduct on-site reviews of accredited certifying agents. Such reviews encompass “the certifying agent’s
certification procedures, decisions, facilities, administrative and management systems, and production or handling operations certified by the
certifying agent.” 440 Such reviews should occur before or soon after initial
accreditation, before renewal of accreditation, and one or more times during
the five-year period of accreditation. 441 NOP reports that fifty-six such
onsite reviews or inspections occurred in 2012. 442
439.
Id.
440.
Id. § 205.508(a).
441.
See 7 C.F.R. §§ 205.508(b), 205.500 (2013) (specifying that the duration of accreditation is five years).
442.
Telephone Interview with Cheri Courtney, Acting Dir., Accreditation & Int’l
Activities Div., Nat’l Organic Prog. (Aug. 16, 2012). Some audit reports and corrective
action reports can be found on the NOP website. See Appeals and Settlement Reports, U.S.
DEP’T AGRIC., http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSv1.0/ams.fetchTemplateData.do?template=
TemplateJ&page=NOPReadingRoomHome (last visited Sept. 9, 2012).
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The authorizing legislation stated that the NOP should provide for the
“collection of reasonable fees from producers, certifying agents and handlers
who participate in such program.” 443 The NOP regulations specify that the
cost of the program’s accreditation services will be collected from applicants
for initial accreditation and accredited certifying agents for review of annual
reports and accreditation renewal. 444 In 2010, the average cost to a domestic
certifying agent applicant was $4,428, and the average cost to a foreign
certifying agent was $24,082. 445

3. Energy Efficiency
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) established the Energy
Star Program in 1992 as a labeling system for products that met specified
voluntary efficiency standards. 446 The Department o� Energy (DOE) has
jointly administered the program since 1995, when labeled products expanded from computers and monitors to “additional office equipment and
residential heating, ventilation, and cooling (HVAC) equipment.” 447 Over
sixty product categories may now carry the Energy Star label including
major appliances, office equipment, lighting, home electronics, new homes,
and commercial and industrial buildings. 448 As of 2010, more than 40,000
individual product models made by over 1,600 manufacturers had earned
the Energy Star label. 449
Effective in 2011, after a critical report by the Government Accountability Office, Energy Star was significantly restructured by EPA to require

443.
7 U.S.C. § 6506(a)(10) (2012).
444.
7 C.F.R. § 205.640 (2013).
445.
National Organic Program FAQ: Becoming a Certifying Agent, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC.,
http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSv1.0/ams.fetchTemplateData.do?template=TemplateN&navI
D=NOPFAQsHowAccredited&topNav=&leftNav=NationalOrganicProgram&page=NOPF
AQsHowAccredited&description=FAQ:%20%20Becoming%20a%20Certifying%20Agent&
acct=nopgeninfo (last visited Nov. 29, 2013).
446.
See infra note 528.
447.
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-470, ENERGY STAR PROGRAM:
COVERT TESTING SHOWS THE ENERGY STAR PROGRAM CERTIFICATION PROCESS IS
VULNERABLE TO FRAUD AND ABUSE 3 (2010).
448.
For general information, see History, subsection of About ENERGY STAR,
ENERGY STAR, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.energystar.gov/index.cfm?c=abou
t.ab_history (last visited Nov. 29, 2013) (discussing the history of the Energy Star labeling
system and the types of products labeled).
449.
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ENERGY STAR OVERVIEW OF 2010 ACHIEVEMENTS
(2011), available at http://www.energystar.gov/ia/partners/publications/pubdocs/2010%20CP
PD%204pgr.pdf.
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that products carrying the label be certified by third parties. 450 The new
third-party structure for the program is shown in Figure 8. “Previously,
manufacturers self-declared . . . that their products met the Energy Star
requirements. With the new third-party certification requirement, product
testing must be conducted in an [EPA-recognized] laboratory and the results must be certified and submitted to EPA by an [EPA-recognized]
certification body.” 451 EPA recognition, in turn, generally depends on accreditation to an appropriate ISO standard by an EPA-recognized
accreditation body.

450.
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 447. See generally ThirdParty Certification, ENERGY STAR, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.energystar.gov/
index.cfm?c=third_party_certification.tpc_index (last visited Nov. 29, 2013).
451.
McAllister, supra note 21 at 19.
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FIGURE 8: STRUCTURE OF THIRD-PARTY PROGRAM FOR ENERGY
STAR PRODUCT LABEL
EPA
recognizes
Accreditation Bodies

recognizes

that accredit

recognizes

Accreditation Bodies
accredit

Laboratories

Certification Bodies

that test

that certify

Products

Products

for conformity with

are in conformity with

Energy Star Label Requirements

Energy Star Label Requirements

Accreditation bodies play the role of providing the accreditation that
certification and laboratories require to become EPA-recognized. To accredit certification bodies, an accreditation body must be a signatory to the IAF
MLA. 452 In 2013, there were about seventy signatories to the IAF MLA
based in about fifty different countries. 453 In the United States, there are
four IAF MLA signatories, including A2LA, IAS, and ANSI.
To accredit laboratories, an accreditation body must be itself recognized
by the EPA. For recognition, the accreditation body must operate its accreditation program in accordance with ISO/IEC 17011 and maintain an
affiliation with ILAC. 454 By 2013, EPA had recognized twenty-seven

452.
Accreditation Body Resources, ENERGY STAR, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
http://www.energystar.gov/index.cfm?c=third_party_certification.tpc_accred_bodies (last visited
Nov. 29, 2013).
453.
See IAF Members and Signatories, INT’L ACCREDITATION FORUM,
http://www.iaf.nu/articles/Accreditation_Body_Members_by_Name/52, accessible from IAF
MLA, INT’L ACCREDITATION FORUM, http://www.iaf.nu/articles/IAF_MLA/14 (last visited
Feb. 10, 2014).
454.
Conditions and Criteria for Recognition of Accreditation Bodies for Energy Star Laboratory Recognition, ENERGY STAR, http://www.energystar.gov/ia/partners/downloads
/mou/Criteria_Accreditation_Bodies_Labs.pdf?e75e-ee91 (last visited Nov. 29, 2013).
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accreditation bodies around the world, including A2LA, IAS, and three
others in the United States. 455
EPA-recognized certification bodies (CBs) certify that eligible products meet the requirements of the Energy Star label. A key requirement for
recognition is accreditation to ISO/IEC Guide 65 or ISO/IEC 17065 by an
accreditation body that is an IAF MLA signatory. 456 These standards require, for example, that the CB operate in a non-discriminatory manner and
make certification decisions based on information gathered during the
evaluation process. 457 EPA also imposes a variety of other requirements
regarding how CBs determine whether a product qualifies for the Energy
Star label and how CBs must conduct a verification testing program to
verify that their certified products continue to meet Energy Star requirements. 458 More specifically, CBs are required to annually select and test at
least 10 percent of all models they have certified, with half the models being
randomly selected and half selected based on EPA referrals. As of 2013,
Energy Star had recognized about twenty-five certification bodies around
the world. 459
In general, qualifying Energy Star products should be tested in an
EPA-recognized laboratory. For recognition, laboratories must be accredited to ISO/IEC 17025 by an EPA-recognized accreditation body. ISO/IEC
17025 requires, for example, that a laboratory employ experienced personnel
with adequate training, have adequate physical plant facilities and test
equipment, and ensure that measuring equipment is accurate. 460 Recognized
labs must also agree to a variety of other requirements, such as reporting to
EPA and otherwise enabling EPA oversight. 461 Recognized labs need not be
independent; they may be owned by the manufacturers of the products they
test.
455.
See EPA-Recognized Accreditation Bodies, ENERGY STAR, U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, http://www.energystar.gov/index.cfm?c=partners.epa_recognized_accreditation_bo
dies (last visited Nov. 29, 2013).
456.
See Conditions and Criteria for Recognition of Certification Bodies for the ENERGY
STAR Program, ENERGY STAR, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.energystar.gov/ia
/partners/downloads/mou/Conditions_and_Criteria_for_Recognition_of_Certification_Bodi
es.pdf (last visited Feb. 10, 2014).
457.
Id.
458.
Id.
459.
EPA-Recognized Certification Bodies (CBs) and Laboratories, ENERGY STAR, U.S.
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.energystar.gov/index.cfm?fuseaction=recognized_bodi
es_list.show_RCB_search_form (last visited Nov. 8, 2013) (generating a list of certification
bodies with the search menu).
460.
Conditions and Criteria for Recognition of Laboratories for the ENERGY STAR Program, ENERGY STAR, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, at 1, http://www.energystar.gov/ia/par
tners/downloads/mou/Criteria_Laboratories.pdf (last visited Nov. 29, 2013).
461.
Id.
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Manufacturers’ laboratories that are not accredited may also be used for
testing under the Energy Star’s Witnessed Manufacturers’ Testing Laboratory or Supervised Manufacturers’ Testing Laboratory programs. 462 Under
these programs, a CB may operate a testing program to accept test data
from such a lab if the CB commits to exercising and documenting a high
degree of oversight, including on-site assessment and monitoring to ensure
the laboratory’s compliance with ISO 17025 and applicable test methods. As
of August 2012, Energy Star testing was being conducted in 463 laboratories: 224 accredited labs, 180 supervised labs, and 59 witnessed labs. 463
About 200 of these labs were located in the Asia-Pacific region, most of
which were fully accredited. 464

4. Water Efficiency
EPA’s WaterSense product certification program, which provides a label for high-performing, water-efficient products, also relies on third-party
certification as shown in Figure 9. Modeled after Energy Star, WaterSense
was launched in 2006 and has required third-party certification since
2009. 465 All products bearing the WaterSense label must be assessed for
conformity with the WaterSense product specification by an accredited
third-party certifying body. The certifying bodies, in turn, are accredited by
an accreditation body approved by EPA.

462.
Id. at 1 n.1.
463.
Telephone Interview with Eamon Monahan, Energy Star Program, U.S. Envtl.
Prot. Agency (Aug. 6, 2012).
464.
Id.
465.
Comprehensive List of All Frequent Questions, WATERSENSE, U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/watersense/full_list.html (last visited Nov. 29, 2013). EPA
issued the first WaterSense product certification system in 2009. WATERSENSE, U.S.
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, WATERSENSE PRODUCT CERTIFICATION SYSTEM (2009) available
at, http://www.epa.gov/watersense/docs/cert_system_revised508.pdf. EPA issued a revised
version in 2011. WATERSENSE, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, WATERSENSE PRODUCT
CERTIFICATION SYSTEM VOLUME 2.0 (2011), available at http://www.epa.gov/
watersense/docs/cert_system_508.pdf [hereinafter WATERSENSE 2.0].
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FIGURE 9: STRUCTURE OF THIRD-PARTY PROGRAM FOR
WATERSENSE PRODUCT LABEL
EPA
approves
Accreditation Bodies
that accredit
Third-Party Certifying Body
that certify
Products
are in conformity with
WaterSense Product Specifications
The applicable standards in WaterSense are EPA’s “product specifications,” which are currently finalized for seven product categories: TankType Toilets, Lavatory Faucets, Flushing Urinals, Showerheads, WeatherBased Irrigation Controllers, Commercial Pre-Rinse Spray Valves, and
Product and Labeling Clarifications. 466 Manufacturers seeking to use the
WaterSense label on products in these categories first enter into a WaterSense partnership agreement with EPA and then have their product(s)
“certified for conformance to the WaterSense specification by an EPA
licensed certifying body.” 467 “Manufacturers apply directly to the licensed
certifying body for certification and to obtain the WaterSense label.” 468
To be approved by EPA, an accreditation body must be domiciled in
the United States and show that it operates in accordance with the require-

466.
Compendium of Product & Program Specifications, WATERSENSE, U.S. ENVTL.
PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/watersense/partners/product_program_specs.html (last
visited Nov. 29, 2013).
467.
Product Certification & Labeling, WATERSENSE, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/watersense/about_us/product_certification_labeling.html (last visited
Nov. 8, 2013).
468.
Id.
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ments o� ISO/IEC 17011. 469 Also, it must offer accreditation services to
ISO/IEC Guide 65 and the IAF Guidance on the Application o� ISO/IEC
Guide 65 and be an IAF MLA signatory for products. 470 As of 2013, EPA
had approved three accreditation bodies: A2LA, ANSI, and IAS. 471
Product-certifying bodies must be accredited by an approved accreditation body in accordance with ISO/IEC Guide 65 and the IAF Guidance on
the Application o� ISO/IEC Guide 65 to operate the WaterSense product
certification system and certify products to the relevant WaterSense product specifications. The accreditation body determines the certifying body’s
scope of accreditation by accrediting it for any or all of the WaterSense
product specifications established by EPA. Accredited certifying bodies also
sign a licensing agreement with EPA to certify and label products for
WaterSense. 472 As o� May 2012, EPA had licensed six certification bodies to
provide product certifications for one or more of the seven product categories. 473 Examples o� licensed certification bodies include Intertek and NSF
International, based in the United States, and CSA International, based in
Canada.
In addition, certifying bodies must have procedures in place to ensure
that the testing data that they rely on is reliable. Independent testing labs
that are used by certifying bodies must demonstrate compliance with
ISO/IEC 17025 and the relevant WaterSense product specification. 474 If a
certifying body relies on testing data from a manufacturer’s laboratory,
additional requirements are imposed. 475 To the extent that a certification
body outsources its evaluation process to contractors, it must have “documented policies and procedures for . . . qualifying, assessing, and
monitoring” them, and it must make a list of them available to the EPA or
accreditation body to review. 476
469.
WATERSENSE 2.0, supra note 465, at 4. The requirement that the accreditation
body be domiciled in the United States is not present in EPA’s Energy Star program or
other programs included in this review.
470.
Id. (noting that references to ISO/IEC Guide 65 will be superseded by ISO/IEC
17065 once ISO/IEC 17065 is published).
471.
Accreditation & Licensed Certifying Bodies, WATERSENSE, U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/watersense/about_us/cert_bodies.html#accreditation (last visited
Nov. 8, 2013).
472.
WATERSENSE 2.0, supra note 465, at 6.
473.
Accreditation & Licensed Certifying Bodies, supra note 471.
474.
WATERSENSE 2.0, supra note 465, at 8; see also U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
RESPONSE TO PUBLIC COMMENTS RECEIVED ON JUNE 2011 WATERSENSE DRAFT REVISED
PRODUCT CERTIFICATION SYSTEM 11 (Sept. 29, 2011) (clarifying that WaterSense does not
require ISO/IEC 17025 accreditation for testing laboratories; it only requires that labs
“demonstrate compliance with ISO/IEC 17025”).
475.
WATERSENSE 2.0, supra note 465, at 8.
476.
Id. at 9.
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III. MEASURING SUCCESS
Given the growing prevalence of third-party verification programs, it is
important to evaluate which work well and why. This section first sets forth
five metrics to assess success. They include the reliability of third-party
determinations, compliance rates, agency capacity to administer the thirdparty system, public acceptance, and industry acceptance. The second part
discusses the incentives that are necessary to attract participation in programs where regulated entities may choose whether to contract with a third
party or rely on regulatory agency for verification of regulatory compliance.

A. Reliability
A key metric of success of third-party programs is whether the thirdparty assessment produces determinations that are sufficiently reliable and
accurate for the regulatory purpose at hand. This metric allows for some
variation. It may be acceptable to the agency, for example, for the reliability
of third-party determinations regarding conformity with voluntary standards to be lower than the reliability of those regarding conformity with
mandatory standards. Similar to private conformity assessment systems that
may vary depending on the needs of the purchaser, regulatory third-party
systems may also be allowed to vary depending on regulatory needs. 477
To a large degree, the reliability of determinations made by third parties will depend on their competence and independence. Generally, third
parties must be competent to perform the required assessment tasks and
independent (or unbiased) in their assessment. In addition, programs
should be designed to enhance the consistency of third-party determinations and avoid problems that have undermined the reliability of similar
assessments in non-regulatory contexts.
In some areas of regulation in which regulatory third-party programs
are being constructed, third parties have been used by private parties to
assess conformity for many years. However, these private systems have
sometimes suffered from a lack of reliability. For example, in the food safety area, corporate purchasers have required suppliers to conduct
independent third-party audits of their facilities. Newsworthy failures in
these systems have suggested problems with the reliability of these audit
determinations. In the case of the Peanut Corporation of America and the
salmonella outbreak with which it is associated, third-party auditors had
given the manufacturer a “superior rating,” but later investigation by FDA
showed that product testing had revealed instances of salmonella contami477.
Cf. infra note 612 and accompanying text (recommending that agencies calibrate
the design of third-party programs to the level of risks associated with noncompliance).
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nation. 478 In cases like this, questions have been raised about both the competence and the independence of third-party auditors.
To ensure competence, an agency may have to give serious attention to
the training of third parties. Two recent pilot programs undertaken by FDA
have underscored the importance of such training. In a pilot program conducted by FDA in which certification bodies were selected to inspect
establishments in the aquacultured shrimp industry for compliance with
U.S. food safety standards, the agency’s audits of the CBs found that some
were not using the correct standards in their inspections even though they
had been instructed to do so. 479 Rather, they were using standards of other
countries, which they had presumably used in other audits. 480 FDA concluded that it would have to conduct additional training to implement a
full-scale third-party program. 481 Similarly, in PMAP, FDA’s pilot program
with Canada for medical device facility inspections, FDA found that training was needed to ensure that “additional regulatory requirements outside
of the ISO 13485:2003 standard and the QS regulation are adequately
covered during audits/inspections.” 482
Despite the training issues, however, the FDA concluded in PMAP
that the use of third-party auditors held promise. FDA gave an overall vote
of confidence in its workability, stating that “[Health Canada] and FDA
have confidence in the ability of a qualified and competent auditing organization to plan, carry out, and report on the audit/inspection according to
basic [Health Canada] and FDA requirements.” 483 In a similar vein, an
FDA staffer who has worked with the AP Inspection Program indicated
that he perceived APs to be very competent, particularly in performing ISO
13485 facility inspections. 484 He noted, however, that because they rarely do
inspections for the AP Inspection Program, the information they provide to
478.
Andrew Martin, Peanut Plant Says Audits Declared It in Top Shape, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 4, 2009), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/05/business/05peanuts.
html?_r=1&ref=peanutcorporationofamerica.
479.
CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY & APPLIED NUTRITION, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
ASSESSMENT OF THE THIRD-PARTY CERTIFICATION PILOT FOR AQUACULTURED SHRIMP
12 (2011); see also Draft Guidance for Industry on Voluntary Third-Party Certification
Programs for Foods and Feed Availability, 73 Fed. Reg. 39,704-05 (Jul. 10, 2008) (announcing the pilot program and calling for applications from certification bodies).
480.
CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY & APPLIED NUTRITION, supra note 479, at 7.
481.
Id. at 26.
482.
PMAP Report, supra note 344 (stating that Canada and many other countries rely
directly on ISO 13485: Medical devices—Quality management systems—Requirements for
regulatory purposes in their regulation of medical devices). The QS regulation of the United
States is similar, but not the same.
483.
Id.
484.
Telephone Interview with David Kalins, supra note 347.
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FDA is generally not adequate to support an FDA enforcement action. 485
He opined that if the program were mandatory or otherwise attracted high
participation by regulated entities, an entire industry of competent inspectors could emerge.
In the shrimp aquaculture pilot, in contrast, the FDA’s conclusions
were more pessimistic. It found that the agency needed “to more fully
explore communication, logistic, administration, and training options for
conducting future third-party programs.” 486 Indeed, FDA noted significant
deficiencies when it observed and assessed third parties to see if they met
eleven “critical performance elements.” 487 These critical audit performance
elements were defined as “key knowledge, skills, and abilities that, if not
demonstrated by the auditor, could result in the failure of the auditor to
detect the processing of potentially unsafe food.” 488 FDA conducted twenty-eight audits and found that only three out of eleven of its critical
elements were met in the majority of the audits and only one was met in all
of the audits. For example, only four out of the twenty-eight audits met
elements as critical as the following: “Did the auditor demonstrate an understanding o� how to identify, evaluate and control the food safety hazards
associated with the product and process being audited?” and “Did the auditor recognize, through in-plant observations, deficiencies in the
identification and control o� hazards?” 489
Another prevalent concern about third-party auditors relates to their
independence. When an auditor is paid by a regulated entity to assess that
entity’s compliance, concerns about the objectivity of the third party arise.
As discussed in the literature on financial auditing, in addition to potentially conscious motivations, a variety of unconscious biases can affect an
auditor’s judgment. 490 For example, the standards with which the auditor
must assess conformity may have ambiguities, and “[b]ias thrives wherever
there is the possibility of interpreting information in different ways.” 491 Also,
an “attachment bias” results from the fact that the auditor has strong business
reasons to please the client and equates his own interests with those of the
client. 492 In addition, the certain and immediate beneficial consequences of
485.
Id.
486.
CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY & APPLIED NUTRITION, supra note 479, at 26.
487.
Id. at 17.
488.
Id.
489.
Id. at 31 (Appendix B).
490.
Bazerman et al., supra note 100, at 97–98.
491.
Id. at 98.
492.
Id. at 99; see also Amy Shapiro, Who Pays the Auditor Calls the Tune?: Auditing
Regulation and Clients’ Incentives, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 1029, 1040 (2005) (discussing the
attachment bias and explaining that working for a client creates a tendency for an auditor to
make judgment calls that favor a client).
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giving a positive audit opinion may outweigh the uncertain and distant negative consequences of not doing so. 493 Another threat to independence occurs
when auditors provide their clients with additional “non-audit” consulting and
tax services. 494 In this case, an auditor that renders a negative audit opinion
risks losing not just the audit engagement but the additional business as well.
Similar issues of auditor independence can be expected to appear in
third-party verification programs. An example of an issue involving thirdparty independence is provided by the NRTL program. Curtis Straus LLC
(CSL) was recognized as an NRTL in 2000 and applied to have its recognition renewed in 2004. 495 In 2007, OSHA informed CSL by letter that it did
not appear to meet the NRTL program policy on independence because of
a change in its ownership in 2005. 496 After the change in ownership, the
investment firm (Wendel) owned 58 percent of CSL as well as 32 percent
o� Legrand, a manufacturer of electrical products that require NRTL testing and certification.
Over the next several years, CSL sought OSHA approval by providing
more information and making some changes to its business structure. For
example, it sought to convince OSHA that a firewall existed to assure the
independence of its certification process and that it would use external and
internal audits to ensure its independence. 497 In 2010, however, OSHA
made a negative finding of renewal based in part on concerns that OSHA
would not be able to effectively monitor CSL’s efforts, given the extent and
complexity o� Wendel’s and Legrand’s business operations. 498 In its continued efforts to persuade OSHA to renew, Wendel decreased its ownership
stake in Legrand to 11 percent in 2011.
In 2011, OSHA published notice of its preliminary finding to deny renewal. 499 In the preliminary finding, OSHA explained that the NRTL
program requires “complete independence,” meaning that NRTLs “must be
free from commercial, financial and other pressures that could compromise
. . . its testing and certification.” 500 CSL’s substantial relationship with
493.
Bazerman et al., supra note 100, at 100.
494.
Keith A. Houghton & Christine A. Jubb, The Market for Financial Report Audits:
Regulation of and Competition for Auditor Independence, 25 LAW & POL’Y 299, 308–09 (2003).
495.
Curtis-Straus LLC, Application for Renewal o� Recognition, 76 Fed. Reg.
62,850–51 (Oct. 11, 2011).
496.
Id. at 62,850–56.
497.
Id. at 62,852.
498.
Id.
499.
Id. at 62,856; Telephone Interview with Robert Biersner, Office of the Solicitor,
Dep’t o� Labor (Aug. 10, 2012).
500.
Id. at 62,852 (quoting OSHA, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, CPL 01-00-003, NRTL
PROGRAM POLICIES, PROCEDURES, AND GUIDELINES (1999), available at https://www.osha.
gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=DIRECTIVES&p_id=2004).
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Legrand deriving from Wendel’s partial ownership o� both violates this
independence requirement. By 2013, however, OSHA’s final determination
on CSL’s renewal had still not been published, suggesting that a lengthy
process is required when an agency seeks to terminate the accreditation of a
certification body. 501
In addition to questions of competence and independence, agencies
should be concerned about the consistency of third-party determinations. If
third-party firms and individuals are able to conduct the required assessment tasks in different ways, their determinations may be less consistent
than governmental determinations, particularly if the latter would be centralized. For example, when EPA decided to verify greenhouse gas
emissions data itself rather than require emitters to contract with a thirdparty verifier, it suggested that this would allow it to comprehensively
review the data and provide the necessary consistency and quality. 502 I�
EPA had opted to incorporate third-party verification, it “would still need
to review and perform consistency checks after the third party verification
was complete.” 503
Aside from competence and independence, there are other characteristics common in auditing that may also be preventing reliable and accurate
results. One scholar of private third-party systems in the food sector found
that auditors focus their review on the records kept by companies rather
than actual company practices. In a study of audits performed to check the
compliance of agricultural suppliers with buyers’ standards, the scholar
observed that “what are mostly audited are not the practices of suppliers,
but their records. Put differently, auditors largely rely on proxy measures to
verify compliance.” 504 As such, the audit may verify that there is documentation showing that a certain standard was met but not actually verify that
the standard was met.
Other scholars have pointed out that audits may verify compliance with
many detailed performance specifications while failing to assess true
501.
E-mail from Kevin Robinson, OSHA, U.S. Dep’t o� Labor (Mar. 5, 2013) (explaining that OSHA was reexamining its independence policy and had decided to delay a
final determination on CSL). It is worth noting that throughout the history of the program,
two NRTLs have had their recognition revoked due to deficiencies in their testing and
certification operations, and one NRTL’s renewal application was denied due to independence issues. Id.
502.
See Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases, 74 Fed. Reg. 56,260, 56,282 (Oct.
30, 2009) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 86–87, 89, 90, 94, 98, 1033, 1039, 1042, 1045, 1048, 1051,
1054, 1065).
503.
Id. at 56,283.
504.
Maki Hatanaka, Certification, Partnership, and Morality in an Organic Shrimp Network: Rethinking Transnational Alternative Agrifood Networks, 38 WORLD DEV. 706, 710
(2010).
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risks. 505 To standardize their task, auditing organizations may develop detailed checklists, so there may be lots of “ticking the boxes” even though
“crucial quality risks can go unnoticed at the same time because they are not
specifically provided for on the checklist of technical requirements.” 506
Moreover, there are reasons that the checklists may be favored in thirdparty programs run by federal agencies. Namely, it removes discretion from
the auditor and may be perceived as more standardized and fair. 507
When constructing third-party programs to serve regulatory purposes,
agencies have many ways to respond to these various concerns and increase
the reliability of third-party determinations. 508 With rules regarding how
third parties are accredited and how regulated entities select third parties,
the agency can create a high bar for third-party competence and independence. With rules regarding how assessment tasks are performed, an agency
can further enhance the reliability and consistency of third-party determinations. Importantly, agencies can also employ a variety of oversight
mechanisms to make sure that third parties comply with program rules.

B. Rates of Compliance
Another metric to assess third-party verification programs can be found
in the extent to which a program ensures and enhances regulatory compliance. When third-party programs are used for regulatory purposes, they
should increase—not reduce—rates of compliance. A third-party program
that enables a greater degree of noncompliance, and thereby eviscerates or
dilutes valuable regulatory protections, cannot be considered a success.
In many existing regulatory programs, compliance inspections occur infrequently and compliance rates are hard to determine. For example, in
2011, about 254,000 foreign food facilities and 167,000 domestic food facilities were registered with the FDA. 509 With limited inspectorial resources
(about 1,000 inspectors), FDA inspected only 6 percent of the 421,000
registered facilities in 2010. 510 Also, according to the FDCA, domestic
manufacturers of a class II or III medical device shall be inspected by the
505.
Albersmeier et al., supra note 102, at 930–33.
506.
Id. at 933.
507.
See id.
508.
Cf. McAllister, supra note 21, at 47–62 (recommending “clear and enforceable
rules” for: the accreditation verifiers, “the selection of verifiers by regulated entities, the
performance of verifications, and the disclosure and reporting of verification information”).
509.
Kathy Gombas & Howard Seltzer, The Reportable Food Registry: A Valuable New
Tool for Preventing Foodborne Illness, FOOD SAFETY MAG., June–July 2011, available at
http://www.foodsafetymagazine.com/article.asp?id=4117&sub=sub1.
510.
Dina ElBoghdady, Taking New Look at Food Inspection, WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 2012,
at A1.
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FDA at least once in every two-year period. 511 However, with limited resources, FDA had not satisfied this biennial inspection mandate. As
reported by the U.S. General Accountability Office (GAO) in 2008, domestic high-risk facilities receive inspections only once every three years
and medium-risk facilities only once every five years. 512 While the law does
not impose an inspection frequency for foreign manufacturers, those that
are high-risk are reportedly inspected only once every six years and medium-risk only once every twenty-seven years. 513
Third-party verification programs can enable more frequent inspections
and more complete data about compliance. A program may be designed, for
example, to require an assessment of the compliance status of all regulated
entities or products each year or every few years. Such regular third-party
inspections can help improve compliance by regulated entities. As this
author has noted elsewhere, “[e]vidence suggests that when managers expect outside observers, they tend to change how they perform their jobs and
how they relate to other managers in ways that favor adherence. As such,
the performance of an individual or group improves when it is singled out
for observation and study by an outsider. Also, in third-party assessment
processes, there may be opportunities for third party assessors to educate
and persuade the regulated entity to comply.“ 514
Indeed, many third-party programs have been implemented by federal
agencies in response to a perceived deficit in the agencies’ ability to inspect
regulated entities. The low inspection rates o� foreign food facilities by
FDA led to the new third-party programs for imported food in FSMA. A
decade earlier, Congress mandated the AP Inspection Program due to concern about FDA’s inability to conduct inspections every three or five years
as legally required. Also, EPA introduced its third-party program for Energy Star in 2011 after a GAO inspection revealed the possibility o� fraud and
abuse in the previous system of self-declaration. In these programs and
others, legislators and regulators appear to hope that third-party programs
will lead to higher compliance rates, and ultimately better regulatory outcomes.

511.
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, supra note 350, at 2; see also 21 U.S.C § 360(h) (2012)
(containing the statutory requirement).
512.
CHALLENGES FOR FDA, supra note 336, at 2nd page (unnumbered), under heading What GAO Found.
513.
Id.
514.
MCALLISTER, supra note 22, at 45 (footnotes omitted).
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C. Regulatory Agency Capacity
Another metric for evaluating third-party verification programs is the
sufficiency of agency resources for establishing and maintaining a program.
Judging from existing programs, a great deal of agency resources may be
required to set up a program. Also, without effective governmental oversight, third-party programs may lack transparency and accountability and
ultimately erode public confidence in regulation and compromise public
welfare. Although private actors may carry out many tasks in a third-party
program, the agency must have the strength and resources to ensure that
the program is effectively serving regulatory purposes.
Depending to some extent on how a third-party program is designed, a
large investment of time and resources may be necessary to get it up and
running. In particular, if an agency approves certification bodies itself instead of delegating this to an accreditation organization, it will need to do
all the work of establishing the relevant rules and implementing them to
verify the qualifications of the third parties. Even if an accreditation organization is used, the agency will have to establish the relevant rules and
oversee the accreditation organization’s implementation of them.
Several existing programs illustrate the challenges involved in accrediting certification bodies. In FDA’s AP Inspection Program, selection and
training of APs took many years to complete. 515 FDA’s aquacultured shrimp
pilot further demonstrates the resource requirements of verifying the qualifications of third parties, particularly when they are outside the United
States. As part of the application process, FDA asked candidate certification bodies to assess their own conformity with certain attributes that FDA
determined were necessary for CB certification programs. 516 These included, for example, that “auditors should understand the food safety issues
related to the processes and products that they audit”; the CB should have a
“quality assurance program that monitors its auditors” and audits; and the
CB “should have sufficient resources, such as equipment and infrastructure.” 517 The FDA developed self-assessment checklists, and participants
reported with few exceptions that they met most of the attributes. However, when FDA performed its onsite certification program assessments, it
515.
See infra note 555 and associated text; cf. GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, supra note
350, at 9–10 (describing the requirements that APs complete a collaborative inspection (in
which the trainee acts primarily as an observer of the FDA inspector); a modified performance inspection (in which the trainee conducts the inspection with the assistance of an
FDA inspector); and a full performance inspection (in which the trainee independently
performs an inspection that is observed and evaluated by an FDA inspector)).
516.
CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY & APPLIED NUTRITION, supra note 479, at 9.
517.
Id.
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found the information in the checklist responses was often unsupported by
source documents and that the self-assessment checklists themselves were
not sufficient to assure attainment of the attributes. Ultimately, FDA found
that most CBs did not fully meet the majority of attributes. 518 The FDA
concluded that the “onsite program assessments and associated discussions
with CB personnel” were “critical to FDA’s evaluation of the CB programs.” 519
Moreover, through this pilot FDA realized the difficulty of performing
such onsite assessments. FDA reports that onsite assessments required at
least four people to spend three to five days at the headquarters of each of
the six CBs, four of which were outside the United States. 520 It also found
that not all supporting documentation and relevant personnel were available
at the headquarters and, in this situation, “FDA’s ability to make a full
assessment of one or more program attributes was limited.” 521 For the CBs
located outside the United States, the overseas travel and need for translation services further complicated FDA’s assessment efforts. 522
In the final phase of the pilot, FDA observed CBs conducting audits of
shrimp processors and farms and conducted its own audits of the laboratories CBs used. Spread across seven foreign countries, FDA confronted
problems in coordinating the schedules of multiple stakeholders (e.g., FDA,
the CB, the competent authorities in foreign countries, and the processors,
farms, and labs being audited) and in receiving permission to observe some
processors, farms, and labs. 523 In addition, some changes in FDA’s plans
were necessitated by international crises and civil unrest in countries where
audits had been planned. 524 Given the difficulties, some CBs conducted
“mock audits” to accommodate the FDA. 525 FDA concluded that the “coordination among multiple stakeholders demanded significant time and
resources.” 526
Finally, the pilot made clear that agencies that implement third-party
programs are likely to need to provide training to their own personnel and
518.
Id. at 13 tbl.3.
519.
Id. at 11.
520.
Id. at 6–7 tbl.1, 11.
521.
Id. at 12.
522.
See id. at 25 (“Language barriers and different operating models and paradigms
(i.e., industry vs. regulatory) made understanding between FDA and the CBs challenging
and clear communication even more critical” and “[i]t should be noted that the number of
interpreters needed for a full-scale third-party certification program are likely to be substantial.”).
523.
Id. at 16.
524.
Id.
525.
Id.
526.
Id. at 24.
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develop new information technology (IT) systems. FDA concluded that
operationalizing a third-party certification program in the future would
require “establishing robust formal training for Agency personnel involved
in on-site program assessments and performance audits of CB auditors and
supporting laboratories.” 527 The pilot, which involved only six CBs, taxed
existing FDA infrastructure and indicated “that an operating program in
the future would need additional resources to be successful, as well as a
central coordinating point within the Agency.” 528 Moreover, FDA reported
that “current IT systems and databases were not designed to accommodate
third-party certification audits” and “more in-depth evaluation, updating,
and the potential development of new systems and databases” would be
required for FDA to operationalize a third-party certification program. 529
Energy Star provides an example of a program in which the agency
delegates accreditation to private accreditation bodies. The accreditation
bodies that accredit laboratories must themselves be approved by EPA.
EPA relies extensively on that accreditation and does little oversight of
accredited labs. The accreditation bodies that accredit CBs do not need
specific EPA approval; any accreditation body that is a signatory to the IAF
MLA may accredit Energy Star CBs. The accreditation bodies are responsible for conducting periodic assessments of the CBs they accredit, and the
Energy Star program itself conducts additional oversight including audits
of product certifications. 530
Existing programs show that agencies may have difficulty maintaining
the resources needed to provide adequate oversight. In 2010, the USDA
Office o� Inspector General (OIG) found deficiencies in AMS’s oversight
o� NOP certifying agents and organic operations. 531 OIG also found that
NOP officials “did not make required onsite assessments and did not identify inconsistencies in implementation o� NOP regulations.” 532 Lacking
sufficiently specific rules and adequate oversight, certification agents developed different criteria for determining whether noncompliances were

527.
Id. at 25.
528.
Id. at 23.
529.
Id. at 24–25.
530.
See Conditions and Criteria for Recognition of Certification Bodies for the ENERGY
STAR Program, supra note 456, at 2 (authorizing EPA to conduct audits at its discretion);
Telephone Interview with Eamon Monahan, supra note 463 (mentioning that Energy Star
picked at random some product categories and had CBs send all related certification files).
531.
See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. [USDA OIG], U.S. DEPT. OF AGRIC.,
AUDIT REPORT 01601-03-HY, OVERSIGHT OF THE NATIONAL ORGANIC PROGRAM 29–30
(2010).
532.
Id. at 3.
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present and whether they were major or minor. 533 OIG concluded that
“AMS did not ensure consistent oversight of organic operations by its certifying agents.” 534 This lack of oversight, in turn, undermined the overarching
goal o� NOP “to assure consumers that such products meet consistent,
uniform standards.” 535
The OIG found even more serious deficiencies in AMS’s oversight o�
foreign certifying agents. 536 AMS is required to make onsite reviews o�
foreign certifying agents, but five o� forty-four never received such a review
and twenty-four o� forty-four received reviews more than two years after
receiving their conditional accreditation. 537 The NOP had underestimated
the number of applications they would receive when the program began in
2002 and had failed to develop a policy to handle the review of certifying
agents located in countries with travel warnings issued by the Department
of State. 538 When NOP reviews were performed, NOP officials often found
that certifying agents committed major noncompliances, such as failing to
identify mislabeled products, maintain complete certification files, and
complete annual conflict-of-interest disclosures. 539
The response of AMS to the OIG report indicates that the root of the
problem was that the NOP program lacked sufficient resources. AMS stated that the NOP budget had increased in 2009 to $3.87 million and its staff
to sixteen, and that a $3.1 million budget increase in 2010 would enable the
program to grow to thirty-one staff members. 540 In 2007, the NOP had
“just nine staff members and an annual budget of $1.5 million.” 541
It is worth noting that the international scope of many third-party programs interacts with the issue of governmental oversight. The international
dimensions of certain regulatory objectives like food safety may make thirdparty programs particularly attractive, but these same international dimensions complicate oversight. Not only may effective oversight be more costly,
but the agency may not have the authority in foreign jurisdictions to do the
kinds of oversight it would do in a domestic context.

533.
Id. at 21–27 (describing how NOP lacked clear and sufficiently focused rules and
did not oversee their implementation).
534.
Id. at 21.
535.
Id.
536.
Id. at 28–29.
537.
Id. at 29–30.
538.
Id. at 28–29.
539.
Id.
540.
Id. at 37–39 (Exhibit B: AMS response).
541.
Andrew Martin, How to Add Oomph to ‘Organic’, UNCLE MATT’S ORGANIC BLOG
(Aug. 20, 2007), http://unclematts.com/dev/how-to-add-oomph-to-organic/.
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D. Public Acceptance
Another metric of success is the support and acceptance that the thirdparty program receives from stakeholders. The most relevant stakeholders
are the concerned public (the beneficiaries of regulation) and the regulated
industry (the target of regulation). Issues relevant to the industry’s acceptance of a program are discussed in the following section.
One gauge of public support for regulatory change consists of the
comments received by agencies in response to rulemaking processes and
other requests for comments. The public is often represented by nongovernmental organizations. While most third-party programs described in
this Article have garnered little public attention, there are a couple exceptions.
First, NGOs concerned with food safety have been very wary of the introduction of third-party auditors into the FDA’s regulatory framework. In
comments to the agency, one NGO acknowledged that FSMA authorizes
third-party certification for imported food, but emphasizes that “the law
does not permit it for domestic facilities.” 542 The commenter then stresses
the need for the agency to rigorously apply conflict-of-interest requirements and otherwise conduct oversight of third-party auditors. 543 Another
NGO criticizes the legislative decision to allow FDA to rely on third-party
auditors for regulatory audits, regretting that FDA will “expend precious
resources” developing conflict-of-interest standards and overseeing third
parties. 544 It cites failures in the National Organic Program 545 and private
food safety audits 546 to support its conclusion that FDA “should invest its

542.
Comments o� Make Our Food Safe & Safe Food Coal. on Proposed Rule, RE:
Docket Nos. FDA-2011-N-0145, § 303 Authority to Require Import Certifications for Food,
and FDA-2011-N-0146, § 307, Accreditation o� Third-Party Auditors, (May 6, 2011) at 2,
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FDA-2011-N-0145-0016 [hereinafter Make
Our Food Safe & Safe Food Coal.].
543.
Id. at 3.
544.
Comment o� Food & Water Watch on Proposed Rule, FDA Food Safety Modernization Act: Title III-A New Paradigm for Importers; Public Meeting (Section 307.
Accreditation o� Third-Party Auditors) (May 6, 2011) at 2, http://www.regulations.
gov/#!documentDetail;D=FDA-2011-N-0146-0007 [hereinafter Food & Water Watch].
545.
Cf. USDA OIG, supra note 531 (finding that AMS fails to adequately oversee
NOP third parties).
546.
A prominent such failure involved the salmonella outbreak caused by peanuts
processed by Peanut Corporation of America in a facility that had received a superior rating
in a private food safety audit required by a buyer, Kellogg Corp. See Lessons From The Peanut
Salmonella Outbreak: Audit System Broken, JIM PREVOR’S PERISHABLE PUNDIT (Feb. 19,
2009), http://www.perishablepundit.com/index.php?date=02/19/09&pundit=1.
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resources into doing as many of the imported food inspections itself and
should avoid at all costs a reliance on a privatized inspection system.” 547
In the product safety arena, NGOs have been more supportive of thirdparty testing. Major consumer NGOs such as the Consumer Federation of
America and US PIRG expressed strong support for “a CPSCadministered, third party safety certification program for monitoring the
safety of all products” before the passage of the CPSIA in 2008. 548 In the
aftermath of its passage, they have participated in the regulatory process to
voice support for a strong third-party testing system. 549
A common concern o� NGOs regarding the use of third-party inspection and certification systems is that they will weaken governmental
accountability and transparency. A food-safety NGO, for example, expresses a preference for inspections performed by FDA, other U.S. agencies, or
foreign governments (in that order) over inspections by third-party auditors, as the latter “may not have the same public health objective or may not
be supported by the same level of expertise, training, resources, and accountability as are FDA inspectors.” 550 When the Energy Star program
announced its intention to establish a third-party verification and testing
program, an environmental NGO expressed strong support but stressed the
need for “complete transparency of the program’s procedures and testing
results.” 551

E. Industry Acceptance
The other major group of stakeholders consists of the regulated entities. A very common reaction to an agency’s announcement that it is
implementing a third-party verification program is industry concern about
costs. Indeed, a third-party program will often shift some of the costs of

547.
Food & Water Watch, supra note 544.
548.
Letter from Rachel Weintraub, Senior Counsel, Consumer Fed’n of America, et
al., to Sen. Daniel K. Inouye, Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transp. (Oct. 26, 2007), available at http://consumersunion.org/news/groups-ask-senate-commerce-comm-not-to-weakenproduct-safety-bill/.
549.
Comments of Consumers Union, Consumer Fed’n of Am., Kids in Danger, and
U.S. PIRG on Requirements for Accreditation o� Third Party Conformity Assessment
Bodies to Assess Conformity with Part 1215 o� Title 16, Code o� Federal Regulations” (July
6, 2010), available at http://www.consumerfed.org/elements/www.consumerfed.org/file/
Comments%20on%203PT%20Bath%20Seats%20(Final)%20(2).pdf.
550.
Make Our Food Safe & Safe Food Coal., supra note 542.
551.
Comments o� Natural Res. Def. Council on ENERGY STAR’s Proposed Enhanced Testing and Verification Program, (Apr. 30, 2010), at 4 (emphasis omitted), available
at http://www.energystar.gov/ia/partners/downloads/mou/Natural_Resources_Defense_Cou
ncil_Comments.pdf.
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inspection and compliance assessment from the government to industry. 552
To augment industry support, third-party programs should reduce the
burden on industry as much as possible while still achieving regulatory
objectives. Third-party programs may also be able to provide benefits to
industry, for example, by reducing the processing times of product approvals applications and by creating a single approval process that satisfies
various national jurisdictions. Notably, third-party programs raise special
concerns about costs for small businesses.
One important way to contain costs in a third-party program is to ensure
that there are a sufficient number of third parties to create competition
among them. 553 A representative of the Energy Star program stated that the
primary way that the program responded to industry concerns about thirdparty certification was by encouraging the rapid development of a strong
market of certification bodies and laboratories. 554 In contrast, in the FDA’s
AP Inspection Program, it took the agency many years to get APs through
all required training and cleared to conduct independent inspections: by
May 2008, four years after the program was established, only eight APs out
of sixteen had completed all training. 555 Because of the delays, few APs were
available to conduct independent inspections in the early years of the program.
As an agency seeks to encourage a competitive market, however, certain
precautions need to be taken. First, an agency should not unduly lower its
requirements for competence and independence in order to accredit more
third parties. In the AP Inspection Program, for example, the training that
was given may have been essential for APs to adequately carry out their
tasks. Second, an agency should establish program rules to ensure that third
parties cannot compete in ways that compromise the quality of the assessment. The agency can require in its program rules, for example, that third
parties inspect a certain number of product samples or make a certain number of site visits to a manufacturing facility.
The CPSC’s third-party program for the testing of children’s products
has provoked substantial industry resistance. As the CPSC has developed
regulations, product manufacturers have repeatedly expressed concerns
552.
See McAllister, supra note 21, at 27.
553.
Cf. Telephone Interview with Eamon Monahan, supra note 463 (discussing how
Energy Star sought to keep costs low for regulated entities by encouraging the participation
of a sufficient number of CBs and labs to create the possibility for competition among
them).
554.
Id.
555.
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-780T, MEDICAL DEVICES: FDA
FACES CHALLENGES IN CONDUCTING INSPECTIONS OF FOREIGN MANUFACTURING
ESTABLISHMENTS 19 (2008).
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about the cost of the required third-party testing. It was clear that these
concerns had reached Congress when it amended the CPSIA in August
2011. 556 The amendments gave the CPSC new authority to exempt qualifying small batch manufacturers (mostly small businesses) from third-party
testing. They also required the CPSC to issue a request for public comments on opportunities to reduce the cost of third-party testing
requirements.
Manufacturers expressed many concerns about the costs of third-party
testing in their comments. 557 For example, they recommended that CPSC
exempt more individual products and categories of products by regulation;
that CPSC make additional attempts to reduce testing requirements based
on the actual likelihood of exposure; and that CPSC increase efforts to
harmonize federal, international and state laws applicable to consumer
products. Other suggestions included decreasing the frequency of retesting
and allowing more retesting to be done by the manufacturers themselves
rather than a third-party lab. 558
Small manufacturers have been most concerned about the new thirdparty testing requirements. A trade association of small jewelry makers
complains of the unreasonable cost burdens imposed by the CPSIA. 559 It
reports that almost one quarter of its members “have reduced their children’s products offerings, and 16% have exited the children’s jewelry market
entirely.” 560 A European maker o� heirloom quality toys calls third-party
testing of its small batches “prohibitive and impossible” and warns that
“specialized toys with high playing value will disappear from the US market” if the CPSIA is not amended. 561 This manufacturer and other small
manufacturers from Europe request that the CPSA exempt products tested
to the European safety standards from CPSIA’s third-party testing requirements. 562 Also, a manufacturer that describes itself as “medium-sized”
556.
15 U.S.C. § 2063(i) (2012); Application o� Third Party Testing Requirements,
H.R. 2715, 112th Cong. §§ 2, 10 (2011) (creating a new section 14(i) of the CPSA); Reducing
Third Party Testing Burdens, 76 Fed. Reg. 69,596 (Nov. 8, 2011). Public Comments in
response are available at regulations.gov (search for Docket No. “CPSC–2011-0081-0001”)
(listing 23 comments).
557.
See generally PUBLIC SUBMISSIONS, APPLICATION OF THIRD PARTY TESTING
REQUIREMENTS; REDUCING THIRD PARTY TESTING BURDENS, COSC DOCKET NO.
CPSC-2011-0081, available at http://www.cpsc.gov/PageFiles/85937/testingburdencomm.pdf
(last visited Nov. 17, 2013).
558.
See generally id. (especially comments submitted by the Society of the Plastics
Industry, Inc., at 119–28; the Toy Industry Association, at 159–64; and Libbey, at 141–42).
559.
See id. at 103–17 (comment submitted by the Fashion Jewelry and Accessories
Trade Association).
560.
Id. at 113 (emphasis omitted).
561.
Id. at 11 (comment submitted by Glückskäfer).
562.
Id. at 11–13 (comments submitted by Glückskäfer, Fagus and Grimm’s).
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expressed that the exemption for small-batch manufacturers does not cover
all low-volume manufacturers, even though they too are considerably different from large volume manufacturers. 563
In Energy Star, manufacturers also voiced concerns about the cost of
third-party certification. As reported in a 2011 study o� Energy Star by the
GAO, “[a]lmost all the manufacturing partners we spoke with stated the
cost to participate in the program had increased. Some manufacturing
partners—particularly small manufacturers or manufacturers with few
Energy Star products—also told us the increasing costs could discourage
their participation.” 564 Energy Star program staff, however, perceive widespread acceptance of the new rules and have not noticed a drop in
applications for the Energy Star label. 565
As in the case of the CPSC rule, small businesses have been particularly concerned about the new costs of certification. If they are not able to
afford certification for their products, their consumer base may be reduced.
Also, delays in getting products to market may be more prejudicial to small
companies. As stated by one commenter on the WaterSense program,
“[h]igh cost will discourage manufacturers, especially small ones, from
participating in the program at all.” 566 In effect, the costs of third-party
certification may benefit larger companies at the expense of smaller ones.
The Small Business Administration’s Office of Advocacy has been concerned about third-party programs. 567 One concern is that once agencies
shift the costs of inspection to industry, the government will not be as
limited in imposing regulatory requirements. Also, whereas many governmental programs establish a lower fee for small businesses, third parties are
not as likely to be as concerned with the affordability to small businesses.
The Office of Advocacy suggests that when agencies establish third-party
programs, they should consider mechanisms to help reduce the burden on
small businesses.
While a third-party program is likely to impose costs, it may also impart benefits that were not available without the program. The TCB program,
for example, cut the approval time of telecommunications equipment from

563.
Id. at 179–82 (comment submitted by Orbit Baby, Inc.).
564.
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-888, ENERGY STAR: PROVIDING
OPPORTUNITIES FOR ADDITIONAL REVIEW OF EPA’S DECISIONS COULD STRENGTHEN
THE PROGRAM (2011) at 26.
565.
Telephone Interview with Eamon Monahan, supra note 463.
566.
WATERSENSE, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, COMMENTS ON THE MAY 2007
DRAFT WATERSENSE CERTIFICATION SCHEME 19 (2007).
567.
Telephone Interview with David Rostker, Assistant Chief Counsel, Office of
Advocacy, U.S. Small Bus. Admin. (Aug. 17, 2012).
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thirty to ninety days in the late 1990s to often just a few days. 568 In addition, a program may be designed such that a third-party assessment satisfies
the regulatory requirements o� both the United States and other countries.
FDA reports that it is currently developing a “single audit program” for
medical devices that would result in a “saving of audit/inspection time in
person days (and associated costs) and less disruption of the manufacturer’s
day-to-day operations; and, greater control over the scheduling of regulatory audits/inspections.” 569
Factors aside from costs and benefits may also play a role in how industry reacts to a third-party program. A third-party program may be well
explained and well implemented by an agency, or it may not be. In the
latter case, industry is more likely to find the program to be overly complex
and objectionable.

F. Use of Optional Third Parties
Programs in which regulated entities have a choice as to whether to
contract with a third party have an additional metric of success: the rate of
regulated entity participation. If regulated entities do not use a program,
then the resources an agency used to create it may seem wasted. Differences
in participation in three programs described in this Article illustrate the
situation: FDA’s AP Inspection Program for medical device production
facilities, FDA’s 510(k) Review Program for medical devices, and FCC’s
TCB program.
The FDA’s AP Inspection Program has had a very low rate of participation. Despite an estimated 8,000 manufacturers that could use the
program, 570 only eighty independent inspections (i.e., unaccompanied by
FDA inspectors) have been conducted by APs in eight years of program
operation. 571 The FDA had hoped that manufacturers would be attracted by
the possibility that a single AP inspection might satisfy regulatory requirements in multiple jurisdictions. 572 However, the effect of this incentive has
been limited because manufacturers have had doubts that APs could cover
568.
Telephone Interview with George Tannahill, supra note 390.
569.
PMAP Report, supra note 344.
570.
Agency Information Collection Activities, 76 Fed. Reg. 29,764 (May 23, 2011)
(reporting FDA’s estimate that there are 4,000 domestic manufacturers and 4,000 foreign
manufacturers that are eligible for inclusion in the AP Inspection Program).
571.
Telephone Interview with David Kalins, supra note 347.
572.
STATUS OF FDA’S PROGRAM, supra note 328, at 13. This could occur if the same
inspection could serve to both verify the manufacturer’s compliance with the FDA’s QS
regulation and the manufacturer’s conformity with “ISO 13485: Medical devices—Quality
management systems—Requirements for regulatory purposes,” which many other countries
use as their standard. See also infra note 625 at 4.
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the multiple requirements of various standards in a single inspection. 573
Also, the program allows manufacturers to control the scheduling of inspections 574 and offers a two-year inspection holiday from regular FDA
inspections. 575
Many disincentives to participation also exist. Under the AP Inspection
Program, manufacturers have to bear the cost of the inspection, whereas
FDA inspections are free. Moreover, the manufacturer may not think an
FDA inspection will occur in the near future, and an AP inspection may
result in further regulatory action. 576 As reported by the GAO, “one industry representative questioned why manufacturers would ask for—and pay
for—inspections when the result could be that FDA closes them down.” 577
Manufacturers expressed concern that, because FDA makes the final determination of compliance with its requirements, FDA might want to
conduct an additional inspection after reading the report prepared by the
third-party inspector. 578 Observing the very small number of AP inspections in 2008, the GAO stated it raised “questions about the practicality and
effectiveness of establishing similar programs that rely on third parties to
quickly help FDA fulfill other responsibilities.” 579
The FDA’s 510(k) Review Program has attracted more participation
than the AP Inspection Program. As described above, this program enables
manufacturers to contract with third parties to conduct the primary premarket review for certain medical devices. The FDA reported in July 2012
that about 8 percent of all 510(k) reviews are conducted by third parties,
which is close to 300 annually. 580 One difference between the AP Inspection Program and the 510(k) Review Program is that in the latter, device
manufacturers pay FDA a user fee if they do not use an AP. In FY 2014, the
fee is $5,170 ($2,585 for qualified small businesses). 581 However, it is likely
573.
Infra note 625 at 4. By being able to schedule inspections, they are able to minimize facility disruptions and ensure that the necessary personnel and documentation is on
hand at the right time. Also, FDA may only give a week of notice of an inspection, but AP
inspections can be scheduled months in advance. See Telephone Interview with David
Kalins, supra note 347.
574.
STATUS OF FDA’S PROGRAM, supra note 328, at 13.
575.
Id. at 8 n.18.
576.
Id. at 15.
577.
Id. at 16.
578.
Id.
579.
CHALLENGES FOR FDA, supra note 336, at 22 (reporting seven inspections between March 2004 and January 2008).
580.
E-mail from Jean Cooper, supra note 378.
581.
FDA User Fees for 510(k) Applications, EMERGO GROUP, http://www.emergo
group.com/fda-user-fees-510k-applications (last visited Feb. 3, 2014). The Medical Device
User Fee and Modernization Act, enacted in 2002, gave the FDA authorization to charge
manufacturers fees for premarket review. See E-mail from Jean Cooper, supra note 378.
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that the user fee is lower than the amount that the manufacturer pays to a
private third party. 582
Another incentive present in the premarket program but not in the AP
Inspection Program is that manufacturers want this review to happen expeditiously in order to get their products to market more quickly. According
to the FDA, 510(k)s reviewed by APs in 2002 received FDA marketing
clearance 29 percent faster compared to 510(k)s reviewed entirely by
FDA. 583 FDA also highlights that the APs generally “have specialized expertise in areas that may be helpful to 510(k) submitters, such as device
testing, standards, or foreign regulatory requirements” and that they have
locations throughout the world “so they often can provide local service.” 584
In the FCC’s TCB program, there is a very high participation rate for
eligible products and third-party review has become the norm. In 2011, 98.5
percent of equipment authorization certifications (13,427 out of 13,645)
were issued by TCBs rather than the FCC. 585 FCC staff explains that companies prefer going to TCBs because their products are approved more
quickly and they can get to market faster. 586 In the late 1990s, product certifications were all conducted by the FCC and processing times tended to
range from thirty to ninety days. Presently, certifications conducted by
TCBs may take just a few days. The 1.5 percent of certifications that continue to be conducted by FCC tend to involve new technology that the
FCC excludes from TCB approval until it publishes a measurement procedure. 587 Also, given that the FCC charges fees for certifications, the costs of
using a TCB may be lower. In 2011, the FCC’s device certification fees
ranged from $490 to $1,265. 588
In sum, voluntary programs have varied greatly in terms of the costs
and benefits of participation, and participation rates have reflected this
variation. As illustrated by the AP Program, if the costs to participate are
582.
Telephone Interview with David Kalins, supra note 347.
583.
Third-Party Review of 501(k)s, subsection of FY 2002 ODE Annual Report – Part 3 –
Key Performance Indices, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA
/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobacco/CDRH/CDRHReports/ucm130097.h
tm (last visited Feb. 10, 2014).
584.
FY 2003 OHIP Annual Report—Medical Device User Fees Modernization Act
(MDUFMA), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/Centers
Offices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobacco/CDRH/CDRHReports/ucm130363.htm (last
visited Feb. 10, 2014).
585.
Telephone Interview George Tannahill, supra note 390.
586.
Id.
587.
Id.; see also OFFICE OF ENG’G & TECH., supra note 385, at 4.
588.
Telephone Interview with George Tannahill, supra note 390; see also Office o�
Eng’g & Tech., Equipment Authorization (EA), FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, http://transition
.fcc.gov/oet/ea/feeguide.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2014).
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high and the offsetting benefits are not clear, firms will not participate. On
the other hand, the TCB program shows that in different circumstances,
optional third-party certification may become the industry’s preference.

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS TO FEDERAL AGENCIES
This section sets forth recommendations to federal agencies regarding
the use of private third parties to assess regulatory compliance. Third-party
verification programs pose risks. If third-party programs are not well conceived and well operated, they may both undermine the achievement of
regulatory goals and impose high costs on regulated entities. Yet, thirdparty programs also offer benefits. By harnessing conformity assessment
expertise in the private sector, they may extend the reach of regulatory
agencies in ways that increase regulatory compliance and otherwise improve
the performance of regulated entities and products. The recommendations
discussed below seek to help agencies minimize the risks and maximize the
benefits of third-party programs.
The first important question that agencies face may be whether or not
to establish a third-party program. Alternatively, Congress may have directed the agency to develop a third-party program. Of the eight programs
surveyed in this Article, four were explicitly required by Congress. 589 The
first set of recommendations below is targeted to situations in which agencies are themselves deciding whether to establish a third-party program.
However, aspects of the recommendations will also be useful when agencies
are required to do so.
Agencies that are charged with or make the choice to establish a thirdparty program will need to write the rules by which the program will operate. The key rules of a third-party program can be categorized into several
types: accreditation rules, which determine who may be approved as a third
party; selection rules, which govern how regulated entities select third
parties; performance rules, which specify how third-party testing and certification should be performed; and reporting rules, which set forth what
information is provided to the regulatory agency by various program actors. 590 Moreover, the agency must make decisions about how it will
conduct oversight and enforce these rules. 591
When a third-party program is required by statute, certain characteristics of the third-party program may already be determined. Yet, within the
589.
See supra Table 1. The four that were required explicitly by Congress are the FDA
programs for food imports, the CPSC program for children’s products, the FDA programs
for medical devices, and the USDA National Organic Program.
590.
Cf. McAllister, supra note 21, at 47–59.
591.
Id. at 59–61.
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constraints of the statute, agencies are still likely to have many options
regarding program design. The second set of recommendations regards how
to establish a third-party program, with most relevance to program aspects
that have not been statutorily determined.

A. Deciding Whether to Use a Third-Party Program
1. Consult Public and Private Resources Related to Conformity
Assessment
There are several important governmental and nongovernmental resources available to agencies considering third-party programs. The federal
government has developed expertise in conformity assessment since the
passage of the National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995
(NTTAA). Most importantly, the NTTAA directed NIST to coordinate
the conformity assessment activities of governmental and private sector
entities “with the goal of eliminating unnecessary duplication and complexity.” 592 Also, in 1998, the Office o� Management and Budget’s Circular
A-119 instructed NIST to write guidance for agencies to ensure effective
coordination of governmental and private conformity assessment activities. 593 NIST published this guidance in 2000. 594
The Standards Services Division o� NIST is available to consult with
agencies interested in incorporating third-party conformity assessment
processes into their regulatory processes. Upon the request of an agency,
NIST staff can become involved in helping an agency design a third-party
program. For example, in the WaterSense program, the chief of the Standards Services Division essentially functioned as part o� WaterSense staf� for
a few months to explain the relevant ISO standards and help establish the
third-party program. 595 NIST coordinates the Interagency Committee on
Standards Policy (ICSP), which consists of one principal representative
from each federal executive agency, who is referred to as the “agency standards executive.” 596 According to NIST’s guidance, agency standards
executives are responsible for, inter alia, promoting the development of
“agency positions on conformity assessment related issues that are in the
592.
National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995 § 12(b)(3), 15 U.S.C.
§ 272 (2012); Guidance on Federal Conformity Assessment Activities, 65 Fed. Reg. 48,894
(Aug. 10, 2000) [hereinafter NIST Guidance].
593.
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, CIRCULAR A119 REVISED §§ 8, 13(e) (1998), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars_a119/.
594.
NIST Guidance, supra note 592.
595.
Telephone Interview with Stephanie Tanner, WaterSense Program, U.S. Envtl.
Prot. Agency (Aug. 10, 2012).
596.
NIST Guidance, supra note 592, § 287.5.
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public interest”; ensuring “that agency participation in conformity assessment related activities is consistent with agency missions, authorities,
priorities, and budget[s]”; and establishing an “ongoing process” for identifying “efficiencies” that “can be achieved through coordination with other
agency and private sector conformity assessment activities.” 597
NIST also runs the NVCASE program, which has responsibility for
recognizing the private accreditation bodies that accredit TCBs for the
FCC. To confer recognition, NVCASE performs an initial assessment of
the accreditation body and then performs a reassessment every two years to
ensure that it continues to operate in accordance with ISO/IEC 17011. 598
Under its regulations, NIST accepts requests to perform these functions
only in certain situations. 599 Otherwise, private accreditation bodies can be
recognized directly by federal agencies, and the assessment role played by
NVCASE may be performed instead by an international organization like
the IAF (for certification bodies) or ILAC (for laboratories). 600
OMB and NIST are both currently considering revising their guidance
to agencies regarding conformity assessment. In March 2012, OMB issued a
request for information and notice of public workshop regarding, inter alia,
whether A-119 should be revised to set out relevant principles on conformity assessment. 601 NIST has also expressed an interest in revising its 2000
guidance. 602
Agencies can also tap into expertise about conformity assessment that
exists in private standards organizations. Most significantly, agencies should
become familiar with ISO’s conformity assessment standards and guides,

597.
Id.; see also OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 587, § 15 (setting forth the
roles of the ICSP and standards executives).
598.
Telephone Interview with Ramona Saar, Standards Servs. Div., Nat’l Inst. of
Standards & Tech. (Aug. 24, 2012) (explaining that NVCASE ensures that the accreditation
bodies operate in accordance with ISO/IEC17011 in accrediting TCBs to ISO/IEC Guide 65
and the FCC’s technical requirements for TCBs).
599.
15 C.F.R. § 286.2 (2013) (stating that NIST accepts requests for recognition of
accreditation bodies “when (i) directed by U.S. law; (ii) requested by another U.S. government agency; or (iii) requested to respond to a specific U.S. industrial or technical need,
relative to a mandatory foreign technical requirement, if it has been determined after public
consultation that (A) there is no satisfactory accreditation alternative available and the
private sector has declined to make acceptable accreditation available, and (B) there is
evidence that significant public disadvantage would result from the absence of any alternative”).
600.
Telephone Interview with Ramona Saar, supra note 598; see also supra notes 116–18
and accompanying text.
601.
Request for Information and Notice o� Public Workshop, 77 Fed. Reg. 19,357
(Mar. 30, 2012).
602.
Id.
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referred to collectively as the conformity assessment (or CASCO)
toolbox. 603
It is important to note, however, that ISO standards and guides are ordinarily subject to copyright restrictions. Some have suggested that this
could present a barrier to wider use of standardized conformity assessment
in regulatory programs if the cost of purchasing copyrighted standards is
high and other reasonable means of accessing the materials are not available
to regulated entities and other stakeholders. 604 Several documents that
provide context for and explain these standards are publicly available. 605

603.
ISO/UNIDO, supra note 106, at 170–74 (providing a chart of all standards and
guides related to conformity assessment).
604.
See Adoption o� Recommendations, 77 Fed. Reg. 2257 (Jan. 17, 2012), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2012-01-17/pdf/2012-621.pdf; ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF
THE U.S., ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE RECOMMENDATION 2011-5: INCORPORATION BY
REFERENCE (2011), available at http://www.acus.gov/research/the-conference-currentprojects/incorporation-by-reference/ (recommending best practices for federal agencies that
incorporate by reference extrinsic materials, including voluntary consensus standards, into
regulations); see also EMILY S. BREMER, ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S.,
INCORPORATION BY REFERENCE IN FEDERAL REGULATIONS 26-32 (Oct. 19, 2011), available
at http://www.acus.gov/report/incorporation-reference-report (discussing ways agencies have
increased public access to copyrighted standards); SCOTT RAFFERTY, ENHANCING THE
COMPETITIVENESS OF THE AMERICAN STANDARDS SYSTEM BY RENEWING CIRCULAR A119, at 10–11 (2012), available at https://law.resource.org/pub/us/cfr/regulations.
gov.docket.01/090000648101c22e.pdf (response to Request for Information OMB-20120003) (noting high cost o� ISO standards and suggesting that “[l]ack of meaningful access is
a particularly serious barrier to wider use of standardized conformity assessments in federal
regulatory program[s] . . . . Agencies can be reluctant to delegate inspection or audit functions if the procedural and operational principles are not openly posted on the internet.”).
605.
See AMERICAN NAT’L STANDARDS INST., NATIONAL CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT
PRINCIPLES FOR THE UNITED STATES (2007), available at http://publicaa.ansi.org/
sites/apdl/Documents/News%20and%20Publications/Brochures/NCAP%20second%20editio
n.pdf; ISO/UNIDO, supra note 106; USTR, supra note 116; see also MAUREEN A.
BREITENBERG, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., THE ABC’S OF THE U.S.
CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT SYSTEM (1997), available at http://gsi.nist.gov/global/docs/pubs/
NISTIR_6014.pdf; Gordon Gillerman, Making the Confidence Connection: Conformity Assessment System Design, 56 STANDARDS ENGINEERING, no. 6, 2004, available at http://www.astm
.org/SNEWS/DECEMBER_2004/gillerman_dec04.html; NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL,
STANDARDS, CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT, AND TRADE: INTO THE 21ST CENTURY (1995),
available at http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=4921; Christopher Johnson,
Technical Barriers to Trade: Reducing the Impact of Conformity Assessment Measures 4–7 (U.S.
Int’l Trade Comm’n, Working Paper No. ID-19, 2008), available at http://www.usitc.gov/
publications/332/working_papers/ca-dft-rev-final082008.pdf.
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2. Consider the Characteristics of the Regulatory Standards and the
Regulatory Target
Different types of regulatory standards and environments entail different considerations about the suitability of a third-party program. Particular
characteristics may weigh in favor or against suitability, though they may
not be determinative.
The regulatory standards used in a third-party program should facilitate the objective assessment of conformity. When possible, standards
should be quantitative and the qualities of interest should be measurable. 606
In the absence of objective standards, the risk of unreliability and inconsistency in the determinations of third parties becomes higher. Notably, the
majority of programs surveyed above involve product standards that lend
themselves to objective measurement (e.g. the CPSC program, FDA’s
premarket program, the FCC program, the OSHA program, and the EPA
Energy Star and WaterSense programs).
When noncompliance with the regulatory standard implies significant
risks to health, safety, or other highly valued regulatory interests, a thirdparty program may also be less suitable. Inherently, reliance on third parties
reduces the agency’s control over regulatory implementation. If it is of
paramount importance that a certain negative regulatory outcome be prevented, then the agency should retain full regulatory control. Moreover, if
the risks associated with noncompliance are high, a more complete and
costly conformity assessment system is warranted. At some point, the costs
of operating and overseeing the third-party program may be so high as to
exceed the costs of direct regulatory implementation and enforcement. As
explained by an NIST official, the more control that is needed, the greater
the resources that are required. 607
Along these lines, voluntary regulatory standards established to confer
a marketing label may be more suited to a third-party program than mandatory standards that directly protect public health and safety. Among the
programs surveyed, the NOP, Energy Star, and WaterSense are the best
examples of the former. 608 When a program confers a marketing label, a
failure in the compliance assessment system has a more limited impact than
when a program is established directly to protect health and safety. Of
606.
Hatanaka, supra note 504, at 708 (emphasizing the importance of measurability
and stating that “that which is being audited must be clearly identifiable, that is, it must be
objective in the sense that it is (at least in principle) independently verifiable”).
607.
Telephone Interview with Gordon Gillerman, supra note 110.
608.
The NRTL program similarly confers a label, but it is different in that OSHAregulated workplaces are required to use labeled products and that the label is more related
to health and safety than the other three programs.
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course, the impact may still be significant and there is an important governmental interest in the integrity of the marketing labels that agencies
establish.
The CPSC program and the various FDA programs, in contrast, involve mandatory standards designed to protect public health and safety. In
some ways, this represents the most difficult case for third-party compliance assessment. Notably, these programs were all created directly by
Congress in response to perceived deficiencies in the ability of the responsible agencies to conduct an adequate level of testing or inspections directly.
Relatedly, a third-party program may be more suitable when the standard is a voluntary consensus standard rather than a governmental-unique
standard. In the NRTL program, the standards are all voluntary consensus
standards. However, in the CPSC program, only some of the consensus
standards are voluntary. When the standard is a voluntary consensus standard, private sector bodies may already be familiar with it and have relevant
experience testing or certifying to it. Also, if the standard to be applied in
the program is an international standard, it becomes more likely that regulated entities will be able to utilize a single third-party conformity
assessment process to satisfy multiple regulatory jurisdictions. 609
Finally, when the regulated product or activity (the regulatory target) is
international in scope because of international trade, it may be better suited
to a third-party program. Many of the existing programs have regulatory
targets with significant international dimensions. FDA’s program for food
safety is specifically focused on imported food. Children’s products, medical
devices, telecommunications equipment, electrical equipment, organic food,
and energy- and water-efficient products are all often manufactured in an
international production chain. Third-party programs enable regulatory
agencies to extend their reach outside national borders by incorporating
private actors around the globe. On the other hand, a new challenge arises:
agencies may have difficulty overseeing the private actors operating in other
countries.

609.
An example is provided by ISO 13485, which by its name explicitly sets forth
standards for quality management systems for regulatory purposes. An FDA official explained that ISO 13485 is directly used in the regulation of many other countries and could
become the U.S. regulatory standard in the future. Telephone Interview with David Kalins,
supra note 347. The official further explained that FDA’s current QS regulation is similar in
many ways but demands more evidence that the quality system is being effectively implemented. Id.
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3. Compare the Benefits and Drawbacks o� Third-Party Programs
with Other Approaches
Agencies that are considering third-party compliance assessment programs to achieve regulatory goals should compare this approach with
others. Most importantly, the agency should compare a third-party approach with direct governmental compliance assessment and with requiring
regulated entities to make a self-declaration of compliance.
An evaluation that EPA undertook when it decided not to require
third-party certification of greenhouse gas emissions reports provides a
good example. 610 EPA commissioned a report that evaluated three options:
(1) facility self-certification and third-party verification paid for by the
reporting companies (i.e., third-party certification), (2) facility selfcertification with EPA verification of submitted data (i.e., direct governmental compliance assessment), and (3) facility self-certification with little
or no independent verification of submitted data (i.e., self-declaration of
compliance). 611
There may be situations in which self-declaration can serve the regulatory purpose at hand. 612 Some regulatory programs may involve “[l]ow- to
medium-risk areas in which market mechanisms . . . can mitigate the negative consequences associated with non-compliances before those
consequences are intolerable to society.” 613 Some voluntary regulatory programs that confer marketing labels may fit this description well. However,
if an agency is considering a third-party program, there may have already
been a determination that self-declaration is insufficient. In the Energy
Star program, for example, self-declaration had been used previously and a
GAO audit had revealed that the self-declaration system opened the program to fraud and abuse.
Also, self-declaration with little or no verification is rarely considered
sufficient for mandatory standards that relate to public health and safety.
Indeed, laws to protect health and safety—and their effective enforcement—are often necessary precisely because market mechanisms are
610.
Memorandum from Ruth Mead et al., ERG, to Suzanne Kocchi and Kong Chiu,
U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency Headquarters, Wash., D.C., Review o� Verification Systems in
Environmental Reporting Programs (Feb. 10, 2009) available at http://www.epa.gov/
ghgreporting/documents/pdf/archived/tsd/Verification%20approaches%20memo%20(2-1009)%20Final.pdf [hereinafter EPA Verification System Memo].
611.
Id.
612.
Cf. Johnson, supra note 605, at 29 (stating that businesses prefer self-declaration of
compliance (SDoC), and citing an economist who states that because SDoC “is surely the
cheapest form of conformity assessment, it is to be preferred except when it cannot be
trusted”).
613.
Gillerman, supra note 605605.
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ineffective in protecting against harm. For example, consumers are generally unable to tell if children’s products contain lead or i� food is infected by
salmonella. Environmental protection and other societal interests are similar: consumers cannot tell if a product came from a highly polluting facility
or an unsafe workplace.
As such, the question to be considered becomes whether the agency
should directly assess compliance or rely on third parties. An agency should
consider which would be less costly and which would provide greater benefits. The EPA report, for example, found that setting up a third-party
program would impose significant costs on the agency. 614 Costs would be
incurred in developing the program, approving third parties and training
them, ensuring that conflicts of interest were not present, and performing
ongoing oversight. The report also observed that, even with third-party
certification, the EPA would probably need to develop specialized software
to receive and review the data and accompany third parties on site visits. 615
In EPA’s decision not to require third-party verification, EPA also emphasized that the activities necessary to set up a third-party program would
“slow down implementation of the [greenhouse gas reporting] rule.” 616
Several of the third-party programs reviewed above also suggest that program establishment may be costly and slow. 617
On the other hand, even if there are significant set-up costs, they may
be justified in light of the cost savings or benefits generated in later years.
For example, with its reliance on TCBs, the FCC now oversees the issuance
of more than four times the number of equipment authorizations annually
as it did fifteen years ago with roughly the same number of staff (seven to
ten employees). 618 If the program had not been established, it can be
614.
EPA Verification System Memo, supra note 610, at 26.
615.
Id.
616.
Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases, supra note 502, at 56,283
(“[D]eveloping the third party verification approach would require EPA to establish and
develop emissions verification protocols and a system to qualify and accredit the third party
verifiers, and to develop and administer a process to ensure that verifiers hired by reporting
facilities do not have conflicts of interest. Such a program could require EPA to review
numerous individual conflict of interest screening determinations made each time a reporter
hires a third party verifier. Even i� EPA were to partner with an existing program or organization to accredit verifiers, EPA would still need to develop the criteria and systems
described above to implement this rule and ensure high quality emissions verification given
the unique reporting requirements of this rule. These efforts would slow down implementation of the rule and sharing of data.”).
617.
See generally supra notes 515–29 and accompanying text (on the shrimp aquaculture
pilot) and notes 570–79 and accompanying text (on the FDA AP Inspections program).
618.
Telephone Interview with George Tannahill, supra 390. Between 2000 and 2011,
the number of equipment authorization applications grew from 3,168 to 13,645. In the year
2000, FCC processed 83.5 percent of the applications (2,645 applications). In 2011, FCC

McAllister_to_PDF

Spring 2014]

9/26/2014 9:42 AM

Harnessing Private Regulation

397

expected that more staff would have been hired. Also, even high set-up
costs might be justified if the long-term alternative is not having the program at all. Due to EPA resource constraints, the WaterSense program
might not have been pursued without a third-party approach.
In some situations, set-up costs may not be as high because third parties are already doing similar assessments for other purposes. An agency
may not have to do as much in terms of identifying suitable third parties
and training them. Also, the costs to industry may be lower because they
are already contracting with these third parties. In WaterSense, for example, one of the most important types of products—toilets—was already
often the subject of private conformity assessment. Manufacturers were
engaging third parties to certify that their products met certain operational
standards set by the Canadian government or state and local governments
in the United States. When WaterSense established its third-party program
to assess conformity with water efficiency standards, the existing conformity assessment networks could be leveraged. Similar networks may already
be present in the arena o� food safety due to the prevalence of private conformity assessment. 619
An agency should also consider the different benefits that derive from
either directly verifying compliance or relying on third-party verification.
The outputs of the two approaches differ in ways that may be important.
For example, FDA staff does not view the compliance data acquired
through the AP Inspection Program as equivalent to the compliance data
acquired directly through an FDA inspection of a medical device facility. If
the AP inspection suggests there may be violations, FDA must follow up
with its own inspections to collect the evidence needed for a formal enforcement action. 620 Similarly, in PMAP, FDA’s pilot program for medical
device facility inspections established in coordination with Canada, FDA
found that “the level of detail in the narrative needs to be greater in order
for the regulators to have a more complete picture of the audit/inspection
and the manufacturer’s organization and operation.” 621 The narrative
portion of the auditors’ reports under the PMAP varied in length from
processed only 1.6 percent of applications (218 applications), and TCBs processed the rest
(13,427 applications). Id.
619.
In terms o� food safety and possibly other areas of product safety, it is important
to note that the private conformity assessment processes that exist are often not considered
to be reliable. See supra note 250 and accompanying text. An agency that seeks to incorporate
existing networks into its compliance assessment program would need to be particularly
careful to set third-program rules that enhance the reliability of third-party determinations
and otherwise instill public confidence.
620.
Telephone Interview with David Kalins, supra note 347.
621.
PMAP Report, supra note 344, at 3.
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three to twenty pages, with large variability in the format and level of detail. 622
Direct governmental verification may also enable more consistency in
compliance data and quicker release of data to the public. Rather than adopt
a third-party approach for greenhouse gas emission reporting, EPA decided
to have facilities submit data electronically and to perform a series of automated data checks with follow-up questions to regulated entities and facility
audits as necessary. EPA found that “the combination of comprehensive
electronic review and a flexible and adaptive program of on-site auditing
will enable us to effectively target verification resources while also providing the necessary consistency and quality in the data.” 623 EPA also found
that the direct verification approach would enable it to make data available
to the public more quickly. With third-party verification, three to six
months might be needed for third-party verifiers to perform their verification role, and EPA “would still need to review [the data] and perform
consistency checks after third-party verification was complete.” 624
Third-party verification programs generally have the drawback of adding complexity and principal-agent problems to the regulatory process.
With a third-party program, many decisions must be made about the roles
and responsibilities of new actors, namely certification bodies, testing bodies, and accreditation bodies. The regulatory agency must also assume a new
role in overseeing these actors. The new roles seem likely to make the regulatory framework more complicated, thus potentially hindering public
understanding and participation. Also, the introduction of new actors creates a “principal-agent problem.” A principal-agent problem arises when a
principal (here, the regulatory agency) chooses an agent (the third party) to
act on its behalf. Because the two parties have different interests and the
agent has more information, the principal has difficulty ensuring that the
agent is acting in the principal’s best interest. 625 In third-party programs,
such principal-agent problems are likely to be exacerbated by the fact that
the third parties are not only agents of the regulatory agency but also paid
agents of the regulated entities. 626
622.
Id.
623.
74 Fed. Reg. 56,282 (Oct. 30, 2009).
624.
Id. at 56,283.
625.
See Paul M. Johnson, Agency Problem, in A GLOSSARY OF POLITICAL ECONOMIC
TERMS, http://www.auburn.edu/~johnspm/gloss/agency_problem (last visited Feb. 11, 2014).
626.
See Amy Shapiro, Who Pays the Auditor Calls the Tune?: Auditing Regulation and
Clients’ Incentives, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 1029, 1031 (2005) (arguing that the problem of
auditing in the financial sector is that auditors have two masters and that the law needs to be
written “so that auditors recognize proper incentives and serve only one master, a master
whose own interests are aligned with those of the investing public”).
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4. I� Third-Party Verification Would Be Optional, Evaluate the
Incentives for its Use
If a third-party program is being contemplated in which regulated entities would have the choice of contracting with third parties or being
assessed directly by the agency, the agency should consider whether regulated entities are likely to use the program. The low level of participation in
the AP Inspection Program exemplifies the problem. The FDA invested
significant resources into its establishment, but it was seldom used by industry. 627 While the program offered several incentives for participation,
they were outweighed by a series of disincentives including the cost o�
hiring the third party and the perceived risk that FDA would ultimately
take a harder look at its facility. 628
Agencies should evaluate whether sufficient incentives can be created
for the use of a voluntary third-party program in light of the costs and risks
the program would impose. A program may attract more participation if the
regulated entity is able to avoid paying an agency-assessed user fee if it
contracts with a third party. Another incentive would be provided if the
third-party conformity would satisfy the regulatory requirements of other
jurisdictions in which a manufacturer operates or sells products. This would
generally require a federal agency to coordinate with its counterparts in
other countries to harmonize standards and assessments procedures. In this
vein, the FDA is currently developing a Medical Device Single Audit Program (MDSAP) in coordination with Canada, Brazil, and Australia. 629 The
goal of the program is to enable a single audit/inspection of a medical device manufacturer’s quality management system to satisfy the regulatory
requirements of all the jurisdictions.

B. Establishing a Third-Party Program
1. Calibrate the Third-Party Program to the Level o� Risks
Associated with Noncompliance
An important principle of private third-party conformity assessment is
that the design of the conformity assessment system should be driven by
627.
Cf. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, THIRD PARTIES AND
FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION STAFF: MEDICAL DEVICE ISO 13485:2003 VOLUNTARY
AUDIT REPORT SUBMISSION PILOT PROGRAM 5 (2012) (stating that “FDA has committed
significant resources to creating the AP for Inspections program and continues to maintain
it”). It is worth noting that this program was required by statute.
628.
See generally supra notes 556–562 and accompanying text.
629.
Telephone Interview with Kim Trautman, supra note 345.
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the degree of assurance its user needs. 630 In some cases, a user—such as a
product purchaser—wants some independent assurance of conformity, but
occasional instances of nonconformity will not cause major problems to the
purchaser’s manufacturing process or business interests. The purchaser
might be satisfied with occasional third-party testing of the product. In
other cases, a purchaser may be at risk of incurring high costs due to nonconformity in a purchased product. The purchaser might instead impose a
variety of special requirements on the supplier and require third-party
certification.
The same principle applies in third-party verification programs. If the
risks associated with noncompliance are very high, a third-party program
should be designed to provide a maximal degree of reliability in the determinations by third parties. This could be accomplished in a regulatory
third-party program through accreditation rules that set high standards for
third parties to be accredited, selection rules that carefully guard against
conflicts of interest and the use of subcontractors, performance rules that
require a rigorous and complete set of assessment activities, reporting rules
that furnish ample information about the outcomes of the assessment, and a
full array of governmental oversight and enforcement actions. Such rules
can be expected to enhance the competence and independence of thirdparty activities and thus the reliability of their determinations.
Yet, such rules are also likely to entail high costs for both the regulatory
agency and regulated entities. Such rules may, in some cases, represent an
instance of “over-design” that adds costs to the system and potentially to
the products or processes assessed, without compensating benefits. 631 In
some cases, the regulatory objective can be achieved with less intensive
conformity assessment activities and with third parties who are not trained
as thoroughly as they could be or who are not completely independent.
For example, in several programs detailed above, the agency does not
require that the laboratory that tests products be completely independent of
the manufacturer. Under the CPSC’s rules, manufacturers’ laboratories can
test products if they meet certain “firewalled” criteria. For Energy Star and
WaterSense, products can be tested in a manufacturer’s lab under certain
circumstances. More generally, the programs vary quite a bit in the extent
they have adopted rigorous accreditation, selection, performance, and reporting rules. In some programs, governmental oversight has been sporadic
and little evidence exists of active enforcement of third-party program
rules.

630.
631.

See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
Gillerman, supra note 605.
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It bears emphasis, however, that many types of regulations for which
third-party programs are considered may be in the high-risk category,
where noncompliance implies risks to health, safety, and other valued regulatory goals. For such regulatory purposes, a relatively complete third-party
conformity assessment may indeed be appropriate despite its costs.

2. Incorporate Existing Conformity Assessment Standards and
Activities When Possible
Agencies should strongly consider relying on existing conformity assessment standards and related activities when they establish third-party
programs. 632 Doing so can reduce the costs of the program for both the
regulatory agency and regulated entities. Relevant conformity assessment
standards and activities may be occurring through other governmental
agencies or in the private sector.
Sometimes a new third-party program may be able to rely on another
governmental agency’s conformity assessment activities. During development of the WaterSense program, for example, companies were concerned
that participation in WaterSense would require them to duplicate testing
and reporting required for DOE plumbing standards and the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) appliance labeling standards. 633 In response, the
WaterSense program made its reporting requirements similar or identical to
what manufacturers already had done for DOE and FTC.
Extensive private sector conformity assessment standards and activities
are also available to be incorporated into regulatory third-party programs. 634 Most significantly, as described above, ISO/IEC have developed a
set of international conformity assessment standards, and an international
632.
Cf. NIST Guidance, supra note 592, § 287.4(c) (advising agencies to “[u]se the
results of other governmental agency and private sector organization conformity assessment
activities to enhance the safety and efficacy of proposed new conformity assessment requirements and measures”); id. at § 287.4(�) (advising agencies to “[c]onsider using the
results of other agencies’ conformity assessment procedures”).
633.
WATERSENSE, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, COMMENTS ON THE MAY 2007
DRAFT WATERSENSE CERTIFICATION SCHEME 14 (2007), available at http://www.epa.gov/
WaterSense/docs/cert_scheme_comments508.pdf; cf. EnergyGuide Labeling: FAQs for Appliance Manufacturers, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, http://www.business.ftc.gov/documents
/bus-82-energyguide-labels-faqs (last visited Feb. 11, 2014); Energy Efficiency and Renewable
Energy, Building Technologies Program, U.S. DEP’T ENERGY, http://www1.eere.energy.
gov/buildings/appliance_standards/residential/plumbing_products.html (last visited Feb. 11,
2014).
634.
See NIST Guidance, supra note 592, § 287.4(e) (directing agencies to “[i]dentify
appropriate private sector conformity assessment practices and programs and consider the
results of such practices and/or programs as appropriate in existing regulatory and procurement actions”).
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conformity assessment industry has emerged to conduct related activities. 635
These standards set forth how testing bodies, certification bodies, and accreditation bodies should function.
Regulated entities have expressed a preference for agencies to incorporate private conformity standards and activities rather than creating
“government-unique” conformity assessment. 636 Regulated entities fear that
government-unique standards would be duplicative of private sector conformity assessment activities that they already undertake for business
reasons. They also opine that government-unique conformity assessment
standards “may be expensive to develop and maintain, may impose additional costs on the private sector, and may not be recognized beyond
national boundaries.” 637
Using international standards of conformity assessment enhances the
possibility that the same conformity assessment might serve regulatory
needs in other countries. For example, a federal agency may require that a
certain product be tested by a lab accredited to ISO 17025 for conformity
with a particular safety standard. If another country has the same safety
standard or otherwise considers the U.S. standard equivalent and it respects
the international accreditation of the lab, then the manufacturer may not
need to undertake any further action to legally market its product in that
other country.
A significant way in which an agency can rely on existing conformity
assessment standards and activities is by recognizing private sector accreditation bodies to accredit certification and testing bodies rather than
accrediting them directly. As in some existing programs, an agency may
require that the private accreditation body operate in accordance with
ISO/IEC 17011 and be a member of an international organization like IAF
or ILAC that coordinates a peer-review process to evaluate accreditation

635.
NIST Guidance, supra note 592, § 287.4(d) (directing agencies to “[u]se relevant
guides or standards for conformity assessment practices published by domestic and international standardizing bodies as appropriate in meeting regulatory and procurement
objectives”).
636.
See, e.g., Comments of Air-Conditioning, Heating & Refrigeration Inst. on
Federal Participation in the Development and Use o� Voluntary Consensus Standards and in
Conformity Assessment Activities, (April 26, 2012), at 1, available at https://law.resource.
org/pub/us/cfr/regulations.gov.docket.02/0900006480ffd5af.pdf.
637.
See id. at 3; see also Comments of Am. Nat’l Standards Inst. on Federal Participation in the Development and Use o� Voluntary Consensus Standards and in Conformity
Assessment Activities, (June 1, 2012), at 4, (advocating solutions based on voluntary consensus standards to reduce the costs of compliance for industry) available at http://publica
a.ansi.org/sites/apdl/Documents/Standards%20Activities/Critical%20Issues/FederalRegister_
OMBA119/ANSI%20Response%20OMB-A119_FINAL.pdf.
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bodies for membership. 638 When an agency relies on the ISO/IEC standards for recognition, it avoids having to set all such standards itself. Also, if
the agency requires that the accreditation be a member o� IAF or ILAC,
those organizations conduct periodic assessments of the accreditation body.
If an agency decides to accredit certification bodies directly, it may still
find ISO/IEC 17011 to be useful as a guide for its own accreditation activities. The NOP regulations initially required that the NOP assemble a peer
review panel pursuant to Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) to
evaluate its accreditation procedures. 639 In its 2010 review of the program,
USDA OIG found that the NOP had never established the panel, reportedly due to budget constraints. In response to the OIG report, the NOP
proposed an alternative, namely that it would amend its regulations and
instead develop “a quality management system that complies with the criteria set forth in NIST’s National Voluntary Conformity Assessment
Evaluation program (NVCASE) as well as the requirements o� ISO/IEC
17011:2004.” 640
The FDA’s aquaculture pilot illustrated some of the challenges faced by
agencies that directly accredit certification bodies, particularly in an international context. 641 FDA reports that after it announced the pilot, it
received applications from candidate certification bodies. It found, however,
that the candidate CBs did not reliably submit supporting documentation
in their applications and determining whether CBs were qualified required
a greater investment of resources than it had anticipated. FDA recommended that “in any future program, FDA should be clearer in its expectations
for the amount and type of information needed to adequately evaluate a
firm’s application.” 642
Notably, programs that anticipate reliance on certification bodies in
other countries may be particularly well served by relying on private accreditation bodies. Such accreditation bodies may have more institutional
competence than the agency in dealing with foreign companies and may
even be located in that country or the same region of the world. Of course,
the issue then arises o� how the agency will oversee the foreign activities of
private accreditation bodies and the foreign certification bodies they accredit.

638.
See supra notes 116–18 and accompanying text.
639.
USDA OIG, supra note 531, at 3.
640.
Id. at 19; cf. GRADING & VERIFICATION DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., QUALITY
MANUAL FOR ACCREDITING CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT BODIES (2001), available at
http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSv1.0/getfile?dDocName=STELPRDC5073714.
641.
CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY & APPLIED NUTRITION, supra note 479.
642.
Id. at 7.
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Importantly, when an agency incorporates international standards into
its requirements for certification, testing, or accreditation bodies, it can
supplement those standards in various ways. An agency, for example, may
require that a certification body be accredited by a private accreditation
body to ISO/IEC 17065 and also meet a certain set of requirements specific
to a third-party program. The accreditation body might be given responsibility for assessing conformity with the program-specific requirements, or
the agency might do its own assessment as part of “recognizing” an accredited certification body for participation in the program.
Through these program-specific requirements, the agency can put flesh
on the sometimes bare-bones requirements of the international standard.
For example, ISO/IEC 17065 contains a basic requirement that certification
bodies conduct surveillance of certified companies or products. Through
program-specific requirements for accreditation of the certification body,
the agency could require it to undertake particular types of surveillance
activities at particular times. Similarly, an agency might specify particular
conflict-of-interest rules that supplement ISO/IEC 17065’s general requirement that certification bodies be independent and impartial.

3. Ensure that the Agency and the Public Have Appropriate Access
to Information
Private third-party conformity assessment systems differ from regulatory third-party verification programs in a key respect. In the latter, the
user of the system is ultimately the public, and the regulatory agencies that
establish third-party programs are accountable to the public for their outcomes. As a result, the responsible agency and the public should have access
to a variety of types of information about the operation of the third-party
program.
The public should have access to and input into the procedures by
which a regulatory third-party program is run. The development of program rules and guidance should include public notice and participation.
When agencies incorporate international conformity assessment standards
into their regulatory processes, important concerns arise about the public
availability of those standards. 643 Because ISO/IEC standards are copyright
protected, they are not easily accessible to interested members of the public. ACUS has recommended that when an agency considers “incorporating
copyrighted material by reference, the agency should work with the copyright owner to ensure the material will be reasonably available to regulated
643.
See especially ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE
RECOMMENDATION 2011-5: INCORPORATION BY REFERENCE, supra note 604, at 2, 5–6.
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and other interested parties both during rulemaking and following promulgation.” 644
The public should also have access to certain types of information
about the compliance of regulated entities. If a third-party program replaces
a regulatory compliance program, the same types of information that were
accessible to the public before the implementation of the third-party program should remain accessible after. In some cases, however, it may be
appropriate and desirable to provide additional compliance information to
the public that was not systematically available before the third-party program came into effect.
The public should have access to certain types of information about the
third parties that participate in the regulatory program. The agency should
make clear the roles and identities of the various third-party actors. In
several programs discussed above, Congress has required that agencies
maintain a public list of the private bodies associated with the program.
Other information about the characteristics and activities of the private
bodies may also be important to create public confidence in the integrity of
the third-party program.
For effective oversight, the government agency will also need certain
types of information from accreditation, certification, and testing bodies.
For example, testing and certification bodies might be required to report
potential conflicts of interest before performing the conformity assessment.
They might also be required to report the dates of their conformity assessment activities so that agency officials can conduct a site visit for oversight
purposes. In addition to the positive or adverse determination that is the
ultimate outcome of the conformity assessment process, bodies can be required to submit documents gathered or generated during the process that
explain and support the determination. To the extent that information
required of third parties constitutes confidential business information, it
can be held back from the public in accordance with the Freedom o� Information Act and other applicable laws.
Information disclosure requirements may have the effect of enhancing
the degree to which third-parties answer directly to the agency rather than
just the regulated entity that has contracted it. For example, FSMA requires that accredited labs send their test results directly to the FDA. 645
One commentator has called this “a game-changing requirement” that “alters the whole dynamic between labs and their clients,” making them

644.
645.

Id. at 5.
21 U.S.C. § 350k(b)(2) (2012).
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“directly responsible to the public (i.e., the government) to ensure that
information is disclosed about their client.” 646
Importantly, international conformity assessment standards include
confidentiality provisions that may prevent the flow of information in a
regulatory third-party program. When EPA requested comments on a draft
of its rules for the recognition of accreditation bodies that would accredit
laboratories, it received comments to the effect that several types of information that it initially wanted from the accreditation bodies were contrary
to the confidentiality provisions o� ISO 17011. 647 For example, EPA initially
wanted to be informed of the results o� ILAC’s peer evaluation. After being
informed that such information was against ISO 17011’s confidentiality
rules, EPA struck the requirement. 648
On the same basis, a commenter also objected to EPA’s requirement
that recognized accreditation bodies provide EPA with copies o� laboratory
assessment documentation including corrective action plans and documentation about the resolution of deficiencies. 649 In this case, however, EPA
responded that the release of this information by the AB is an “integral
aspect o� EPA’s recognition of the laboratory” and suggested that the AB
should seek the laboratory’s written consent to share this information with
EPA. 650 EPA’s response also indicates how an agency can use programspecific rules to essentially modify the default confidentiality rules contained in the international standards.
While confidentiality provisions should not hinder the flow of information that is necessary for adequate regulatory oversight and public
accountability, some would argue that certain confidentiality assurances
ultimately serve regulatory goals. For example, the FDA has provoked a
negative reaction from industry by interpreting FSMA to require that an
accredited auditor must immediately notify the FDA if it “discovers a condition that could cause or contribute to a serious risk to the public health”
646.
Daniel R. Dwyer, Third-Party Accreditation under the FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, KKBLOG (Mar. 7, 2012, 5:31 PM), http://www.kkblaw.com/?p=206&
option=com_wordpress&Itemid=5.
647.
See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ENERGY STAR COMMENTS MATRIX 2, http://w
ww.energystar.gov/ia/partners/downloads/mou/AB_Comment_Matrix.pdf (last visited Feb.
12, 2014) (providing matrix that summarizes comments on the condition and criteria for
recognition of accreditation bodies for Energy Star laboratory recognition); see also Stakeholder Comments on the Enhanced Program Plan for ENERGY STAR Products, ENERGY STAR,
http://www.energystar.gov/index.cfm?c=partners.intro_conf_calls#accred (last visited Feb.
12, 2014) (listing of stakeholder comments on draft accreditation body requirements).
648.
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ENERGY STAR COMMENTS MATRIX, supra note 647,
at 2.
649.
Id. at 3.
650.
Id.
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during either a regulatory or a consultative audit. 651 As stated by one industry commenter, “[w]e disagree with this interpretation of the FSMA and
maintain that such a position could undermine the purpose of the law,
ultimately dissuading manufacturers from using third party auditors—a
move that could negatively impact food safety and hinder FDA’s efforts to
efficiently use its own resources.” 652 Agencies should consider pros and cons
o� limiting the types of confidentiality that regulated entities expect when
they contract privately with third parties.
IT can play an important role in enabling the flow of information in a
third-party program. Regulated entities, third-party conformity assessment
bodies, and accreditation bodies can be required to e-report certain types of
information. Also, with well-administered IT systems, information that
should be public can be more promptly made public. In its shrimp aquaculture pilot, the FDA made a special note of the need for new “IT data
systems to capture and report on results of assessments and audits.” 653
In sum, a change in the “communicative energy” of third-party conformity assessment is required in a regulatory context. 654 The default in the
private sector is for the third party to disclose his audit report exclusively to
his client. 655 If interested parties external to the contractual relationship are
privy to the audit’s results at all, they are likely to be told little more than
whether the subject of the audit conformed or not. 656 For an assessment to
serve public regulatory purposes, much richer information about its process
and outcomes is necessary. 657

4. Commit to Undertaking Appropriate Oversight Activities
When an agency establishes a regulatory third-party program, its role
often changes from being the inspector to overseeing the inspectors. 658
Governmental oversight of third-party programs is essential to ensure that
651.
21 U.S.C. § 384d(c)(4)(A) (2012); see also Imports, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/food/guidanceregulation/fsma/ucm257980.htm (last updated Aug. 19,
2013) (answering in the affirmative the question, “I.4.2 Is the accredited auditor required to
notify the FDA if a condition of concern is found during a consultative audit?”).
652.
Comments o� Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n on U.S. Food & Drug Admin. Food Safety
Modernization Act Import Provisions Rulemaking, Docket Nos. FDA-2011-N-0143 to -45,
(Apr. 28, 2011), at 3, available at http://www.idfa.org/files/IDFA_FSMA_Import_Com
ments_042811.pdf.
653.
CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY & APPLIED NUTRITION, supra note 479, at 26.
654.
Christine Parker, Regulator-Required Corporate Compliance Program Audits, 25 LAW
& POL’Y 221, 235–36 (2003).
655.
See id. at 235.
656.
See id.
657.
Id. at 236.
658.
Martin Shapiro, WHO GUARDS THE GUARDIANS? (1988).

McAllister_to_PDF

408

9/26/2014 9:42 AM

Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law

[Vol. 3:2

they are fulfilling their regulatory purposes. In addition to exercising direct
oversight, an agency can also require third parties to conduct and report
surveillance activities that provide additional information to the agency
about program operation.
For a successful third-party program, a regulatory agency must implement and enforce the rules it establishes for associated accreditation and
conformity assessment bodies. In principal, many of the same enforcement
strategies and tools would apply in enforcing third-party program rules as
apply in enforcing other regulatory rules. The agency can require certain
types of reporting, conduct inspections to verify compliance, and impose
sanctions for noncompliance. One important sanction would be the removal
of a noncompliant accreditation or conformity assessment from the program.
An agency should determine in advance how it intends to conduct oversight. The agency may decide, for example, that it will assess the
performance of accreditation bodies every few years, that it will conduct a
certain number of audits of accreditations or certifications, or that it will
carry out a market surveillance program that will test a certain number of
products off the shelf each year. Special program rules may be necessary to
ensure an oversight activity. In the shrimp aquaculture pilot, for example,
FDA found that entities subject to certification were not always willing to
allow an FDA official to accompany the certification body on a site visit.
FDA concluded that it should “[c]onsider requiring, as a condition for
accreditation, that CBs maintain agreements with establishments they
certify to allow FDA to monitor or otherwise participate in certification
audits as necessary.” 659
The agency should also retain direct enforcement authority over regulated entities, which could be used when the agency discovers through the
third-party program or otherwise that a regulated entity is out of compliance. In the NOP program, for example, AMS uses its traditional
enforcement powers to respond to situations where organic operations
knowingly market nonorganic food as organic. 660 Its enforcement actions
play “a central role in maintaining the validity of the program and ensuring
public trust” in the label. 661
As in traditional regulatory programs, agencies should be equipped to
receive and respond to information about potential noncompliance from the
public. In an investigation of the NOP program, the USDA OIG found
that “NOP officials did not have adequate procedures or a system for track659.
660.
661.

CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY & APPLIED NUTRITION, supra note 479, at 21.
USDA OIG, supra note 531, at 8.
Id. at 8.
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ing the receipt, review, and disposition of complaints and any subsequent
enforcement actions.” 662 When third parties have played a role in assessing
compliance, the agency might be able to direct a public complaint to the
relevant third-party body for an initial investigation. The agency, however,
would remain ultimately responsible for ensuring that the complaint was
resolved. The agency could also require that employees of accreditation
bodies and conformity assessment bodies be given information about how
to anonymously contact an official within the regulatory agency to report
any potential problems.
The agency may require accreditation bodies and conformity assessment bodies to undertake certain activities that provide information for
oversight purposes. For example, accreditation bodies may be required to
conduct periodic audits of the certification bodies they accredit. Certification bodies may be required to conduct surveillance audits of the entities
and products they certify. 663 In either, the agency might also require that
some or all of the audits be unannounced rather than announced. 664 In its
investigation of the NOP’s organic milk program, the OIG found that
certifying agents were not performing unannounced inspections of organic
dairy operations. 665 While unannounced inspections are not required by
NOP regulations, OIG and other stakeholders consider them to play a
“critical role” in ensuring compliance. 666 Notably, if the rules of a thirdparty program do not require unannounced audits, accreditation and certification bodies will have little incentive to do them for fear of offending
clients. Unannounced audits o� facilities can be facilitated by requiring
regulated entities to agree to them as a condition of certification.

662.
Id. at 1.
663.
Energy Star requires CBs to operate a partner-funded verification testing program to ensure products meet Energy Star standards. DEPT. OF ENERGY, ENERGY STAR
APPLIANCE VERIFICATION TESTING – PILOT PROGRAM SUMMARY REPORT 22 (2012),
available at http://www1.eere.energy.gov/buildings/appliance_standards/pdfs/energystar_
pilotprogram_report_02_03_12.pdf.
664.
See Albersmeier et al., supra note 102, at 933 tbl.5 (showing that a superior riskoriented approach includes “[r]andomly chosen audits without announcement” rather than
“regular audits with announcements”).
665.
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., AGRICULTURAL
MARKETING SERVICE: NATIONAL ORGANIC PROGRAM—ORGANIC MILK 16-17 (2012),
available at http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/01601-0001-Te.pdf?utm_source=Organic+Mil
k+Audit+Report+Published&utm_campaign=Organic+milk+audit+report&utm_medium=em
ail.
666.
Id. at 17.
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CONCLUSION
Private regulation is pervasive. In a variety of contexts, private actors
create, implement, and enforce rules that serve the traditional social goals
of public regulation. This Article examines how these private actors and
their work might be harnessed to build more effective regulatory regimes.
After providing an overview o� how private regulators perform the classic
functions of regulation—standard setting, implementation, and enforcement—the first part of the Article focused on several forms o� harnessing
private regulation, namely the incorporation of private standards, the public
endorsement of self-regulation, and third-party verification.
Having situated third-party verification in this broad context, the Article proceeded to describe and analyze the use of third-party verification by
a diverse set o� federal agencies responsible for health, safety, and environmental protection. Eight third-party programs established by six federal
agencies are described with attention to the goals of the regulatory program, the authorizing laws and regulations, the roles and responsibilities of
the third parties, and provisions for agency oversight. In doing so, the Article shows how the exercise of public and private authority is interwoven
when federal agencies develop programs that enable private third-parties to
assume primary responsibility for compliance monitoring and assessment.
The rich empirical information provided in the second part of the Article allows for the construction of a set of metrics of success in the third part
and recommendations in the fourth part. As two scholars of private regulation recently explained, while there are many political forces pushing
policymakers to prefer private regulation, there is “little or no guidance
being given to policymakers about when, and under what circumstances
[private regulatory schemes] can prove viable from a public policy perspective.” 667 They further observed that “public bodies seem to have developed
no means to design collaborative forms [to] control the evolution of public/private governance.” 668 The metrics and recommendations for thirdparty verification answer this call for policy analysis and advice, enabling a
much greater understanding of when and how third-party conformity assessment can be used for public regulatory purposes.
Private regulation and attempts to harness it are likely to grow as government resources continue to fall short in fulfilling regulatory needs. This
Article suggests that there is both promise and peril in harnessing private
regulation. Third-party verification, in particular, seems likely to increase
the comprehensiveness and reliability of safety testing in various regulatory
667.
668.

Cafaggi & Renda, supra note 144, at abstract.
Id. at 3.
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contexts, particularly when regulated products are produced in international
commodity chains. It also seems much more reliable than self-declaration to
create trustworthy governmental labels for consumer products.
Yet Congress and agencies should tread carefully. They need to identify
the contexts that are amenable to harnessing and establish third-party programs that keep “non-governmental regulators committed to public
purpose.” 669 As shown in this Article, not all programs have been successful,
and public regulators will benefit greatly by understanding what has worked
well and what has not. Perhaps most importantly, public regulators must
have the resources and will to exercise serious and consistent oversight once
a program is in place. 670 Ensuring that public regulatory objectives are met
remains their responsibility.

669.
670.

Balleisen, supra note 134, at 481.
Balleisen & Eisner, supra note 34, at 147.
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APPENDIX

ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE
RECOMMENDATION 2012-7
Agency Use of Third-Party Programs to Assess Regulatory Compliance
Adopted December 6, 2012
Federal agencies in diverse areas have developed third-party programs
to assess whether regulated entities are in compliance with regulatory
standards and other requirements. Through these programs, third parties
assess the safety of imported food, children’s products, medical devices, cell
phones and other telecommunications equipment, and electrical equipment
used in workplaces. Third parties also ensure that products labeled as organic, energy-efficient, and water-efficient meet applicable federal
standards. In these regulatory third-party programs, regulated entities
generally contract with and pay third parties to carry out product testing,
facility inspections, and other regulatory compliance assessment activities in
the place of regulatory agencies. Regulatory agencies then adopt new roles
in coordinating and overseeing these third-parties. 1
In some areas of regulation, Congress has directed federal agencies to
develop a third-party program; in others, regulatory agencies have developed programs under existing statutory authority. A third-party program is
just one of many regulatory approaches that Congress and agencies may
adopt. 2 Regulatory objectives may, for example, be adequately met by requiring regulated entities to self-assess and report their compliance
(sometimes referred to as “first-party certification”). Also, statutory restrictions on information disclosure or other legal restrictions may preclude
an agency from using third parties to conduct inspections and other compliance assessment activities. Some compliance assessment activities may be

1.
Agencies may use third parties in connection with regulatory, procurement, and
federal assistance programs. This recommendation addresses use of third parties in regulatory programs.
2.
The Administrative Conference has addressed various approaches in prior recommendations. See, e.g., Recommendation 94-1, The Use of Audited Self-Regulation as a
Regulatory Technique, 59 Fed. Reg. 44,701 (Aug. 30, 1994); Recommendation 89-1, Peer
Review and Sanctions in the Medicare Program, 54 Fed. Reg. 28,965 (Jul. 10, 1989); Recommendation 78-4, Federal Agency Interaction with Private Standard-Setting
Organizations, 44 Fed. Reg. 1357 (Jan. 5, 1979).
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inherently governmental, and thus require performance by government
personnel. 3
Several broad reasons support the growing use of third-party programs
in federal regulation. In many areas, federal regulatory agencies are faced
with assuring the compliance of an increasing number of entities and products without a corresponding growth in agency resources. Third-party
programs may leverage private resources and expertise in ways that make
regulation more effective and less costly. In comparison with other regulatory approaches, third-party programs may also enable more frequent
compliance assessment and more complete and reliable compliance data.
Because agencies can authorize third parties located in other countries to
undertake assessment activities, third-party programs may be particularly
effective when regulated products or processes are international in scope.
Regulatory third-party programs raise a host of important questions.
Because third-party programs represent a partial privatization of the public
function of implementing and enforcing regulatory law, they are a form of
“public-private governance,” in which private actors play roles that are
traditionally viewed as governmental in nature. 4 While third-party programs may increase regulatory compliance or otherwise improve the
performance of regulated entities and products, these programs also pose
risks. 5 If they are not well-conceived and well-operated, they may both
undermine the achievement of regulatory goals and impose unnecessary
costs on agencies and regulated entities.
Frequently, regulatory third-party programs use the practices and terminology of a conformity assessment framework that has been developed
by international private-sector standards organizations. “Conformity assessment” is defined in international standards as the “demonstration that
specified requirements relating to a product, process, system, person, or
body are fulfilled.” 6 International standards also set forth how the organiza3.
4.

Office o� Mgmt. & Budget, OMB Circular No. A-76 (Revised May 29, 2003).
See William J. Novak, Public-Private Governance: A Historical Introduction, in
GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (Freeman and
Minow, eds., Harvard University Press, 2009); Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for the New Religion, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1229, 1230 (2002-2003); Jody
Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms through Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1286-87
(2002-2003); Jody Freeman, Private Parties, Public Functions and the New Administrative Law,
in RECRAFTING THE RULE OF LAW: THE LIMITS OF LEGAL ORDER 331 (David Dyzenhaus
ed., Hart, 1999).
5.
See Lesley K. McAllister, Regulation by Third-Party Verification, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1
(2012).
6.
American National Standards Institute (ANSI), National Conformity Assessment
Principles for the United States, 3, available at http://publicaa.ansi.org/sites/apdl/Documents
/News%20and%20Publications/Brochures/NCAP%20second%20edition.pdf.
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tions that conduct conformity assessment – “conformity assessment bodies,”
which are usually private organizations – should operate. International
standards have been developed for various types of conformity assessment
bodies, including testing bodies, certification bodies, and inspection bodies.
Recognizing the assessment of regulatory compliance as a form of conformity assessment, many federal agencies that have established third-party
programs have relied on conformity assessment standards and bodies.
Agencies may require, for example, that third parties that certify conformity with regulatory requirements operate in accordance with the
international standards for certification bodies. Federal agencies may also
require that the third parties be accredited by accreditation bodies that
operate in accordance with international accreditation standards. Accreditation bodies are established in many countries, and they may be either
private or governmental.
Agencies that establish third-party programs generally cannot or do not
delegate their regulatory authority to conformity assessment bodies. Rather,
agencies authorize conformity assessment bodies to perform certain technical tasks to assess conformity, and regulatory agencies rely on these
assessments in their own enforcement of regulatory requirements. The goal
is to leverage private expertise and resources to serve regulatory objectives.
Because the regulatory agency must remain ultimately responsible for
achieving regulatory objectives, it is vital to provide public oversight of
third-party assessment activities.
A key resource for agencies considering a regulatory third-party program is the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), which
has the responsibility under the National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995 to coordinate government conformity assessment
activities with similar activities of private-sector entities, with the goal of
avoiding unnecessary duplication and complexity. Following Office o�
Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-119, NIST published guidance
in 2000 for federal agencies on conformity assessment activities. 7 NIST: (1)
provides advice, solutions, and program support for development of technical standards and conformity assessment programs to support agency
missions; and (2) develops and conducts customized standards-related
workshops and educational events for government.
Recognizing the growing use of third parties and the issues it raises, the
Administrative Conference makes this recommendation to assist federal
agencies in determining whether and how to establish third-party programs
to assess regulatory compliance. The recommendation first suggests that,
7.
OMB Circular A-119 Revised §§ 8, 13(e) (Feb. 10, 1998); NIST, Guidance on
Federal Conformity Assessment Activities, 65 Fed. Reg. 48,894 (Aug. 10, 2000).

McAllister_to_PDF

Spring 2014]

9/26/2014 9:42 AM

Harnessing Private Regulation

415

when considering a third-party program, agencies should consult relevant
governmental and nongovernmental resources. Next, agencies should compare the advantages and disadvantages of a third-party approach to a more
traditional approach of direct governmental compliance assessment. Also, if
an agency is considering a program in which regulated entities could choose
whether to contract with a third party for regulatory compliance assessment, it should first determine that regulated entities will have sufficient
incentives to choose to contract with a third party.
The recommendation then sets forth considerations for agencies after
they have decided to establish a third-party program. An agency should
design conformity assessment programs to be proportional to the risks
associated with regulatory noncompliance. When regulatory noncompliance
implies serious risk to public health, safety, or other important values,
third-party program rules should guarantee a high degree of rigor and
independence. When possible, the agency should incorporate existing conformity assessment standards, which may avoid unnecessary duplication and
create efficiencies for both agencies and regulated entities. The agency
should also ensure appropriate government and public access to information
about program operation. Finally, the agency should undertake appropriate
oversight activities to ensure that the third-party program fulfills its regulatory purpose.

RECOMMENDATION
A. Considerations for a Federal Agency When Deciding Whether to Develop a Third-Party Program to Assess Regulatory Compliance
1. Resources. When considering whether to develop a third-party program to assess regulatory compliance, the agency should consult
governmental and non-governmental resources relating to third-party conformity assessment, as appropriate. These include, but are not limited to,
the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST); private conformity assessment standards, particularly the standards of the International
Organization for Standardization (ISO); and conformity assessment bodies,
for practical input on feasibility and the impacts on the regulated entities.
2. Compare Regulatory Approaches. The agency should compare a thirdparty approach with direct governmental assessment of compliance. In
choosing between them, the agency should evaluate the advantages and
disadvantages of these approaches, with consideration of:
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(a) whether third-party conformity assessment is likely to be effective
in practice and as a technical matter for the applicable regulatory standards
and context;
(b) the costs and potential delay that may result from developing and
establishing a third-party program;
(c) the capacity of the agency to perform effective oversight and its related costs;
(d) the potential for the agency to achieve efficiencies through reducing its direct compliance assessment costs and resource needs;
(e) the costs to regulated entities of paying third parties to perform
conformity assessment activities, which are likely to be of particular concern
to small businesses;
(�) the potential for development of a well-functioning market in
third-party conformity assessment services; and
(g) the benefits that may accrue to regulated entities by, for example,
receiving regulatory approval to market their products more quickly or
simultaneously satisfying the regulatory requirements of other agencies to
which they are subject, including state agencies or agencies in other countries. (See Administrative Conference of the United States,
Recommendation 2011-6, International Regulatory Cooperation, 77 Fed.
Reg. 2257, 2259 (Jan. 17, 2012); Exec. Order 13,609 (May 1, 2012); Exec.
Order 13,563 (Jan. 18, 2011)).
3. Evaluate Incentives. If an agency is contemplating a third-party program in which regulated entities would have the choice of either contracting
with third parties or being assessed directly by the agency, the agency
should evaluate whether sufficient incentives exist or can be created to
attract the participation of regulated entities in the third-party program.
Incentives for regulated entities to utilize third parties may include:
(a) exemption from a governmental fee that would otherwise be applicable; or
(b) the ability to satisfy the regulatory requirements of multiple jurisdictions through a single third-party conformity assessment engagement.

B. Considerations for a Federal Agency When Establishing a Third-Party
Program to Assess Regulatory Compliance
4. Proportionality to the Risk. An agency that has decided to establish a
third-party program to assess regulatory compliance, or is directed by statute or other provision o� law to do so, should design its conformity
assessment program to be proportional to the risks associated with regulato-
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ry noncompliance. When the risks are high, a conformity assessment program should be characterized by high degrees of rigor and independence.
When the risks associated with noncompliance are lower, the regulatory
objective may be achievable with less rigor and independence. Types of
rules that may be established by the agency to help ensure rigor and independence include:
(a) accreditation rules that set high standards of competence for the
accreditation of third parties;
(b) selection rules that pertain to how regulated entities select third
parties, requiring, for example, that third parties disclose conflicts of interests or that regulated entities contract with a different third party after a
specified number of assessments;
(c) performance rules that require third parties to perform a rigorous
set of assessment activities; and
(d) reporting rules that require third parties to provide sufficient information to the agency and the public about the process and outcomes of
assessment activities.
5. Use of Existing Conformity Assessment Standards. The agency should
consider relying on existing conformity assessment standards, particularly
international standards that set forth requirements for conformity assessment and accreditation bodies. Incorporating existing standards may
reduce costs for the agency and for the regulated entities. To evaluate the
suitability of using existing standards, the agency should take into account
the following considerations:
(a) When an agency incorporates existing conformity assessment
standards into its program requirements, important concerns may arise
about the public availability of those standards due to the costs of obtaining
copyrighted materials. When an agency considers incorporating copyrighted material by reference, the agency should be cognizant of issues relating
to incorporation by reference. (See Administrative Conference of the United States, Recommendation 2011-5, Incorporation by Reference, 77 Fed.
Reg. 2257 (Jan. 17, 2012));
(b) An agency that anticipates the use of conformity assessment bodies
in other countries may particularly benefit by recognizing accreditation
bodies that operate in accordance with international standards rather than
the agency itself accrediting conformity assessment bodies;
(c) When an agency incorporates existing standards into its requirements for third parties, it can supplement those standards with programspecific rules. An agency may require, for example, that in addition to
being accredited to an international standard, a conformity assessment body
must satisfy accreditation rules specific to the third-party program; and

McAllister_to_PDF

418

9/26/2014 9:42 AM

Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law

[Vol. 3:2

(d) Agencies should also be aware that existing conformity assessment
standards may include confidentiality provisions that apply to information
collected during the assessment. Agencies should consider when disclosure
to agencies and/or the public is necessary and when confidentiality may be
justified. Program-specific reporting rules, as discussed in section 6 below,
may be necessary to enable appropriate governmental or public access to
such information.
6. Access to Information. The agency should ensure that both the government and the public will have appropriate access to information about
program operations. An agency’s development of third-party program
rules and guidance should include notice and an opportunity for public
participation. Also, the agency should provide information to the public
about the roles and identities of the third parties associated with a regulatory program. Finally, the agency should establish reporting rules that
require third parties to provide information to the agency based on the
following considerations:
(a) The reporting rules should facilitate transparency. Information
about the compliance of regulated entities should be available from the
agency to the public, comparable to what would be available in the absence
of a third-party program. Agencies may also be able to provide additional
compliance information to the public that was not available before the
third-party program;
(b) The reporting rules should facilitate appropriate agency oversight.
For example, conformity assessment bodies can be required to report to the
agency potential conflicts of interest before performing a conformity assessment, or provide the dates of their assessment activities so that the
agency can conduct site visits;
(c) In certain circumstances, the agency might have reporting rules
that require conformity assessment bodies to send assessment results directly to the agency; and
(d) The agency might require conformity assessment bodies and/or
regulated entities to report electronically, which may facilitate the provision
of information to the public.
7. Agency Oversight. The agency has a duty to exercise oversight to ensure that the third-party program is fulfilling its regulatory purpose. An
agency should generally set forth how it intends to conduct such oversight.
For example, it may annually audit a certain number of accreditations or
conformity assessments, or carry out a market surveillance program to test
regulated products off-the-shelf. In exercising oversight, the agency should
also take into account the following considerations:
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(a) Beyond conducting direct oversight, an agency can require third
parties to conduct additional assessment activities that provide further
information to the agency about program operation. For example, an agency may require accreditation bodies annually to audit a certain number of
conformity assessments, or it may require conformity assessment bodies to
conduct particular types of surveillance on products they assess;
(b) The agency should establish procedures for receiving and responding to public complaints regarding potential noncompliance or other aspects
of program operation. The agency could, for example, require a third party
that has assessed the conformity of a regulated product or entity to investigate a complaint of noncompliance. In any event, the agency should ensure
that complaints are resolved in an appropriate and timely manner; and
(c) The agency should make clear the possible adverse actions that it
may take against third parties that do not comply with program rules. A
key adverse action is removing third parties from the program. Third parties may be removed temporarily through a suspension of accreditation, or
permanently through a withdrawal of accreditation.
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